The role of regret and responsibility in decision-making by Nicolle, A.L.
  
 
 
 
The role of regret and responsibility in 
decision-making 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
by 
 
Antoinette Laura Nicolle 
UCL 2010 
 
 
 
  
  
This work was carried out under the primary supervision of Professor Raymond J. 
Dolan and secondary supervision of Professor Jon Driver. The work was funded by a 
Prize Studentship Award from the Brain Research Trust. 
 
I, Antoinette Nicolle, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. 
Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been 
indicated in the thesis. 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
  
  
Abstract 
Regret is a cognitively mediated, multifaceted emotion engendered by 
thoughts of how things might have been better had we behaved differently. The 
causes, experience and behavioural impact of regret have been widely studied by 
psychologists. However, research into the neural basis of regret has been motivated 
primarily by economic approaches, which often reduce regret to such a simplistic 
construct that it loses many of its interesting qualities. This thesis attempts to build a 
bridge between recent functional imaging studies of regret and a more established 
psychological literature that addresses the subjective content and motivational 
impacts of regret. The thesis aims to provide a deeper understanding of the 
experience of regret, the factors necessary for it to be elicited, and its behavioural 
impact. Using functional imaging, I also provide new insights into the neural 
mechanisms underlying each of these levels.  
In the first two studies, I provide evidence for a key role of responsibility in 
the experience and neuronal representation of regret, and in the efficacy of learning 
and decision-making more generally. In three further studies, I explore the immediate 
motivational impact of the experience of regret, and contrast findings with 
conventional models that address the impact of anticipated regret on choice. 
Specifically, I provide evidence that experienced regret encourages decision inertia, a 
bias to repeat, rather than avoid, a previous choice. These studies indicate that 
conventional models of the experiential content of regret, and its motivational effect, 
traditionally employed by economists and cognitive neuroscientists alike, do not 
provide a full description of behavioural responses to regret. I go on to consider 
multiple motivational effects of regret, including those (not always beneficial) 
responses through which individuals tend to manage and regulate aversive emotions.  
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“Make the most of your regrets; never smother your sorrow, but tend and cherish it 
till it comes to have a separate and integral interest. To regret deeply is to live 
afresh.” 
 
Thoreau (1893). The writings of Henry David Thoreau. Houghton, Mifflin and 
company. p.260 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 What is regret?  
Regret is, above all else, an aversive experience that we are motivated to 
avoid. So unpleasant is the feeling of regret that people will pay money to avoid 
receiving information likely to induce it (Bell, 1982; Larrick & Boles, 1995), even if 
this risks reduced learning from mistakes and greater regret in the long-term (Reb & 
Connolly, 2009). The Dutch Postcode Lottery takes full advantage of our aversion to 
regret-inducing information. Here, non-participating individuals will discover if they 
would have won had they played, and must contend with the possibility of being the 
only person on their street not to have shared a jackpot. The anticipated regret this 
elicits boosts participation in the lottery (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). However, as 
painful as they may be, our regrets can guide us to make better decisions, and help us 
atone for past mistakes. As posited in the quotation opening this thesis, we may 
benefit hugely from making the most of our regrets though, in order to take full 
advantage of them, we must first accept (and face) the aversive feeling they elicit. 
For psychologists, economists, cognitive neuroscientists and consumer 
decision theorists, regret is of special interest for empirical study on several grounds. 
Firstly, its genesis and the content of its experience depends upon a complex set of 
cognitive processes, drawing on memory, causal inference, inductive reasoning, 
social and personal norms and beliefs. As such, regret has been termed an “unusually 
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cognitively-laden or cognitively-determined emotion”, while at the same time being 
“typically loaded with feeling and therefore qualifies as a true emotion” (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1995, p. 379). Moreover, regret is thought to have a special involvement in 
learning and decision-making. I begin this thesis with an introduction to the unique 
antecedents, experiential content and motivational impact of regret. 
The critical precursor of regret is knowledge that something might have been 
better had we acted differently. Such cognition is a form of counterfactual thinking, 
by which an experienced reality is compared against one that „might have been‟ in a 
different state of the world. Counterfactual thinking requires a level of cognitive 
maturity, developing only between the ages of 5-7 years (Guttentag & Ferrell, 2004; 
Weisberg & Beck, 2010). Roese & Olson (1995) propose a two-stage model of 
counterfactual comparison, whereby the various possible states of the world are first 
activated (or made available) for consideration, and second the content of the 
comparison with the actual state of the world is determined. The authors argue that 
the mutability of the environment and the motivation of the individual will determine 
both the availability and content of counterfactual thought. While counterfactual 
thinking is a cognitive process, emotions can be a consequence of such cognition. 
Which emotion is induced depends upon the content and structure of the 
counterfactual, with other factors also influencing its intensity. 
Firstly, counterfactual comparisons vary in their direction. While upward 
counterfactuals are thoughts that something could have been better and tend to 
induce negative emotions, downward counterfactuals are thoughts that something 
could have been worse and tend to elicit positive emotions. Upward counterfactuals 
are more likely to be generated when an individual perceives themselves as losing 
(Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993). Although resulting in lower 
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outcome satisfaction, these upward counterfactuals have strong motivational 
implications. Indeed, more upward counterfactuals are generated when individuals 
expect to be able to use such information to improve future circumstances (Markman 
et al., 1993). This also invokes the notion that the availability and content of 
counterfactuals depend upon the sense of control one has over the environment, such 
that upward counterfactuals are deemed less useful when future steps will not lead to 
a better outcome (Roese & Olson, 1995b). Conversely, downward counterfactuals 
have a more affective role, enhancing current feelings of esteem and wellbeing. 
However, they also have less (or a different) impact on subsequent behaviour. 
Upward counterfactual thinking alone is not sufficient to induce regret. 
Counterfactual thoughts also vary in the object of comparison. Outcomes that could 
have been better from the same choice, but under a different state of the world, tend 
to invite within-option counterfactual thoughts (i.e. comparing an experienced 
outcome against what was expected from the same choice). This form of 
counterfactual thinking tends to induce feelings of disappointment, rather than regret, 
since our own action is irrelevant. Outcomes that could have been better from a 
different choice, on the other hand, tend to invoke between-option counterfactual 
comparisons, and induce feelings of regret (Roese & Olson, 1995a; Zeelenberg, van 
Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). The result of these distinct counterfactual 
activations is that regret and disappointment differ in their experiential content and 
motivational effect (Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998). I will 
further discuss this emotional specificity of regret in section 1.2 below.  
The emphasis on our bad decisions, or between-option upwards 
counterfactuals, invokes the notion that regret depends upon feeling responsible, 
while disappointment does not. Responsibility may amplify feelings of regret 
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induced from such counterfactual thinking, while also increasing the tendency to 
consider between-option, rather than within-option, comparisons. Indeed, evidence 
points to regret being dependent on a personal sense of blame or responsibility 
(Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994,  study 4; 
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 1998). Zeelenberg 
and colleagues found that, when judging the regret experienced by students who 
switched courses only to find that the new course was worse than the original one, 
participants tended to rate a student as experiencing greater regret if they themselves 
chose to switch, compared to if a computer randomly reassigned them. Whether 
responsibility is necessary for regret or whether it only amplifies the feeling of regret 
has been heavily debated (see Connolly, Ordónez, & Coughlan, 1997; Ordónez & 
Connolly, 2000; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000 for a thorough 
review and discussion). In an attempt to resolve this debate, Connolly & Zeelenberg 
(2002) proposed two core components of regret as 1) the upwards, between-option 
counterfactual comparison, which they term „outcome regret‟ and 2) an intense 
feeling of responsibility and self-blame, which is based on the justifiability of the 
decision or decision process (see also Connolly & Butler, 2006; Connolly & Reb, 
2005). „Outcome regret‟ has been the basis for computing regret in economic 
theories (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), and in patient and neuroimaging 
studies (e.g. Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005). Both experienced and 
anticipated outcome regret have been shown to depend upon feedback of a better 
between-option alternative (e.g. Boles & Messick, 1995; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; 
Ritov & Baron, 1995). The behavioural impact of regret also depends on such 
feedback, as shown by the aforementioned Dutch Postcode Lottery example describe 
previously (Zeelenberg, Beattie, Van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; Zeelenberg, 1999). 
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A study of the neural basis of regret (Coricelli et al., 2005) has addressed the 
factor of responsibility, showing that ventral striatum responses to absolute losses 
and gains depend on agency over choice. However, it is unknown whether this effect 
extends to responses to outcomes that are better or worse than what might have been 
(i.e. gains and losses relative to a counterfactual reference point). This would be a 
better indicator of the role of responsibility in how the brain processes regret. 
Moreover, feelings of self-blame for a bad outcome involves more than simple 
agency over a choice, depending also on how justified we believe we were in a 
decision in relation to personal and social norms (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
Subtle variations in the internal attribution of responsibility will likely result in 
noticeable differences in the intensity of regret. The ability to adapt our behaviour 
appropriately after past mistakes may also depend on our understanding (and 
accepting) to what extent our actions have directly contributed towards the bad 
outcome. In other words, responsibility may determine our capacity to learn the 
consequences of our actions. Risk preference, loss-aversion, or effort in a decision 
may also be moderated by the responsibility an individual accepts for its outcome. 
One of the major aims of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of this self-
blame component of regret. 
Upward, between-option counterfactuals are arguably necessary for the 
feeling of regret to be elicited. As a result, much research has assumed that these are 
also sufficient, and only rarely do they explicitly include other factors, such as self-
blame, in the equation. Gilovich & Medvec (1995) write that,  
“Unfortunately, economic theorists have defined or operationalized regret so 
narrowly that the applicability of their work is more limited than perhaps it could 
be.” (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995, p. 380)  
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The psychological literature, on the other hand, supplies other factors that can 
influence the intensity of regret and, in some cases, could conceivably avoid it 
altogether. These include distance in value between the actual reality and the better 
possible alternative (relative value); the number of antecedent events that would need 
to be mutated in order to reach the better alternative (closeness); how easily one 
could mutate these antecedents (controllability); the degree to which one can be held 
responsible, or accountable, for the antecedent decisions; and the degree to which 
one believes the antecedent decisions were justifiable at the time they were made. 
Other factors influencing the saliency of the decision process may also modify the 
intensity of regret, including external context, and social and personal norms and 
beliefs. In particular, much of the economic literature ignores the path by which a 
decision is made, placing the emphasis instead on the decision outcome. 
Psychologists have, however, drawn an important distinction between regret for the 
decision itself and regret for the decision process (e.g. Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002), a distinction that bears similarities to that of outcome 
regret versus self-blame regret described previously. Indeed, Connolly & Zeelenberg 
(2002) argue that many findings in regret research can be explained by a Decision 
Justification Theory of Regret (DJT). For example, regret stemming from actions is 
generally rated higher than regret stemming from a failure to act (Baron & Ritov, 
1994; Feldman, Miyamoto, & Loftus, 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 
1987; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002), 
and this effect may be driven by actions being deemed less justifiable and more 
causal than inactions. In keeping with DJT, however, Connolly & Zeelenberg (2002) 
provide evidence that inactions can be associated with the greater regret if previous 
experience deems them to be less justifiable (see also Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
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While the simplicity of the economic definition of regret does allow for 
elegant experimental design, it is important to bridge the gap between the economic 
and psychological approaches, taking the benefits of each to help towards a unified 
conceptualisation of both the experience and behavioural impact of regret. Moreover, 
research into the neural basis of regret has primarily been motivated by the economic 
literature and lacks significant integration with the more established psychological 
literature.  
 
1.2 The specificity of regret  
Theories of the specificity of emotions are grounded in that the unique 
experiential content and behavioural impact of a particular emotion is determined by 
the particular appraisals that elicit it. For example, fear is elicited by the anticipation 
of approaching danger and motivates avoidant (i.e. flight) behaviour, while anger is 
distinct in that it is elicited by current and unjustified threat and motivates offensive 
(i.e. fight) behaviour. In accord with such a cognitive appraisal approach to emotion 
(e.g. Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), regret‟s dependency on the specific set of 
antecedent cognitive processes allows us to separate it from other aversive emotions 
– even those of a similarly counterfactual nature. Moreover, the distinct precursors of 
regret invoke a notion that its motivational impact should also be unique, since the 
goals encouraged by its experience will not be the same as those encouraged by, for 
example, disappointment. Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007) promote this emotional 
specificity of regret (see also Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007).  They write that: 
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“regret is distinct from related other specific emotions such as anger, 
disappointment, envy, guilt, sadness and shame, and from general negative affect on 
the basis of its appraisals, experiential content, and behavioral consequences”. 
(Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007, p. 7) 
 
An elegant illustration of the specificity of regret involves a comparison 
against disappointment, an aversive emotion also dependent on counterfactual 
thinking. The two emotions differ profoundly in their experiential content and 
motivational effect. Zeelenberg et al. (1998) show that recalled autobiographical 
experiences of regret and disappointment differ most acutely in their associated 
action tendencies and “emotivational goals”1. While disappointment is associated 
with feelings of powerlessness, a tendency to avoid the situation and to do nothing, 
regret is associated with feelings of self-blame, a drive to correct one‟s mistake, and 
a tendency to “ruminate and focus on past events” (p.228). Thus, the clearest 
difference between these two emotions lies in the sense of reproach or self-blame 
elicited by a high sense of responsibility and the appraisal of between-option 
counterfactual information in the case of regret. While disappointment does depend 
upon counterfactual thinking, it is a within-option comparison, comparing an 
obtained outcome with a better one that was expected from the same action. As such, 
it lacks the personal responsibility component, since the focus is on the alternative 
outcome rather than on the alternative choice. Zeelenberg & Pieters (1999) extended 
these findings to everyday consumer decision-making. Disappointment with a 
purchase (when subjects found the obtained service to be worse than expected) was 
                                                 
1
   “Emotivational goals” is a term first used by Roseman (1984) to refer to the motives and 
goals that accompany our emotions. 
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associated with assigning responsibility to others, as shown in an observed desire to 
complain to a service provider. On the other hand, regret experienced when a 
consumer realised they had made the wrong choice (after comparing the obtained 
service with that of other service providers) was associated with a desire to switch 
service provider and avoidance in sharing the experience with others. These findings 
further emphasise the importance of a sense of responsibility, and ensuing self-
blame, in the experience of regret. 
More recently, evidence has emerged for an anatomical and/or functional 
dissociation of regret and disappointment in the brain. Camille et al. (2004) found, 
using a risky two-choice financial gambling paradigm inspired by Mellers, Schwartz, 
& Ritov (1999), that patients with selective lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
were unable to experience regret in the way that normal controls did, as shown by 
affective ratings in response to gamble outcomes. Furthermore, they were unable to 
modify their future choices to avoid further instances of regret. On the other hand, 
they were able to experience normal levels of disappointment for a loss and 
satisfaction for a win, suggesting that the impairment caused by OFC damage was 
specific to regret. A follow-up study used fMRI as a further test of this dissociation 
(Coricelli et al., 2005). Using the same paradigm on healthy individuals, they found 
that activity in medial OFC, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the amygdala 
varied with the magnitude of regret. On the other hand, middle temporal gyrus and 
dorsal brainstem showed activity that correlated with the magnitude of 
disappointment. 
Other aversive emotions also show interesting distinctions from regret. 
Although envy is similar to regret, in that it also relies upon upward between-option 
counterfactual comparison, it does not depend on our having made a bad choice, but 
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can be induced simply by observing that our state of affairs is worse than that of 
others. Anger depends upon our being adversely affected by the actions of others, 
with responsibility therefore being transferred externally. While guilt does contain 
the self-blame component, the focus here is on the consequences of our actions for 
another person, rather than for the self. In the case of shame, the comparison process 
relies on a reflection on one‟s character or reputation as opposed to one‟s behaviour. 
Mandel (2003) also emphasised the importance of responsibility in regret, showing 
that intensity of regret for autobiographical memories correlated only with other 
emotions that are associated with self-blame, for example shame and guilt, but not 
with anger or distrust for which responsibility is attributed externally.  
The emotional specificity of regret is of particular importance when 
attempting to understand its role in learning and decision-making. A “feeling-is-for-
doing” perspective states that emotions are first and foremost for motivating goal-
directed behaviour, and that each particular emotion motivates behaviour in a unique 
way (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2006). Moreover, these distinct motivations stem from 
the different appraisals that generate the emotions, and from the unique experience of 
the emotion itself. In the next section I will further discuss the functional (or 
preparative) role of regret in decision-making. 
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1.3 The preparative role of regret  
 
“Never, never waste a minute on regret.  It's a waste of time.” 
Harry S. Truman (1884-1972) (in Landman, 1993) 
 
Emotions have, in the past, been considered obstructive for optimal, rational 
decision-making (e.g. see discussion by Solomon, 1993). A similar sentiment is 
shown by Harry Truman in the quotation above. However, a prevailing view now is 
that experiencing and anticipating emotions can be beneficial for learning and for 
guiding and motivating behaviour. This is especially the case for regret, as it involves 
recognition that better results that could have arisen (and could arise in the future) 
from exploring alternative behaviours. According to March (1978), all decisions 
involve predictions of how future outcomes will make us feel. Particularly in 
situations of uncertainty, the ability to anticipate future emotions probabilistically 
may provide a valuable source of information when selecting future behaviours. As 
written by Loomes & Sugden, two of the forerunners in regret theories of decision-
making: 
 
“…if an individual does experience such feelings, we cannot see how he can 
be deemed irrational for consistently taking those feelings into account”.  (Loomes 
& Sugden, 1982, p. 820) 
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The functional, or preparative, role of upward counterfactual thinking has 
been discussed in the work of Neal Roese (e.g. Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese, 
1994). Roese proposes a “problem solver” role of counterfactual thinking, such that 
it is activated by problems and triggers behavioural adaptation to solve them. Roese 
(1994) finds that upward counterfactual thinking encourages intentions to do better 
next time, resulting also in improved performance in a second chance at a task. This 
was not the case for downward counterfactual thinking, which does not have this 
preparative role. Markman et al. (1993) found that an increased number of upward 
counterfactuals were generated after failure at a game when participants expected to 
play again, than when they did not. This suggests that upward counterfactual 
thinking may be perceived as more useful when there is opportunity to improve 
future behaviour. Upward counterfactuals are also perceived as less useful when the 
outcomes are perceived as uncontrollable (Roese & Olson, 1995b). In such cases, 
individuals are more likely to construct downward counterfactuals (associated with 
feelings of relief) which have the different aim of improving mood. An example of 
this is evident in cancer patients or assault victims who may use downward 
counterfactuals as a way of coping with their traumatic, uncontrollable experience. 
Regret avoidant behaviour is apparent, for example, in consumer choice 
(Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), sexual choice (Richard, Van der 
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), and health related choice (Lechner, de Vries, & Offermans, 
1997). For health related decisions, Lechner et al. (1997) found that those women 
who reported anticipating the regret they might feel from not getting a breast cancer 
screening were more likely to get the screen than those who did not report 
anticipated regret. A loss in the ability to experience regret, as shown by patients 
with OFC lesions, is associated with poor decision-making compared to normal 
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controls (Camille et al., 2004). Patients with Parkinson‟s disease and schizophrenia 
also show impaired generation of counterfactuals, which may in part explain the 
decision-making deficits they exhibit (Hooker, Roese, Park, Sledge, & Penn, 2000; 
McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Lynch, 2003). The evidence, therefore, suggests that 
regret is not a “waste of time”, but rather plays an important role in decision-making. 
Much effort has been put into advancing the descriptive appeal (and 
predictive validity) of economic models of decision-making – especially that of 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT). Although the concept of value is integral to EUT, it 
does not take into account many subjectivities attached to value, utility and 
probability. As such, people‟s actual decisions often violate the key axioms of EUT 
(Von Neumann, Morgenstern, Kuhn, & Rubinstein, 1947). The Allais paradox 
(Allais, 1953) provides an ideal example. Here choices are observed between the 
following two pairs of gambles. 
 
Pair 1 
1a)  £2,400 for certain 
1b)  £2,400 with a 66% chance, £2,500 with a 33% chance or £0 with a 1% 
chance 
Pair 2 
2a)  £2,400 with a 34% chance or £0 with a 66% chance 
2b)  £2,500 with a 33% chance or £0 with a 67% chance 
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It is commonly observed that people tend to choose 1a over 1b, but choose 2b 
over 2a. This shows a systematic violation of the independence axiom of EUT, 
whereby common consequences of each gamble within a choice pair should be 
disregarded when making a choice. This can be grasped better by deconstructing 
each gamble pair, as follows: 
 
Pair 1 
1a)  £2,400 with a 66% chance or £2,400 with a 34% chance 
1b)  £2,400 with a 66% chance, £2,500 with a 33% chance or £0 with a 1% 
chance 
Pair 2 
2a)  £2,400 with a 34% chance or £0 with a 66% chance 
2b)  £2,500 with a 33% chance, £0 with a 66% chance or £0 with a 1% chance 
 
By removing the common consequences from within each pair (shown in red 
italics), the two choice pairs are now equivalent and EUT cannot explain the 
preference reversal observed in people‟s actual choices.  
One possible source of this intransitivity in choice may be that the value of 
each option depends upon its counterfactual context. That is, an apparently good 
option will be valued less when in the context of an apparently better option, and 
valued more when in the context of an apparently worse option. Kahneman & 
Tversky (1979) were among the first to consider the impact of counterfactuals on 
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choice preference, by introducing a psychological reference point to the preference 
function. While this reference point was originally intended to reflect comparison 
against the status-quo, any other comparative reference point can be important here, 
including what might have been from having made a different choice. Through this, 
the Allais paradox can be explained by the anticipation of regret. Given that the 
individual expects to receive feedback of both the chosen and the unchosen 
outcomes, they are likely to anticipate a between-option counterfactual comparison 
(with associated self-blame if the result is unpleasant). The preference for 1a can be 
explained by the decision-maker expecting to feel intense regret if they chose 1b and 
received the 1% chance of £0. On the other hand, in the second choice pair both 
gambles have a high probability of resulting in £0, making this anticipated regret less 
salient. The decision-maker is then motivated more by the anticipated regret of 
missing the larger gain in 2b (see Loomes & Sugden, 1983). When considering regret 
in this way, the preference reversal seems less surprising. 
In a further example, Bell (1982) described how regret can explain a tendency 
for people to show both a risk-seeking preference in gambling behaviour, and a 
simultaneous risk-averse preference when taking out car insurance. This form of 
preference reversal is also difficult for EUT to account for. However, the risk-
seeking preference may be explained by greater anticipated regret for missing a 
gamble jackpot than for losing a small bet. At the same time, less regret is anticipated 
for unnecessarily paying a small amount on car insurance than for paying the higher 
costs of car repairs, so predicting risk-aversion in such decisions (for details see Bell, 
1982, pp. 970-972). 
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1.3.1 Regret Theory 
Since the 1950s, researchers have been incorporating regret into models of 
choice (e.g. Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 
1997; Savage, 1951), an approach Connolly & Butler (2006) refer to as the 
“Modified Expected Utility Tradition”. These models generally apply variants on a 
regret-minimax principle, whereby people make choices that aim to minimise their 
maximum possible regret. In other words, they assume that the typical decision-
maker is regret-averse. Hart & Mas-Colell (2000) use the term “regret-matching” to 
describe a strategy of switching to a new action with a probability proportional to the 
regret anticipated for the current action. A turning point came when economists Bell 
(1982) and Loomes & Sugden (1982) incorporated regret into the utility function, 
such that both the possible regret and the expected utility of a decision are important, 
rather than assuming that only one of the two influences choice, as the EU theorists 
and the minimax theorist had done. This was termed Regret Theory. 
Regret theory works as follows. Where 
is
x is the outcome of choosing the 
action 
i
A in state s , and 
ks
x is the outcome of choosing action 
k
A in state s , 
anticipated regret decreases the utility of 
i
A  when 
is
x  is expected to be worse than 
ks
x . Similarly, anticipated relief increases the utility of 
i
A  when 
is
x  is expected to 
be better than 
ks
x . The modified expected utility of 
i
A , given that 
k
A  is the 
alternative, is then written as 
k
is
m , as shown in Equation 1: 
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Equation 1 
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Every choice option has a “choiceless” utility function (.)c , which is the 
utility of an option if its consequences were to occur without the individual having 
chosen it. [.]R  is the regret/relief function, whereby the difference between the 
choiceless utilities of what is and of what might have been influences the modified 
expected utility. The function is strictly increasing (i.e. more regret always leads to 
less utility) and concave (i.e. it has a marginally diminishing nature such that each 
additional unit of regret has less impact on utility than the unit before). 
 
1.3.2 Decision Affect Theory 
Barbara Mellers and colleagues later developed Decision Affect Theory, 
which attempts to explain choice preferences as a function of regret, disappointment 
and expected value. The heart of this theory is that decisions are influenced by the 
predicted emotional effect of our actions (Mellers et al., 1999; Mellers, 2000; Mellers 
et al., 1997).  
The earliest version of this theory incorporated only a disappointment 
function into computations of expected pleasure with an outcome (Mellers et al., 
1997). This comprised a within-option counterfactual comparison, with possible 
outcomes also weighted by their relative probability of occurring. Weighting 
emotions by their probability has the effect that surprising outcomes have relatively 
greater impact on behaviour than unsurprising outcomes. The authors found that this 
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model accounted well for people‟s judged expected pleasure, for outcomes in a task 
with a single two-outcome gamble (i.e. with no choice component). In a later 
extension of the theory, Mellers et al. (1999) asked participants to choose between 
two gambles, like those shown in Figure 1-1. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 – Example gamble pair used by Mellers et al. (1999). For each gamble, 
outcome probabilities were indicated by wedge size, shown with corresponding monetary 
outcomes in black and white. 
 
In this task, the authors varied outcome feedback in order to manipulate the 
object available for counterfactual comparison (see introduction the various forms of 
counterfactual thinking in section 1.1 above). In a partial feedback condition, 
participants observed only the obtained and unobtained outcomes of the chosen 
gamble, therefore allowing only for within-option comparisons. Here, the expected 
emotion ( R ) of receiving outcome A , given that B  is the unobtained outcome of 
the same gamble, was assumed to be computed according to Equation 2. 
 
Equation 2 
)]1)(([ ABAARA suuduJR  
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Here, RJ is a function whereby the emotional response to outcome A is 
dependent on the utility of outcome A  (i.e. Au ) and its difference from the utility of 
unobtained outcome B (i.e. Bu ). This expected disappointment (or d ) is weighted 
by the inverse probability of receiving outcome A  (i.e. the surprise). With this 
partial feedback, the subjective expected pleasure of the full gamble becomes the 
summed expected emotions of each outcome, weighted by the probability that they 
will occur (i.e. BBAA RsRs ). 
In a complete feedback condition, foregone outcomes of the unchosen gamble 
were also observed, thus allowing also for a between-option comparison. In this 
condition, the expected pleasure of receiving outcome A , given that B  is the 
unobtained outcome of the same gamble, and that C  is the outcome that would have 
been obtained from the unchosen gamble is computed according to Equation 3. 
 
Equation 3 
)]1)(()1)(([)( CAcAABAARCA ssuursuuduJR  
 
Here, the pleasure of receiving outcome A is dependent also on the 
difference in utility of outcome A  and that of foregone outcome C  (the expected 
regret or r ). Expected regret is weighted by the inverse of the probability that both 
outcomes A  and C  will occur. With complete feedback, the subjective expected 
pleasure of choosing gamble 1 then depends upon both a within- and between-option 
comparison of possible outcomes, and is calculated as in Equation 4. 
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Equation 4 
)()()()( DBCBCBCBDADACACA RssRssRssRss  
 
Fitting the predictions of the theory, Mellers et al. (1999) observed that 
people‟s emotional responses to outcomes depend upon a mixture of the obtained 
outcome, what would have been obtained from the alternative outcome of the same 
gamble, and would have been obtained from the alternative gamble, as illustrated in 
Figure 1-2. The authors found that Decision Affect Theory also explains people‟s 
choices between gambles well, such that people tend to make choices that maximise 
their subjective expected pleasure. 
 
 
Figure 1-2 – 
Normalised emotional 
response expressed for the 
obtained outcome, when in 
the presence of better and 
worse outcomes that might 
have been obtained from the 
chosen and unchosen gamble. 
The slopes of the curves show 
the effect of the unobtained 
outcome of the chosen gamble 
(disappointment effect), while 
the distance between the 
curves show the effect of the 
unobtained outcome of the 
alternative outcome (regret 
effect). Taken from Mellers et 
al. (1999). 
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1.3.3 Impact of experienced regret 
While the models described previously address the impact of anticipated 
regret on choice, it is less clear whether past experiences of regret have the same 
effect. Two key questions come out of this problem. Firstly, how does learning from 
experience of regret fit into these models? Secondly, is the impact of experienced 
regret always to encourage regret-avoidant future behaviour? 
Concerning the first question, important advances have come from 
reinforcement learning approaches. In general, learning models assume that 
reinforcement signals elicited from experience are used to modify future behaviour 
towards our goals. A handful of studies have addressed the role of experienced regret 
in learning, whereby learning is influenced by the difference between a received 
outcome and one that, as realised post-hoc, would have been better from a different 
behaviour. Those models incorporating some form of this operational regret with 
high predictive success include Camerer & Ho's (1999) Experience Weighted 
Attraction Learning, and  Normalized Fictitious Play Learning (e.g. Ert & Erev, 
2007). Most recently, economists Marchiori & Warglien (2008) constructed a simple 
parameter-free neural network that provides an elegant model of the role of regret in 
interactive decision-making. In this model experienced regret is included in the 
online adjustment of connection weights between perceived inputs and choice 
propensities. As such, connections towards choices that previously induced regret are 
weakened by an increment proportional to the size of the regret, computed as the 
difference between the outcome received by the individual and the best outcome 
received by other players in the game. This model essentially converts previous 
experienced regret into anticipated regret for all possible subsequent actions. 
Subsequent choice then reflects a prototypical regret-minimax decision strategy. The 
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authors compared the fit of this model with the two previously mentioned, along with 
other well established models in game theory, and found that their model was a good 
predictor of behaviour in 21 different social decision games. They also found that the 
Normalized Fictitious Play model (Ert & Erev, 2007), which predicts a related form 
of exploration (i.e. trying of new choice options) in response to regret (and likewise 
“stickiness” after relief), performed comparably well. 
It is important to note that the interactive learning games, used by Marchiori 
& Warglien's (2008), may not provide the purest test of the behavioural impact of 
experienced regret. This is because the model reflects learning from other people’s 
better choices, a scenario that may elicit emotions such as envy and shame whose 
effects on behaviour may not be comparable to regret. As highlighted in a 
commentary by Cohen (2008), Marchiori & Warglien‟s model is found to predict 
quicker learning than is actually observed in some games, therefore suggesting that 
the model does not account for some of the inconsistencies shown in real social 
learning. 
This otherwise promising approach to understanding the behavioural impact 
of experienced regret has also been taken up by neuroeconomists studying how 
fictive (i.e. what might have been) learning signals are represented in the brain. This 
work also goes further in considering the role of fictive signals in private (as opposed 
to interactive) learning scenarios. Montague, King-Casas, & Cohen (2006) suggest 
that fictive signals provide individuals with a “cheaper way to learn about the world” 
(p.425), since individuals are able to learn simultaneously about the value of actions 
both taken and not taken. Fictive errors (i.e. when the fictive state is better than the 
actual state) also appear to have a directional impact on behaviour. In an investment 
decision task, Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague (2007) found that greater 
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fictive error drove participants more to change their next choice. This study will be 
discussed further in the following section on the neurobiological basis of regret. 
It is yet unclear how learning from past experiences of regret should be 
included in Regret Theory, and how these experiences influence behaviour in the 
short- and long-term. During decisions plagued by uncertainty about the objective 
probabilities of future occurrences, decision-makers may be largely reliant on their 
emotional response to similar choices made in the past. These are likely to provide 
the strongest influence on behaviour in iterated decision tasks, such as that used by 
Lohrenz et al (2007). Some studies show that cumulative experiences of regret 
encourage regret-minimising behaviour (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005), 
although trial-by-trial effects on behaviour are not addressed. Some have shown that 
subjective desire to change a decision is greatest after regrettable trials (Chua, 
Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Israel Liberzon, 2009). However, others have shown in 
actual behaviour (as opposed to intentions) a greater tendency to switch choices after 
rejoice than after regret (Liu et al., 2007, data reanalysed by Sommer et al., 2009), 
suggesting that the immediate behavioural effect of regret may be more complex 
than simple avoidance. 
From this perspective, experienced regret may have multiple impacts on 
behaviour. In particular, experienced regret may influence behaviour independent of 
any anticipated regret elicited (or learnt) from it. Perhaps the most significant 
difference between anticipated and experienced regret is that the former involves the 
prediction of a future emotional state, while the latter involves an immediate 
emotional experience. Of particular interest for this thesis is the notion that emotional 
experiences can influence behaviour by both moderating one‟s expectations of future 
outcomes (an indirect impact equivalent to anticipated future events) or by directly 
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influencing our goals, arousal and attention (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). It is 
conceivable that our goals when in the midst of an intense emotional experience need 
not be equivalent to those when in a neutral emotional state. In particular, while 
anticipated regret motivates us to adjust behaviour so as to avoid the possibility of 
regret being elicited, current experiences of regret are unpleasant and our strongest 
motivation may be to regulate or reduce this current experience rather than to plan 
for future avoidance. The possibility that regret-regulatory goals are different under 
anticipated and experienced regret, and motivate distinct behavioural responses, will 
be discussed further in section 1.5 of this introduction.  
 
1.4 The neurobiological basis of regret 
1.4.1 Overview of the literature 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) and basal ganglia are prime candidates for 
involvement in counterfactual thinking and regret, given their established roles in 
reward processing, reasoning, planning and decision-making. Of particular 
importance are findings that both systems code rewards relative to the context in 
which they are presented, as shown through single cell recording in macaque 
monkeys (Hosokawa, Kato, Inoue, & Mikami, 2007; Tremblay & Schultz, 1999) and 
in human fMRI studies (Elliott, Agnew, & Deakin, 2008; Fujiwara, Tobler, Taira, 
Iijima, & Tsutsui, 2008; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005). 
The earliest studies considering how rewards signals in the brain depend on 
their counterfactual context employed a task inspired by Mellers et al. (1999). In the 
first of these studies, participants passively (i.e. without choice) received outcomes 
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from good, bad and intermediate gamble wheels, like those shown in Figure 1-3 
(Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001). The authors concluded that 
nucleus accumbens, sublenticular and extended amygdala activity during neutral 
outcomes (i.e. $0) was stronger for bad spinners than for good spinners. This 
provided evidence that coding of rewards in these regions depended upon within-
option counterfactual information.  
 
 
Figure 1-3 – Exemplar gamble types from Breiter et al. (2001). These authors compared 
the neutral, $0, outcome in the context of bad, intermediate and good gamble types. 
 
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has received the most attention with respect to 
regret and is widely shown to manifest context dependent responses to reward (see 
previously cited references on relative reward, and also Ursu & Carter, 2005, on 
counterfactual context). Patients with OFC lesions often have difficulty in 
anticipating consequences of their actions, which may account for poor decision-
making and impulsive behaviour (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 
1994; Mobini et al., 2002). Camille et al. (2004) used a similar Mellers-inspired task 
to that used in Breiter et al. (2001), but this time OFC lesioned patients made choices 
between gamble pairs. In any given pair, one of the gambles was likely to induce 
more regret (i.e. it is anticipated to generate a greater negative discrepancy between 
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its outcome and that of the unchosen gamble). In addition, the authors compared 
trials in which participants were shown complete feedback (where the outcome of the 
unchosen gamble was shown and could be compared to the obtained outcome of the 
chosen gamble) or partial feedback (where only the obtained and unobtained 
outcomes of the chosen gamble were shown). Regret/relief was assumed to be 
experienced only on complete feedback trials. The authors found that OFC lesion 
patients were less likely to experience regret and were also less likely to use 
anticipated regret to guide their future choices in the full feedback condition, 
compared to non-OFC prefrontal lesion patients and healthy controls. Conversely, 
the patients were unimpaired in experiencing disappointment (elicited by a purely 
within-option comparison in partial feedback trials), and in making choices that 
minimised disappointment. 
A follow-up fMRI study, using the same task, further explored the role of the 
OFC in this gambling task (Coricelli et al., 2005). In trials with complete feedback, 
healthy individuals showed responses in both lateral and medial OFC, anterior 
cingulate, and hippocampus that reflected a discrepancy between chosen and 
unchosen outcomes. Cumulative experience of regret was associated with enhanced 
activity in right somatomotor cortex, left inferior parietal lobule, left medial OFC, 
and left amygdala, while immediately preceding regret was associated with enhanced 
right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right lateral OFC and right inferior parietal lobule 
activity at subsequent choice. Moreover, both subjective pleasantness ratings and 
skin conductance responses reflected negative valuation and increased arousal with 
outcomes that were worse than what might have been from the other gamble choice. 
Medial OFC involvement in degree of regret was evident in a task involving 
avoidance of electric shocks, as opposed to reward-based motivators, while various 
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other regions are found to be involved in degree of rejoicing, including bilateral 
anterior insula, bilateral striatum, right rostral anterior cingulate, left hippocampus 
and superior frontal cortex (Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns, 
2008). Moreover, these authors also showed that activity associated with both regret 
and rejoicing was amplified by the surprisingness of the outcome, supporting this 
assumption in Decision Affect Theory. 
In a similar task, Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon (2009) found 
only lateral OFC involvement in regret compared to disappointment (along with 
bilateral anterior insula, right superior frontal gyrus, left middle frontal gyrus and 
right occipital gyrus), while medial OFC was rather involved in rejoicing. The 
possible different roles of medial and lateral OFC in regret is discussed in a review 
paper by Sommer, Peters, Gläscher, & Büchel (2009). These authors propose that the 
medial OFC is important in the emotional experience of regret, while activity in the 
lateral OFC is more likely to be involved in our behavioural response to such 
experiences.  
In the studies discussed previously, participants are required to choose 
between a new pair of gambles on each trial, and only this form of task appears to 
recruit OFC in regret. A second class of task design requires participants to decide 
upon a level of risk to take on repeated decisions. In contrast to those tasks involving 
choices between gamble pairs, here no new information on outcome probability is 
made available on each trial to guide participants‟ choices. Rather choice is assumed 
to be guided by past experiences. For example, Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & 
Montague (2007) used a task designed to explore the neural underpinnings of 
tracking fictive errors. On each trial, participants placed a bet on a dynamic stock 
market. After outcome feedback, participants were able to compare the outcome of 
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their bet and that of the best bet they could have placed on that trial, which would be 
a 100% bet for wins, and a 0% bet for losses. The authors contrasted these fictive 
error signals in the brain against standard temporal difference (TD) error signals, 
computed as the difference between the experienced payoff and the expected payoff 
assumed from the participant‟s bet on that trial. For example, if a participant bets 
60% on a trial in which the market then increases, the TD error is then the difference 
between the 60% bet and the fractional market increase, while the fictive error would 
be the difference between the best possible bet, i.e. 100%, and the actual 60% bet 
allocated. This task did not recruit the OFC, but rather striatum activity reflected 
these fictive error signals. A recent study, using single cell recording in monkeys, has 
shown cells in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) also respond to fictive errors 
(Hayden, Pearson, & Platt, 2009). 
The striatum is known to be important in both the passive processing of value 
and in motivating goal-directed behaviour. In an early model of how counterfactual 
thinking might be implemented in the brain, Baird & Fugelsang (2004) proposed that 
the striatum may be vital for both the generation of possible counterfactuals and their 
use in guiding subsequent behaviour. They also suggested that the ACC may be 
important in checking the suitability of a counterfactual “idea”, evaluating it and 
checking it for “errors and/or incongruities”. In keeping with this model, patients 
with deficits to basal ganglia and PFC appear to have difficulty in appropriately 
considering the consequences of their actions, which may be associated with an 
inability to generate possible counterfactuals and to compare them against reality. 
Sommer et al (2008) also suggest the striatal involvement in some (but not all) 
regret-related tasks is due to its particular importance in the processing of fictive 
error signals which are vital teaching signals for guiding behaviour. 
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A recent study by Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & Gray (2009) explored 
how “near miss” outcomes are processed in the brain. These outcomes are 
objectively a loss, but where a win was especially close. They are, therefore, optimal 
for eliciting upward counterfactual thinking and regret, due to the relative ease with 
which the better counterfactual alternative outcome of a full win can be brought to 
mind (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a). “Near miss” outcomes in gambling may have a 
similar conditioning effect on future behaviour as does a full win (Reid, 1986). 
Indeed, Clark et al. found that near misses increase the desire to continue gambling, 
when resulting from participant‟s own choices (but not from a computer-enforced 
choice), despite also being rated as more aversive. This finding is in keeping with the 
concept that upward counterfactual comparisons, though painful, are a powerful 
motivator for behaviour. Intriguingly, the authors also found that near misses were 
associated with similar neuronal responses as full wins, eliciting activity in bilateral 
ventral striatum and insula. Rostral ACC was also recruited by near misses, but only 
when participants were personally responsible for the choice. This response to a near 
miss is unlikely to reflect increased subjective value of the outcome, since 
participants reported them to be aversive experiences. They may instead be 
associated with the behavioural response such outcomes encourage, as the authors 
themselves suggest. The increased desire to continue gambling after near misses may 
be associated with higher sensitivity to anticipated future wins, and so this increased 
reward-related activity may also reflect the anticipated pleasure of future outcomes, 
rather than the current aversiveness of the outcome.  
A key role for the striatum in such responses suggests that dopamine may be 
involved. McNamara et al. (2003) found that patients with Parkinson‟s disease had 
marked deficits in spontaneously generating counterfactuals and on counterfactual 
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inference tests, where participants must form counterfactually-derived inferences 
about hypothetical scenarios. This supports a role of dopamine in counterfactual 
thinking, as Parkinson‟s disease is characterised by a loss of dopamine cells in the 
substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area. The patients were also impaired in 
standard tests of frontal lobe function (e.g. Stroop task and Tower of London), 
suggesting that disruption in dopamine connections to striatum, amygdala and PFC 
may result in the impaired counterfactual reasoning. Individuals with schizophrenia 
show similar cognitive deficits (Hooker et al., 2000; Roese, Park, Smallman, & 
Gibson, 2008). While deficits in counterfactual thinking with Parkinson‟s disease 
may be due to the loss of dopaminergic cells, the deficit in schizophrenia may be 
associated with excessive levels of dopamine (cf. the dopamine theory of 
schizophrenia, e.g. Bell, 1965; Carlsson, 1978, 1995). Dopamine may also be 
involved in encouraging repetitive gambling behaviour. Greater dopamine increases 
during gambling are found in compulsive, compared to non-compulsive, gamblers 
(Meyer et al., 2004), and evidence suggests a link between dopamine agonist 
treatment of Parkinson‟s disease and the onset of problematic gambling (and other 
forms of compulsive behaviour) in some patients (Molina et al., 2000; Weintraub et 
al., 2006). It is conceivable that near misses and regret may be an important 
precursor to such behaviour, through a dopaminergic mechanism and neural activity 
found by Clark et al. (2009), though such a theory is clearly in its early stages of 
development.  
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1.4.2 Synthesis and future directions 
Patient studies and functional neuroimaging investigations have provided 
considerable advances in our understanding of regret. My review of studies exploring 
the neurobiological basis of regret shows consistency in brain regions involved. The 
OFC is the most often activated in regret. Moreover, while medial OFC involvement 
is the most consistent, there is apparently some role for lateral OFC. Striatum, ACC, 
angular gyrus/inferior parietal cortex, anterior insula and amygdala also appear to be 
important. In rejoicing, on the other hand, the striatum is most often implicated, 
though middle frontal cortex and OFC are also important. These consistencies 
provide a useful guide for restricting neurobiological hypotheses in the fMRI studies 
performed as part of this thesis. 
Neuroimaging studies of regret have been largely inspired by the economic 
approaches, and so tend to reduce the construct of regret, along with its behavioural 
impact, to a simplistic form that it can be in danger of losing many of its interesting 
qualities. To date, this strand of research lacks significant integration with a more 
established psychological literature, leaving many areas open for further study. For 
example, how regret depends upon external context, as well as internal beliefs and 
regulatory strategies, is often disregarded. The role of agency in modulating brain 
activity associated with choice outcomes is highlighted by findings that ventral 
striatal responses to absolute gains and losses depend on agency over the causal 
choice (Coricelli et al., 2005). However, it is still unclear whether an agency 
modulation also extends to response to outcomes that are relative to a counterfactual 
reference point. Self-blame for a regrettable outcome also involves more than just 
agency over a choice, depending also on social norms and decision justifiability 
(Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). Moreover, Sommer et al‟s (2009) suggestion that 
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the OFC may be important in tasks the allow for anticipation of possible regret, while 
striatum may code fictive error signals vital for learning from experienced regret, 
may be key to developing an understanding of the possibly dissociable roles of 
experienced and anticipated regret in decision-making, a distinction rarely made in 
the literature to date.  
 
1.5 Recurrent themes of this thesis 
Regret is what we feel when we realise we should have done something 
differently. By developing a fuller understanding of the situational factors and 
internal appraisals that encourage such a feeling, we can then better control and/or 
manipulate these conditions in the empirical study of regret. Such understanding is 
important for predicting the conditions in which regret is elicited in everyday life. 
For the purpose of this thesis, “regret-related” conditions are considered as those 
externally manipulated factors that fit the major specifications for inducing the 
upward between-option counterfactual comparison deemed necessary for regret to be 
elicited. Inspired by the work of Mellers and others, I generate these regret-related 
conditions by revealing to participants the higher value monetary outcomes that 
would have been received had they behaved differently (and similarly relief-related 
conditions are induced when participants made the better choice). This experimental 
manipulation is widely considered to induce a form of operationalised outcome 
regret without recourse to subjective ratings of experience (Bell, 1982; Ert & Erev, 
2007; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Marchiori & Warglien, 
2008). Moreover, numerous studies show that such feedback is strongly associated 
with subjective ratings of regret, general negative affect, and a desire to have acted 
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differently, in iterated choice games (e.g. Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli et al., 2005; 
Inman et al., 1997; Mellers et al., 1997). While I do not see such externally 
controlled conditions as always sufficient for inducing the full emotional and 
cognitive experience of regret, here I will refer to them as regret-related (or 
regrettable) in order to clarify the states in which participants are placed in the tasks I 
describe. 
To make this operationalisation more descriptive of regret, and more 
predictive of its behavioural impact, a primary aim of this thesis is to understand 
other factors necessary for its experience, or at least important in determining its 
intensity. The first two studies of this thesis test whether responsibility should be 
added as a necessary precursor of regret, as well as addressing the importance of 
responsibility in learning and decision-making more generally. 
 
Theme 1: This thesis addresses the necessary precursors currently missing from 
conventional economic models of regret, with a special focus on responsibility. 
 
A second aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the way 
healthy individuals respond to regrettable experiences during private decision-
making. The feeling and subjective experience of emotions are, to many researchers, 
of great importance. However, others place greater emphasis on a behavioural 
response. This functionalist approach considers any particular emotion as 
characterised by both the external and psychological events causing it and its effect 
on behaviour. For example, while fear and anger can both be elicited by a threatening 
external event, fear is associated with potential threat and tends to encourage a flight 
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response, while anger is associated with current and unjustified threat and will more 
often elicit a fight response. Regret is also thought to have a powerful impact on 
behaviour, as discussed in section 1.3 above, although further empirical work is 
needed to clarify the specific direction of this impact and distinguish it from 
anticipated regret.  
This distinction between anticipated and experienced emotion is necessary in 
studying the behavioural effect of regret. Anderson (2003) had noted that:  
 
“the vast majority of studies support the conclusion that emotional goals 
influence decision avoidance but that postdecisional emotions are infrequently 
measured” (p.142).  
 
The possibly dissociable roles of experienced and anticipated regret in 
decision-making has been discussed in section 1.3 above. Critically, „Regret Theory‟ 
describes only the role of anticipated regret in decision-making, and the 
neuroimaging literature also follows in this approach. As expected by its aversive 
nature, anticipated regret encourages regret-averse behaviour, i.e. decisions that 
minimise the likelihood of its future experience. However it is less well understood 
how people respond behaviourally to the actual experience of regret. As considered 
in section 1.3 of this introduction, experienced regret may not encourage the same 
regret-avoidant behaviour thought to be associated with anticipated regret. 
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Theme 2: This thesis considers the possibility that the experience of regret may 
have a distinct behavioural impact from that associated with its anticipation.  
 
One possible reason for this difference is that experienced regret is associated 
with intense and current negative affect, while anticipated regret is driven by a fear 
of possible future regret. While anticipated regret motivates us to adjust behaviour so 
as to avoid the possibility of regret being elicited (in a way that resembles a flight 
response), experiences of regret are unpleasant and our strongest motivation may be 
to regulate or reduce this current experience rather than to plan future avoidance. It is 
known that individuals use a variety of cognitive and behavioural strategies to 
regulate current feelings of regret (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007; Roese & Olson, 
2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), the behavioural effects of which may trade-off 
against a desire to avoid repeating the regrettable choice in the future. In their Model 
of Regret-Regulation 1.0, Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007) advise that the regulation of 
anticipated regret involves attempts to prevent regret from occurring, for example by 
making regret-avoidant decisions or by avoiding information that can elicit regret 
(e.g. feedback about the outcomes of alternative options). When it comes to 
regulating experienced regret, however, the priorities of the decision-maker seem to 
change, as shown in Table 1-1. The authors write that decision-makers are, 
“motivated to avoid regret from happening and when it happens they engage 
in ameliorative behaviors (e.g., reverse the decision or undo the consequences). 
When this is not possible, they manage, deny, or suppress this experience in one of 
many possible ways” (p.3) 
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Roese & Olson (2007) add to this by highlighting a difference between 
behavioural and cognitive responses to regret (or indeed to any emotion). They argue 
that undoing or reversing the decision in a behavioural response to experienced 
regret is likely the “primary, pivotal, and default response” (Roese, Summerville, & 
Fessel, 2007, p. 27). However, all other responses in part II of Table 1-1 relate to 
cognitive regulatory responses, which may prevail when the regrettable action cannot 
be undone or reversed. Such responses, Roese et al suggest, can be thought of more 
generally as forms of cognitive dissonance reduction strategies, associated with a 
ubiquitous bias to protect self-esteem.  
 
Theme 3: This thesis assumes that individuals use various behavioural and 
cognitive strategies to regulate the aversive experience of regret. 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction
 
Page | 1.37  
 
Table 1-1 – Taken from Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007) and showing that regret regulation 
strategies differ in the case of anticipated (I) and experienced (II) regret. 
 
 
 
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
The five studies described in this thesis are motivated by two broad aims. 
Firstly, I aim to provide a deeper understanding of the experiential content of regret, 
and the external and psychological antecedents that are necessary for it to be elicited. 
Secondly, I aim to shed light on the motivational impact of regret, by addressing the 
effects of regrettable events on immediately subsequent decision-making. For the 
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latter, I explicitly examine the effect of real experiences (with real financial 
incentives) in games in which individuals make repeated free decisions. This 
approach contrasts with the bulk of experimental studies on regret which have relied 
on hypothetical scenarios, anticipated or imagined emotional responses, or social (as 
opposed to private) decisions, and is assumed to capture more realistic behaviour 
preferences. Investigating the neural mechanisms underlying the experience of – and 
the decision strategies motivated by – regret was expected to be particularly 
informative for both of these aims. 
The role of responsibility in the experience of regret is debated, as discussed 
above. Moreover, it is unclear whether regret-related brain activity is a function of 
subtle differences in the degree of responsibility a decision-maker exerts over a 
regrettable outcome. In Chapter 3, I present the results of an experiment designed to 
clarify the role of responsibility in the experience (and neural representation) of 
regret. Here, participants made decisions under varying levels of objective 
responsibility, and I tested how responsibility modulates regret-related brain 
responses, as well as trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret.  
It is also unclear what the role of responsibility is in our ability to learn and 
implement optimal decisions more generally. Specifically, does being responsible for 
the outcomes of our actions help or hinder our learning and decision-making? To 
address this, in Chapter 4 I compared the efficacy of value learning by active trial-
and-error against vicarious learning through observation of the outcomes of actions 
performed by others. The extant literature is ambiguous as to which of these modes 
of learning should be more effective, since controlled comparisons of operant and 
observational learning are rare. Here, I contrast human operant and observational 
value learning, assessing implicit and explicit measures of learning from positive and 
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negative reinforcement. I also used a model-based analysis to address possible 
differences in the mechanisms underlying each form of learning. Based on a 
hypothesised relationship between regret and responsibility, I particularly compared 
models that take into account the outcomes of unchosen options (i.e. which allow for 
between-option counterfactual comparisons to be made) with those that do not take 
into account this fictive information. 
With its seemingly important role in motivating behaviour, is surprising that 
trial-by-trial influences of regrettable outcomes on subsequent choice have not been 
widely studied. As discussed in section 1.3 above, economic models have addressed 
the impact of anticipated regret on choice, i.e. under conditions of a knowable risk of 
future regret from different choice alternatives. When the risk of future regret is 
uncertain across choice options, past experiences may act as a powerful guide to 
behaviour. It is less understood, however, whether past regret encourages the regret-
avoidant behaviour typically associated with anticipated regret. 
Using a task in which two choice options do not differ in probability of future 
regret, in Chapter 5 I aimed to tease out the immediate behavioural impact of 
regrettable outcomes. To stay close to the designs of earlier economic and 
reinforcement learning literature, here I reduce the construct of regret to those 
components that are best understood and most easily manipulated experimentally. 
These comprise a) the upward between-option counterfactual comparison, and b) 
responsibility for the choice. Surprisingly, results indicated that after a regrettable 
outcome individuals did not tend to avoid the regret-related choice on a subsequent 
trial, but rather appeared to repeat it. This behaviour fit poorly to a typical regret-
minimax model of choice that was tested against the data. It may, however, be better 
explained in relation to some of the regulatory strategies associated with minimising 
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experienced regret, as in part II of Table 1-1. Specifically, the observed choice 
repetition could instead be associated with either an attempt to make up for the 
previous mistake, or with a form of decision inertia elicited by experienced regret. 
The behaviour observed in Chapter 5‟s study cannot be readily explained by 
conventional models of regret-aversion. In Chapters 6 and 7, I address this intriguing 
finding further, using fMRI to explore neuronal mechanisms underlying a bias to 
repeat previously bad choices. I approach this in two different ways. In Chapter 6, I 
study neuronal responses associated with outcome-type and subsequent choice within 
the same gambling task used in Chapter 5. For Chapter 7, I designed a task to 
address the possibility that experienced regret may drive a bias towards decision 
inertia. Others have provided behavioural evidence suggesting that regret may be 
higher when errors arise from rejection rather than acceptance of a status-quo, and 
that this could encourage the emergence of a status-quo bias on subsequent decisions 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994; Feldman et al., 1999; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman, 
1987; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg et al., 2002). Such a bias could explain the 
previous observation that regrettable outcomes encourage choice repetition, rather 
than avoidance. Motivated by the purely behavioural literature connecting regret and 
a status-quo bias, I acquired fMRI data during a difficult perceptual decision task 
with a trial-to-trial intrinsic status-quo and explicit signalling of outcomes (error or 
correct). I examined the neural mechanisms underlying such a bias by linking choice 
behaviour, and neuronal activity at choice, to antecedent error processing and regret.  
In Chapter 8, I discuss the implications of these findings for standard models 
of the antecedents, experience and behavioural impact of regret. General implications 
and future directions are also considered. In the next chapter (Chapter 2) I provide 
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an introduction to the methodology used in this thesis, and how it has allowed me to 
address issues and concerns described above. 
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Chapter 2. Introduction to the methodology 
 
2.1 Overview 
This thesis relies on a combination of behavioural methods, functional brain 
imaging, skin conductance recordings and computational modelling of learning and 
decision-making, to address the questions and hypotheses discussed in Chapter 1. In 
all five experiments described, healthy participants complete iterated, private (i.e. not 
interactive) decision-making tasks that I developed to address a particular research 
question of interest (or modified from tasks used in previous literature). For the 
purpose of clarity and coherence, in this thesis these tasks will be described in full 
within the relevant chapters ahead. The statistical methods used, along with those 
functional imaging and computational modelling procedures specific to each 
experiment, will also be described within the individual chapters. Below, I provide a 
brief introduction to these methods and discuss what they add to the study of emotion 
and decision-making. I also take this opportunity to provide the details of those 
procedures that apply to multiple experiments. 
 
2.2 Participants 
All participants were right-handed with normal or corrected vision, and no 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorder, according to self-report. Each gave 
Chapter 2: Introduction to the methodology
 
Page | 2.2  
 
informed consent, according to procedures approved by the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee. Number of participants, mean ages and gender ratios will be provided 
for each experiment separately. Participants were an opportunity sample and, for the 
purpose of generalisation of findings, were assumed to represent a random sample of 
the population. 
 
2.3 Behavioural measures and analysis 
The experiments used iterated, private decision-making tasks, in which 
outcome feedback was presented trial-by-trial to encourage participants to evaluate 
the quality of their choices. Choice quality evaluation was also promoted by 
introducing financial incentives for participants. In all experiments participants were 
paid according to their task performance, in addition to a reimbursement for their 
time. Tasks were designed to capture changes in behaviour in response to previous 
outcomes, but with the specifics dependent on the particular study. These tasks were 
either uniquely designed, or inspired by previous studies (Camille et al., 2004; 
Coricelli et al., 2005; Fleming, Thomas, & Dolan, 2010; Lohrenz et al., 2007; 
Mellers, 2000; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). For use both 
inside and outside of the fMRI scanner, visual stimuli were generated and presented 
to participants through the Cogent 2000 Toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) for 
MATLAB. Responses were recorded from the computer keyboard (in behavioural 
studies) or 5-finger optical button-box (inside the scanner). 
Analyses of behaviour and ratings were performed using SPSS 17.0. 
Dependent measures comprised choice propensities or ratings of subjective 
experience. Independent measures were the outcome experienced on the previous 
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trial (which due to the self-blame nature of regret was critically dependent on 
participant‟s own previous choices), as well as the particular controlled task 
manipulations described in depth within the relevant chapters. In all experiments, the 
primary statistical analyses compared means across conditions in a within-subject 
design, using repeated-measures ANOVAs and paired t-tests. Here I assumed equal 
variance across conditions. I tested this assumption with Mauchly‟s test of sphericity, 
and degrees of freedom were corrected (using a Greenhouse-Geisser correction) 
wherever this assumption did not hold. In Chapter 3, I also tested a series of 
hierarchical multiple linear regression models to assess the influence of 
responsibility on the experience of regret. These will be explained in the behavioural 
analysis section of Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)  
fMRI provides an elegant way of defining the neural mechanisms underlying 
human behaviour and subjective experience non-invasively in healthy individuals. 
The ability to use event-related designs in fMRI is ideal for the study of iterated 
decision-making. This allows for relatively good spatial resolution and 3D 
localisation of brain activity, although its temporal resolution (compared to M/EEG 
or single unit recording) is limited by the delayed and dispersed nature of the 
haemodynamic response function (HRF). Here I will provide a brief introduction to 
fMRI, followed by a description of its use in this thesis. 
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) measures the radiofrequency energy 
released by hydrogen atoms as they relax from a high energy state (elicited by a 
radiofrequency (RF) pulse) to a resting state along the longitudinal axis of the 
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scanner magnet (B0). This relaxation (termed T1 relaxation) increases the strength of 
the MR signal in the B0 direction, and its speed differs depending on tissue type. 
This allows for signals from grey matter, white matter and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) 
to be differentiated. A second form of relaxation in the signal occurs when the spin 
of neighbouring molecules diphase from each other after the RF pulse forces them 
into spins that are all in phase. As these spins diphase, there is a decrease in MR 
signal, the speed of which is also unique to the tissue type. This is termed T2 
relaxation. 
Inhomogeneities in the magnetic field also cause the T2 signal to decay at a 
faster rate (the actual decaying signal being termed T2*). One variable that 
influences the speed of the T2* decay is the composition of the blood supplied to the 
particular brain region. Specifically, deoxygenated blood is paramagnetic (Pauling, 
1977). This results in greater inhomogeneities in the local magnetic field, meaning 
that the T2* signal is relatively faster to decay in regions with a higher ratio of 
deoxygenated to oxygenated blood. The BOLD (Blood Oxegenation Level 
Dependent) response measured in fMRI is therefore associated with an increased 
ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood. Put simply, since active brain regions 
require energy from oxygenated blood, local changes in this ratio allow us to make 
an inference about an increase in the underlying neural activity of that brain region 
(Ogawa et al., 1993), after correcting for the temporally delayed and dispersed nature 
of the HRF. Although the BOLD contrast does not measure oxygen usage directly, 
local changes in cerebral blood supply have been linked to underlying neural activity 
through animal models (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; 
Viswanathan & Freeman, 2007) and through comparisons to E/MEG signals 
measured in humans (Nangini, Tam, & Graham, 2008; Ogawa et al., 2000). 
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For the experiments described in Chapters 3 and 6, I scanned participants in a 
3T Allegra scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) operated with its standard head 
transmit-receive coil. For the experiment described in Chapter 7, I scanned 
participants in a 3T Trio whole-body scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) 
operated with its standard body transmit and 12-channel head receive coil. The 
manufacturer‟s standard automatic 3D-shim procedure was performed at the 
beginning of each experiment. Echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences were optimised 
for sensitivity in brain regions of primary interest in each experiment, the details of 
which are available in the methods sections of the relevant chapters. EPI magnitude 
images were reconstructed from the complex k-space raw data using a generalised 
reconstruction method based on the measured EPI k-space trajectory to minimise 
ghosting (Josephs, Deichmann, & Turner, 2000). EPI data acquisition was monitored 
on-line using a real-time reconstruction and quality assurance system (Weiskopf et 
al., 2007).  
I acquired Fieldmaps for each subject at the start of scanning (Siemens 
standard double echo gradient echo fieldmap sequence, echo time = 12.46 ms, TR = 
10.2 ms, matrix size = 64×64, 64 slices covering the whole head, voxel size = 3 × 3 × 
3 mm). These allowed for calculation of static geometric distortions caused by 
susceptibility-induced field inhomogeneities, which were used to correct EPI images 
for both these static distortions and any changes in these distortions due to head 
motion (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, & Friston, 2001; Hutton et al., 
2002). I also recorded heart rate with a pulse oximeter, along with respiratory phase 
and volume using a breathing belt, which were used to correct for physiological 
noise at the stage of data analysis. At the end of all scanning sessions, I acquired a 
T1-weighted anatomical scan for each participant using a Modified Driven 
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Equilibrium Fourier Transform (MDEFT) sequence (Uğurbil et al., 1993), with 
optimised parameters as described in the literature (Deichmann, Schwarzbauer, & 
Turner, 2004): for each volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions were acquired with an 
image matrix of 256×224 (Read × Phase). 
Image pre-processing and data analysis were implemented using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software in Matlab2009a with SPM8 for Chapters 3 and 7 
(Matlab7.4 with SPM5 for Chapter 6) (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 
Institute of Neurology, UCL, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The procedure for 
pre-processing was identical across the three fMRI experiments described in this 
thesis. After discarding the first 6 volumes of each run, to allow for T1 equilibration, 
EPI images were realigned and unwarped using SPM (Andersson et al., 2001). This 
corrected the images for head movement through rigid-body realignment (taking into 
account translation, rotation, zoom and shear), as well as geometric distortions 
caused by susceptibility-induced field inhomogeneities. The latter was performed 
utilising the Fieldmaps processed for each participant using the FieldMap toolbox 
implemented in SPM (Hutton, Deichmann, Turner, & Andersson, 2004).  
Each participant‟s structural image was then co-registered to the mean of the 
motion-corrected functional images using a 12-parameter affine transformation, and 
was segmented into grey matter, white matter and CSF according to the standard 
procedure in SPM (Ashburner & Friston, 2005). The spatial normalisation 
parameters resulting from the previous step were then applied to the functional 
images, to remove individual differences in brain structure and place all images onto 
a standardised anatomical space. This step in image pre-processing allows for 
statistical averaging across participants, comparison across participants, and 
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comparisons against the findings of other studies. These spatially normalised images 
were then smoothed using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
Procedures for modelling and inference were similar across the fMRI 
experiments of this thesis, but with the particular details depending on the contrasts 
that addressed the research question at hand. The general linear model (GLM) allows 
for estimation of the parameters that best explain the spatially and temporally 
continuous data collected from the 3D brain over time. The model convolves a 
psychological variable (or multiple variables) by a canonical HRF, in order to allow 
for the delayed and dispersed form of the BOLD response. In the case of all the 
fMRI-based studies of this thesis, the temporal derivative of the HRF is also 
included, in order to allow for a small amount of variance in the onset of the 
response. Correlation between psychological regressors is avoided as this causes 
problems for interpretation of effects. Movement-related effects and physiological 
noise are also factored out from the effects of interest. This is achieved by entering 
the motion parameters defined by the realignment procedure as 6 regressors of no 
interest, along with 17 additional regressors of cardiac phase (10 regressors), 
respiratory phase (6 regressors) and respiratory volume (1 regressor).  
In each experiment, I implemented a group-level random-effects analysis 
using one-sample t-tests on the contrast images obtained from each contrast of 
interest for each participant. Statistical parametric maps were formed in order to 
locate brain regions for which the measured BOLD response can be significantly 
explained given the model and its fitted parameters. Family-wise error (FWE) 
correction was used to correct the statistical threshold for multiple comparisons 
(since a mass-univariate approach is used by SPM, i.e. comparing many voxels 
against the null hypothesis of no effects). This correction also deals with spatial 
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correlations (i.e. non-independence) between neighbouring voxels due to spatial 
processing, smoothing and the spatially extended nature of the HRF (i.e. Random-
Field Theory). For pre-defined regions of interest (ROIs; described within the 
relevant chapters), I report activity that is significant at a voxel-level, FWE corrected 
threshold of p<0.05. For completeness, I also report any activity that survives whole-
brain cluster-wise corrected significance of p<0.05. All reported activity had a voxel-
level uncorrected significance of at least p<0.001. Anatomical ROIs were all defined 
through the WFU PickAtlas in SPM (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003; 
Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). 
 
2.5 Physiological measures and analysis 
In the 5
th
 experiment (Chapter 7), skin conductance responses were collected, 
to address task-related arousal indexed in activity of the sympathetic nervous system. 
Such responses reflect change in the electrical resistance of the skin, a parameter 
known to be sensitive the emotional state of the individual (e.g. Greenwald, Cook, & 
Lang, 1989; Manning & Melchiori, 1974). In my experiment, these recordings were 
collected, as described by Bach, Flandin, Friston, & Dolan (2009), using 8 mm 
Ag/AgCl cup electrodes and 0.5%NaCl gel on thenar/hypothenar of the non-
dominant hand. Constant voltage was provided by a custom-build coupler, and data 
was recorded using a 1401 signal converter and spike software (Cambridge 
Electronics Design). Data were z-transformed and analysed using dynamic causal 
modelling (Bach, Flandin, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).  
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2.6 Computational modelling of learning and decision-
making 
Two of my experiments use a model-based approach to assess mechanisms 
underlying learning and decision-making in the relevant task. Here, this approach is 
guided both by the modified expected utility literature described in section 1.3 of the 
Introduction and by classical models of operant learning (e.g. see Dayan & Abbott, 
2001, chap. 9).  
A model-based approach allows for building of a generative model that can 
replicate a particular effect, and so provides a way of understanding causal 
mechanisms in human, animal or inorganic patterns of behaviour. However, such an 
approach is heavily biased by assumptions about both the direction of an effect and 
about the mechanism itself (i.e. since one can only compare models, the resulting 
inference depends upon which models are compared). Model-free approaches, such 
as comparison of mean choice propensities after various previous outcome 
conditions (as described in section 2.3 above), provide an appropriate test of whether 
an effect exists as well as the nature of the particular effect. Model-free approaches 
are sensitive to various effects that may not have been predicted, though they do not 
provide an understanding of the mechanism underlying the observed effect (i.e. they 
are not specific when it comes to understanding the effect). A model-based approach, 
on the other hand, is not sensitive to effects that are not been predicted, and so is 
relatively more biased by our assumptions.
2
  
                                                 
2
 This is not to say that a model-free approach is completely unbiased, as any statistical test is biased 
by the type of test that is performed and how it is interpreted compared to a null hypothesis (which is 
still a form of model-comparison). It does, however, require fewer assumptions. 
Chapter 2: Introduction to the methodology
 
Page | 2.10  
 
Figure 2-1 illustrates this trade-off between sensitivity and specificity in 
model-free and model-based approaches. One way to improve the inferences made 
from a model-based approach is to guide our assumptions by the findings of a prior 
model-free analysis. Refining the assumptions in this way should allow for our 
inferences to approach a more optimal level, as indicated at the top right of the chart 
in Figure 2-1. As such, I combine both approaches to reach my conclusions in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 – Graphical illustration of the sensitivity-specificity trade-off encountered 
when empirically exploring the mechanisms underlying learning and behaviour. The optimal 
state is to maximise both ones sensitivity for an effect and one‟s specificity for capturing its 
underlying mechanism. 
 
The models I test in this thesis each involve a valuation stage, in which the 
values of various choice options are updated based on how one‟s experience diverges 
from one‟s prior expectations. This is followed by a decision stage, in which values 
are transformed into choice propensity. Predictions from each model are fit to 
participants‟ actual choices, optimising the model‟s free parameters to maximise the 
likelihood of the model given the choices. This is realised through a standard 
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gradient descent method (fminsearch in MATLAB). Negative log evidence (i.e. 
likelihoods) are penalised for the complexity of the model (i.e. the number of free 
parameters) by calculating the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 
1978). Smaller BIC scores indicate a better fit to the data, and model comparisons 
were performed in order to infer the underlying mechanism that best explains 
observed choices. 
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This chapter was originally published in a shorter form in Nicolle, Bach, Frith, & Dolan, 
(2010). Amygdala involvement in self-blame regret. Social Neuroscience, in press. 
 
 
Chapter 3. How important is self-blame in the 
experience of regret? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
“Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it.” 
George Bernard Shaw (1903) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, outcomes that could have been better from the 
same choice tend to induce feelings of disappointment, while outcomes that could 
have been better from a different choice induce feelings of regret (Roese & Olson, 
1995a). This focus on the different choice, or the between-option counterfactual 
comparison, invokes a prediction that regret depends upon self-blame, whereas 
disappointment is associated more with a sense of bad luck and/or powerlessness 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998). While some have suggested that “outcome regret” can be 
experienced without a feeling of self-blame (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; 
Simonson, 1992), a dominant view is that self-blame or responsibility is important, if 
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not necessary, for the experience of regret (see Connolly, Ordónez, & Coughlan, 
1997; Ordónez & Connolly, 2000; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000 
for a thorough review and discussion).  
The role of agency in modulating brain activity associated with choice 
outcomes has been highlighted by findings that ventral striatum responses to absolute 
losses and gains depend on agency (Coricelli et al., 2005). In fact in Chapter 6 of this 
thesis, I extend this finding by showing that agency also modulates ventral striatal 
responses to outcomes that are relatively better or worse than what might have been 
from a different choice. However, self-blame involves more than just agency over a 
choice, depending also on social norms and decision justifiability (Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002). For example, we may more easily justify a bad decision, thus 
reducing feelings of self-blame, if we know that others would have made a similar 
choice. Similarly, if others actually played a part in the bad decision, self-blame 
regret can be reduced by transferring responsibility to them. 
The likely importance of self-blame in regret led me to predict that regret-
related responses (both psychological and neurobiological) would be modulated by 
the degree to which a decision-maker feels responsible for an outcome. Thus, I 
designed an experiment where participants experienced outcomes of „played‟ and 
„unplayed‟ gambles under various levels of responsibility (a task modified from 
Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999, e.g. as in Chapter 1, Fig 1.1). This paradigm 
created situations where participants‟ experienced sense of responsibility for 
outcomes was systematically varied. This was realised by informing participants that 
each of their played gambles would depend on their own choice along with the votes 
of varying numbers of additional individuals. Here, I predicted that participants‟ 
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subjective sense of responsibility for gamble outcomes would decrease as a function 
of greater numbers of these “other voters”. 
Responsibility might be expected to be expressed in brain regions implicated 
in agency and motor control, including the insula and angular gyrus (Farrer et al., 
2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002), although such regions have previously been implicated 
only in being responsible, as opposed to feeling responsible. In relation to my central 
question, I predicted regret-related brain activity would be modulated by the degree 
to which an outcome of a played gamble is worse than that of the unplayed gamble in 
regions previously implicated in regret (including OFC, amygdala, hippocampus, 
ACC, insula and striatum, see Chapter 1, section 1.4), but only under higher levels of 
responsibility. 
 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants  
I recruited 18 participants (10 female) for the experiment. Participant age 
ranged between 19 and 30 yrs (mean = 23.67 yrs). Due to incomplete behavioural 
data collection, one participant was removed from the behavioural analysis, but 
included in the imaging analysis. A second participant was removed from the 
imaging analysis due to scanner malfunction, but was included in the behavioural 
analysis. A further participant was excluded as an outlier, after showing a correlation 
between regret-related outcomes and subjective ratings of regret that was negative 
and 2.5 standard deviations from the mean. 
 
Chapter 3: How important is self-blame in the experience of regret?
 
Page | 3.4  
 
3.2.2 Experimental procedure 
The aim of this study was to explore how subjective and neuronal responses 
to regret-related outcomes are modulated by responsibility. I used a task based on 
that of Mellers et al. (1999). Participants were instructed to choose between two 
“wheel-of-fortune” gambles on each trial, each incorporating a win and loss outcome 
with differing probabilities (25%, 50% or 75%) (e.g. see Figure 3-1). There were 24 
different gamble pairs, allowing for 4 different pairs per probability combination 
(e.g. 25% win against 50% win). Points allocated to the possible winning and losing 
outcomes were such that the two gambles in the pair were of equal expected value 
(EV) (i.e. probability of win × magnitude of possible win). In order to enhance 
feelings of skill in the game, 2 further pairs types made up 7% of trials and included 
one gamble of a clearly higher EV than the other. Details of the gamble pairs used 
are available in Appendix A.  
Participants were told that their choice would count as one vote towards 
which gamble was played. In mini-blocks of 5 trials, participants played in a group 
alongside 0, 2, 4, 6 or 8 other voters, who they believed to have performed the task in 
advance, but who were not real. After selecting their preferred gamble, the gamble 
receiving the highest number of votes from the group (including their own vote) was 
„played‟. When there were more than 0 other voters, there was a chance that the 
played gamble would not be congruent with the participant‟s own choice. The 
likelihood of participants‟ chosen gamble being played varied probabilistically as a 
function of the number of voters, such that increased number of voters meant an 
increased chance that their gamble was not played, and 0 other voters meant that 
their chosen gamble was always played. If the played gamble was incongruent with 
the participant‟s own gamble choice, the lowest sense of responsibility was 
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predicted, as participants were not the agents of the choice. If the played gamble was 
congruent with the participant‟s own gamble choice, however, participants‟ 
subjective sense of responsibility for gamble outcomes was predicted to decrease 
with increased numbers of “other voters”, even though participants were still the 
agents of the choice. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 – An exemplar trial timeline. Trials included a choice phase in which 
participants select their choice of gamble, with choice indicated by a blue box. For each gamble, 
outcome probabilities were indicated by wedge size, with corresponding outcomes written above 
in number of points. Number of other voters was also shown, but was constant for mini-blocks 
of 5 trials. A gamble selection stage followed, in which the gamble receiving the highest number 
of votes was indicated with a yellow box. This gamble was then played, with its outcome 
affecting participants‟ winnings whether chosen by them or not. Next, the outcome of both the 
played and unplayed gambles was revealed. 
 
After a 2 second delay, participants were then shown the points outcome of 
both the played and unplayed gamble. The outcome of played gamble, whether 
congruent or incongruent with their own gamble choice, determined participants‟ 
payment for the experiment. Participants received 50p for each percentage won of 
the maximum points they could have won in their game. This encouraged 
participants to compare the received outcome with what might have been under the 
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unplayed gamble, on a trial-by-trial basis. Participants were assumed to treat all trials 
as having an equal impact on their financial gain. 
Participants performed both a behavioural session and a scanning session, 
each occurring on separate days (order counterbalanced across participants). The 
behavioural session was optimised to gather trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret 
and responsibility for different outcome types. Here, participants played 320 trials in 
four sessions and, after every trial, provided two subjective ratings on a 100-point 
horizontal visual analogue scale (this was not practical in the scanning session). The 
starting position of the slider on each rating scale was random between the extremes 
of 1 and 100, in order to avoid anchoring effects. The rating questions comprised 
either a memory probe asking “How much bigger or smaller was the received gamble 
outcome than what might have been received from the unplayed gamble?” or a rating 
of subjective negative feeling comprising the following probes, “How positive or 
negative do you feel about the trial outcome?”, “How much regret do you feel for 
outcome?” and “How responsible do you feel for the outcome?” It was randomly 
decided which 2 of these 4 ratings would be presented on each trial. It was explained 
to participants that these ratings related to their response to the outcome of each trial.  
Only the memory test, and not the other ratings, was used during the scanning 
session (in 10% of trials) in order to enhance the tendency to think counterfactually. 
In the scanning session, participants also played 320 trials in four 8 minute games. 
 
3.2.3 Imaging acquisition and processing 
Participants were scanned with a single-shot gradient-echo EPI sequence 
optimised to reduce BOLD sensitivity losses in the orbitofrontal cortex due to 
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susceptibility artifacts, using a combination of increased spatial resolution in the 
readout direction and reduced echo time (Weiskopf et al., 2007). Imaging parameters 
were as follows: 48 oblique transverse slices tilted by 30
o
, resolution of 1.5mm in the 
readout direction and 3mm in the PE direction, slice thickness = 2 mm, gap between 
slices = 1 mm, repetition time TR = 3.12 s, α = 90o, echo time TE = 25 ms, 
bandwidth (BW) = 1,953 Hz/pixel, phase-encoding (PE) direction anterior-posterior, 
field of view (FOV) = 192×192 mm
2
, matrix size 128×64, z-shim gradient pre-pulse 
moment = -1.4 mT/m×ms. 
Image preprocessing and data analysis were implemented using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software in Matlab2009a (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, at UCL), as described in Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
 
3.2.4 Analysis of subjective ratings 
I operationalised “regret-related outcomes” as those where the outcome of the 
played gamble showed a negative discrepancy with (i.e. is worse than) that of the 
unplayed gamble. Critically this outcome discrepancy relates to a between-option 
counterfactual comparison. The design incorporated a continuous variable of this 
between-gamble negative outcome discrepancy (i.e. received outcome – foregone 
outcome). I predicted that subjective ratings of regret (as well as negative affect) 
would increase with increasingly negative outcome discrepancy. I also predicted that 
subjective ratings of responsibility would decrease with increasing number of other 
voters. Finally, I predicted that the relationship between subjective regret and 
negative outcome discrepancy would depend upon both subjective and objective 
measures of responsibility. I used linear regressions to test for continuous 
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relationships between outcome discrepancy and subjective ratings of regret, since the 
independent variables were on a continuous scale. To test the relationship between 
subjective responsibility and number of voters and choice congruence, I used a 
repeated-measures ANOVA, allowing for the effects of these discrete factors of 
objective responsibility to be addressed.  
To assess the main hypothesis that regret depends on choice responsibility, 
and the degree thereof, I tested a multiple regression model with subjective ratings of 
regret as the dependent variable. The model entered as independent variables the 
outcome discrepancy (a continuous variable from extreme positive to extreme 
negative) along with the interaction of this discrepancy with a measure of 
responsibility (outcome discrepancy × responsibility). For the latter, three distinct 
measures of responsibility were tested comprising subjective ratings of 
responsibility, choice congruency, and the number of other voters. For its descriptive 
value, I also performed an ANOVA, similar to that described above in the case of 
subjective responsibility, to test the relationship between subjective regret and 
number of voters and choice congruence for negatively discrepant outcomes only 
(i.e. only for those outcomes objectively thought to induce regret, rather than relief). 
As multiple subjective ratings were obtained from each participant, along 
parametric continuums of regret, responsibility and negative feeling, these ratings 
were standardised for each participant, to avoid anchoring effects, and the 
standardised regression coefficients for all analyses were calculated on an individual 
subject basis. I report mean standardised regression coefficients from the between-
subjects level of a hierarchical linear model. Finally, with a one-sample t-test, I 
tested whether participants‟ answers on the post-trial memory tests showed 
performance significantly above chance. This allowed for verification that 
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participants were taking into account both the outcomes received from the chosen 
and the alternative outcome of the unchosen gamble on each and every trial. 
 
3.2.5 Imaging analysis 
For the fMRI analysis, I used a two variable parametric design, with one 
factor for the number of other voters (0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 other voters), comprising the 
manipulation of responsibility, and one factor for level of outcome discrepancy, 
which ranged from -200 to +200 points. This factor was transformed such that 
positive numbers were regret-related (i.e. negative outcome discrepancy). An 
additional two level factor was expected to influence sense of responsibility, and 
comprised whether or not a participant‟s choice of gamble was congruent or 
incongruent with the gamble selected by the majority vote. 
For each participant, an event-related GLM included 9 regressors of interest. 
These comprised one regressor for the onsets of trial outcomes at each level of 
responsibility, separated out as 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 other voters. Trials in which there 
were more than 0 other voters were further segregated as a function of whether 
participants‟ choices were congruent, or incongruent, with the gamble selected by the 
majority vote. In trials with 0 other voters, participants‟ choices were always 
congruent with the gamble selected, as participants were the only voter. Each of 
these 9 regressors was parametrically modulated by a mean-corrected regressor of 
outcome discrepancy. Positive values of this parametric regressor were regret-related 
outcomes (i.e. negatively discrepant). Onsets were modelled with stick-functions at 
the time at which participants received outcome feedback, convolved with a 
canonical HRF and its temporal derivative.  
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I generated statistical parametric maps from my contrasts of interest, 
including the main effects of responsibility. Here, I were particularly interested in 
probing activity within the regions of interest (ROIs) reported by Farrer & Frith 
(2002), as involved in decreased (the angular gyrus) and increased motor control (the 
insula). As mentioned above, while these regions are implicated in simple motor 
responsibility (or agency), they may also be involved in processing variations in 
blame based upon how easily we can transfer outcome responsibility externally (of 
key importance for decision justification models of regret, e.g. Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002).  
Next I tested the main effect of negative outcome discrepancy (as a linear 
parametric effect) where I was interested in activity that increased with greater levels 
of negative outcome discrepancy independent of level of responsibility, as well as 
(using a conjunction analysis) brain activity that showed significantly increased 
response to negative outcome discrepancy across all levels of responsibility. I tested 
for these effects within anatomical ROIs in regions previously implicated in the 
experience of regret and regret induced decision bias, including OFC, anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), amygdala, hippocampus, insula, and striatum each defined 
anatomically and bilaterally. To address the hypothesis that regret-related responses 
are modulated by responsibility I compared the response to increasingly negative 
outcome discrepancy under full responsibility (i.e. 0 other voters) with that when 
other voters were present. Critically this contrast was performed only on trials where 
the participant‟s own chosen gamble was played (i.e. congruent choice). 
Additionally, I compared response to increasingly negative outcome discrepancy 
under congruent choice versus incongruent choice.  
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3.3 Behavioural results 
A one sample t-test confirmed that participants had above chance memory for 
whether the outcome received from played gambles were better or worse than that 
which might have been received from the unplayed gamble, as determined by post-
trial memory questions (t(15) = 15.09, p < 0.001, mean percent correct = 91.3%). 
This showed that participants were aware of both the received and the unplayed 
alternative outcomes on each trial. Mean earnings were £12.20 (SD £2.64) in the 
behavioural session, and £22.43 (SD £2.67) in the scanning session. 
The predicted linear effect of number of voters was found on subjective 
ratings of responsibility (F(1,15) = 49.5, p < 0.001), reflecting an increased sense of 
responsibility with decreased number of other voters. This linear effect was also 
significant within congruent choice trials alone (F(1,15) = 24.0, p < 0.001), i.e. when 
participants had chosen the played gamble, but not within incongruent choice trials 
(F(1,15) = 0.6, ns). There were also significant quadratic (F(1,15) = 9.1, p < 0.01) 
and cubic (F(1,15) = 5.6, p < 0.05) effects of voters in the congruent choice 
condition, indicating that the influence of number of voters on subjective 
responsibility is not purely linear. Furthermore, participants showed significantly 
higher ratings of responsibility for congruent than incongruent choice trials (F(1,15) 
= 46.9, p < 0.001) (Figure 3-2-a, blue line). 
Single-subject standardised regression coefficients, taken forward to a 
between-subject one-sample t-test, showed that increasingly negative outcome 
discrepancy significantly predicted greater subjective ratings of regret (mean R = 
0.52, t(15) = 8.04, p < 0.001). This showed a successful manipulation of subjective 
regret by outcome discrepancy. More negatively discrepant outcomes also 
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significantly predicted increased general negative affect (mean R = 0.71, t(15) = 
14.19, p < 0.001). 
A multiple regression analysis indicated that increased responsibility 
amplified the tendency for participants to report high subjective feelings of regret for 
outcomes with increasingly negative discrepancy. That is, outcomes were rated as 
more regretful when they were both more negative than what would have been from 
the alternative gamble and when participants felt more responsible. The three 
regression models used indicated that this effect was significant for all of the three 
measures of responsibility; namely, decreased number of voters (t(15) = 2.82, p < 
0.02), increased subjective ratings of responsibility (t(15) = 3.83, p < 0.002), and 
choice congruency (t(15) = 3.29, p < 0.005).  
I show the regression coefficients for the three regression models in Figure 
3-2-c. These regression models were not restricted to negatively discrepant outcomes 
(i.e. they include the full spectrum of outcome discrepancy), and were performed 
using continuous functions of subjective responsibility and outcome discrepancy. To 
further illustrate the direction of this effect, I show subjective regret for just 
negatively discrepant outcomes under the different levels of objective responsibility 
in Figure 3-2-a (red line), and under a median split of high and low subjective 
responsibility in Figure 3-2-b. In an ANOVA, I found a linear effect of number of 
voters on subjective ratings of regret for negatively discrepant outcomes (F(1,15) = 
18.7, p < 0.001), reflected in increased regret with decreased number of other voters. 
The linear effect was significant within congruent choice trials alone (F(1,14) = 6.8, 
p < 0.05), i.e. when participants had chosen the played gamble, but not within 
incongruent choice trials (F(1,14) = 0.3, ns). Participants also showed significantly 
higher ratings of regret for congruent than incongruent choice trials (F(1,15) = 30.7, 
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p < 0.001) (Figure 3-2-a, red line), and for high compared to low subjective 
responsibility (t(13) = 4.5, p < 0.001) (Figure 3-2-b). 
 
 
Figure 3-2 – Panel a) shows gradually decreasing mean normalised ratings of subjective 
responsibility (blue line) and of subjective regret (red line) under congruent and incongruent 
choices with 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 other voters, otherwise considered objective responsibility. For 
clarity, subjective regret ratings here are shown only for negatively discrepant outcomes, i.e. 
where the outcome of the played gamble was worse than the outcome of the unplayed gamble. 
Panel b) shows the mean normalised subjective ratings of regret, displayed as a median splot of 
low and high subjective ratings of responsibility, for negatively discrepant outcomes. Panel c) 
shows the mean regression coefficients for the three regression models used, each indicating that 
the predictive value of outcome discrepancy (Odiff) on subjective ratings of regret is greatly 
enhanced by multiplying this Odiff by either of the three measures of responsibility (number of 
voters, subjective rating of responsibility, or choice congruence). Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean across participants. 
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3.4 fMRI results 
3.4.1 Manipulation of responsibility 
I examined the effect of linearly decreasing responsibility, following the 
pattern shown in Figure 3-2-a. While no areas showed a significant effect of 
increasing responsibility, I found significant effects in superior frontal cortex (MNI 
51, 26, 31), brainstem (MNI 0, -34, -26) and left insula (MNI -45, 14, -8) for 
decreasing responsibility. In the a priori ROIs, right angular gyrus activity (within a 
20mm sphere radius of the coordinates reported by Farrer & Frith, 2002) 
significantly increased with decreasing responsibility (MNI 57, -43, 34), as did 
bilateral insula (MNI right 30, 20, -11 and left -45, 14, -8). No regions dissociated, at 
the time of outcome, between played gambles that were congruent or incongruent 
with the participant‟s own choice, at a whole brain corrected level. However, right 
insula activity showed such an effect within the a priori ROI of bilateral insula (MNI 
30, 20, -14). 
 
3.4.2 Manipulation of regret 
Averaged across all levels of responsibility I found significantly increased 
activity as outcomes became linearly more negatively discrepant in left angular gyrus 
and lateral OFC (Figure 3-3-a). Activity in other a priori regret-related ROIs (in the 
amygdala, hippocampus, ACC and insula) did not show this effect. Crucially, no 
regions showed responsibility-invariant responses to negatively discrepant outcomes, 
as evident in a conjunction analysis, providing evidence against a neural 
representation of what a purely outcome-based form of regret. Instead, regret-related 
responses in angular gyrus and lateral OFC appeared to be dependent upon the level 
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of responsibility. However, it is important to note that the reduced power inherent in 
such a conjunction analysis means that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that such 
responsibility-invariant responses do exist. 
To address whether activity associated with negative outcome discrepancy is 
modulated by level of responsibility, I restricted the analysis to congruent choice 
trials, i.e. where the participant‟s chosen gamble was played. This was since 
negatively discrepant outcomes received in incongruent choice trials were associated 
with participants actually having been the agents of the post-hoc better choice. 
Within a priori anatomical ROIs implicated in regret, I found no regions showing an 
entirely linear enhanced response to more negatively discrepant outcomes by 
decreased number of other voters (i.e. increased responsibility). However, in keeping 
with the marked step-like decrease in rated responsibility from 0 to 2 or more other 
voters (shown in Figure 3-2-a), I found that left amygdala activity was enhanced for 
more negatively discrepant outcomes during full responsibility trials, and not when 
there were any number of other voters (Figure 3-3-b and c) (within anatomically 
specified bilateral ROI of the amygdala). A linear interaction of outcome discrepancy 
and responsibility (within congruent choice trials) was seen in right amygdala 
activity but only in participants who showed a greater enhancement of subjective 
regret by responsibility in the separate behavioural session, as indexed by a greater 
difference between the first two bars of Figure 3-2-c. This effect (shown in Figure 
3-3-d) was also seen in left amygdala at a trend level of significance. 
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Figure 3-3 – Group SPM data, thresholded at p<0.005 for display purposes, shown on a 
normalised canonical template brain.  a) Activity in angular gyrus (peak at -42, -64, 25) and 
lateral OFC (peak at 51, 38, -11) associated with the average effect of linearly increasing 
negative outcome discrepancy. b) Enhanced activity in amygdala (peak -18, -1, -20) associated 
with increasingly negatively outcome discrepancy during full responsibility (0 other voters) 
compared to other congruent choice trials in the presence of other voters. Plotted in c) are the 
beta weights showing the same amygdala response to increasingly negative outcome discrepancy 
under the different numbers of other voters. d) Right amygdala activity (peak 30, 5, -26) 
showing greater linear effect of increased responsibility on its response to more negatively 
discrepant outcomes (FWE corrected) in those participants exhibiting a greater enhancement of 
subjective regret ratings by increased responsibility (decreased number of voters) as indexed by 
a greater difference between the first two bars of Figure 3-2-c. Co-ordinates are in MNI space. 
Error bars are standard error of the mean.  
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By contrast, activity in middle cingulate cortex and angular gyrus showed an 
increased response to more negatively discrepant outcomes, when the played gamble 
was incongruent (whole brain cluster-level corrected p < 0.05), compared to when it 
was congruent with the participant‟s own choice. This indicates a role of middle 
cingulate cortex and angular gyrus in the processing of regret-related outcomes that 
are externally enforced. Furthermore, activity in middle cingulate cortex, left angular 
gyrus, and lateral OFC responsive to average effect of regret-related outcomes 
(Figure 3-3a), showed a greater response to more negatively discrepant outcomes on 
these incongruent trials compared to congruent trials (although this was only at p < 
0.005 uncorrected level for the lateral OFC). This indicates that regret-related 
activity in these regions is not associated with self-blame, but perhaps rather to an 
external attribution of blame. This possibility will be explored further in section 3.6 
below. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Here I have shown that subjective ratings of experienced regret depend both 
on the outcome being worse than what might have been from a different action and 
on perceived responsibility. Moreover, I provide new evidence that subjective regret 
depends upon level of subjective responsibility even though the individual‟s own 
choice or action directly contributed to the regret-related outcome (as in the case of 
congruent trials). These findings indicate that regret is not just a function of being the 
agent of a choice but also depends upon subtle changes in sense of responsibility, or 
accountability, for the outcomes of our actions.  
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In keeping with these behavioural effects regret-related neuronal activity in 
the amygdala was enhanced by increased responsibility, suggesting a critical role in 
„self-blame regret‟. This effect was magnified in participants who displayed a greater 
enhancement of their subjective ratings of regret by responsibility. Interestingly, I did 
not find any brain regions responding to what has been termed “outcome regret”, i.e. 
showing invariant responses to regret-related outcomes under all levels of 
responsibility. This suggests that, as for the psychological experience of regret, the 
way the brain processes regretful events may crucially depend upon a sense of 
responsibility. 
The human amygdala is known to be important in emotional memory (Cahill, 
Babinsky, Markowitsch, & McGaugh, 1995; Richardson, Strange, & Dolan, 2004; 
Strange & Dolan, 2004) and in learning stimulus-reward associations (Büchel, 
Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998; Gottfried, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003; LaBar, 
Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998; Whalen et al., 2004). A critical model of 
the amygdala for the present study relates to its putative role in “relevance detection” 
(Bach et al., 2008; Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). This proposes that the 
amygdala is involved in focussing attentional and physiological resources towards 
cues that have special relevance for our safety or success. Amygdala activation is 
found in socially relevant situations, such as viewing untrustworthy or novel faces 
(Winston, Strange, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; Wright et al., 2003) or following eye 
gaze (Kawashima et al., 1999), along with especially self-relevant situations, e.g. 
when one‟s own name is presented during sleep (Portas et al., 2000). Moreover, the 
amygdala is implicated in biasing future decisions by previous regret (Coricelli et al., 
2005), emphasising its importance in goal-directed motivation of behaviour. Regret 
associated with high responsibility for its occurrence is an experience with particular 
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self-relevance, while also being a strong motivator of future behaviour. 
Experimentally, self-blame regret is known to motivate active attempts to (or 
intentions to) undo unpleasant events (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 
1998). A failure to appropriately accept responsibility for our mistakes may interfere 
with learning the accurate associations between our actions and their outcomes, 
which are vital for us to adapt future behaviour to improve our wellbeing. 
Specifically, self-relevant information may be passed to the amygdala from other 
cortical regions involved in the particular task at hand (for example, I have shown 
information about responsibility and between-option outcome comparisons to be 
associated with activity in the angular gyrus and prefrontal cortex). It may then be 
used by the amygdala to allocate processing resources to cortical mechanisms 
appropriate for motivating adaptive behaviour. In keeping with such a framework, 
evidence suggests that the amygdala imparts information necessary for acquiring 
stimulus-reward associations to the OFC, which uses this information to guide 
behaviour (Arana et al., 2003; Pickens et al., 2003; Schoenbaum, Gottfried, Murray, 
& Ramus, 2007), allowing for behavioural flexibility in accordance with our goals 
(Morris & Dolan, 2004). 
In summary, I provide evidence that self-blame should be included as a 
necessary precursor to the experience of regret, alongside the upward between-option 
counterfactual comparison. I also show that in the amygdala – a region important in 
gathering personally relevant information, in forming stimulus-reward associations, 
and in guiding future behaviour – response to outcomes that could have been better 
from a different choice are enhanced by responsibility, even when a free choice has 
been made. This highlights a particular role of the amygdala in the self-blame 
component of our experiences of regret. 
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3.6 Further findings related to blaming others 
A problem faced when studying the neural representation of self-blame regret 
is that people use strategies that regulate their aversive experiences. In an elegant 
paper by Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007, see also Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2007), the 
mechanisms of regret-regulation are discussed. They reason that regret is an aversive 
emotion that we are motivated either to avoid or, once it is unavoidably elicited, to 
regulate, modulate or suppress. One such regulation strategy, they argue, involves 
denying or deferring responsibility for the relevant action/decision. In the context of 
consumer decision-making, an example would be to blame a sales advisor for a bad 
product choice so as to reduce one‟s own feeling of regret. A separate stream of 
research into attribution biases also finds that people often attribute their own 
behaviour to uncontrollable, external causes, while attributing the behaviour of 
others to their internal disposition when the behaviour, or its outcome, is unpleasant 
(e.g. Jones & Harris, 1967; Storms, 1973). Cialdini, Braver, & Lewis (1974) showed 
that observers made more dispositional inferences about an actor when such 
inferences serve to improve their own self-image. As well as improving mood and 
self-esteem, this bias may be driven by a desire to feel in control of our environment 
(e.g. Miller, 1978; Miller & Norman, 1975), and to better predict the future 
behaviour of others (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1971). 
Such attribution bias is dependent on the outcome of the behaviour. 
Individuals tend to make dispositional attributions, i.e. take more personal 
responsibility, for their own behaviour when it results in a success, while making 
external attributions, i.e. transferring responsibility, when failure ensues. This effect 
has been associated with a self-serving bias and is widely replicated (e.g. Beckman, 
1970; Johnson, Feigenbaum, & Weiby, 1964; Miller, 1976; Streufert & Streufert, 
Chapter 3: How important is self-blame in the experience of regret?
 
Page | 3.21  
 
1969; Wolosin, 1973; Wortman, Costanzo, & Witt, 1973). For example, Johnson et 
al. (1964) found that teachers tended to accept responsibility for any improvement in 
their students‟ performance, but tended to blame the children for any lack of 
improvement. Beckman (1970) showed also that external observers attributed less 
responsibility to the teacher for successes than did the teacher themselves, suggesting 
that the teacher‟s bias was motivated by a desire to protect their esteem. This form of 
self-protecting, emotional regulation could be conceptualised as follows: The 
stronger the regret induced by a regrettable outcome, the more these regret-
regulatory strategies are promoted. While self-blame would usually play a role in 
enhancing feelings of self-blame regret, these regulatory strategies act to reduce the 
experience of regret and perhaps also its neuronal representation. In Figure 3-4, I 
illustrate how regretful outcomes may excite regret-regulatory strategies, including 
denial or deferral of blame, with an aim to improve mood. Such strategies, however, 
inhibit a sense of blame for the regrettable outcome, which has the consequence of 
reducing regret. 
 
 
Figure 3-4 – 
Possible mechanism of a 
self-protecting attribution 
bias in the regulation of 
regret, either behaviourally 
or neuronally. Solid lines 
indicate excitatory effects, 
while broken lines indicate 
inhibition. 
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3.6.1 Regret reduces subjective responsibility 
I also explored the current data to examine the possibility that highly 
regrettable outcomes may actually be associated with decreased subjective ratings of 
responsibility compared to less regrettable outcomes (in line with pathways a and b 
in Figure 3-4). In Figure 3-5 and Figure 3-6, the blue lines illustrate that participants 
indeed tend to report lower subjective responsibility for outcomes with higher 
negative discrepancy. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis found that both 
subjective regret (t(15) = -3.914, p < 0.001) and negative outcome discrepancy (t(15) 
= -4.771, p < 0.001) significantly diminished the tendency to claim high 
responsibility for trials with lower number of other voters. That is, participants were 
less likely to report feeling responsible for objectively high responsibility trials when 
the outcome was relatively more regretful.  
 
Figure 3-5 – The figure shows the mean normalised actual outcome discrepancy for 
negatively discrepant outcome trials only, separated according to a median split of participants‟ 
subjective ratings of responsibility. The figure shows that more negatively discrepant outcomes 
are associated with lower ratings of subjective responsibility. Error bars show the standard 
error of the mean. 
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3.6.2 The aversive experience of low responsibility 
Higher ratings of disappointment may be associated with lower responsibility 
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998). If regret is reduced by the regulatory strategy illustrated in 
Figure 3-4, disappointment may then be the more salient and painful emotional 
response in conditions in which responsibility can be deferred. I tested whether such 
an effect was apparent in the subjective negative feeling ratings collected in the 
present study. For this, I implemented a further multiple regression model, now with 
subjective negative feeling as the dependent variable. The model entered as 
independent variables the outcome discrepancy along with the interaction of this 
discrepancy with a measure of responsibility. Analogous to the initial model with 
subjective regret as the dependent variable, I tested the effects of subjective ratings 
of responsibility, choice congruency, and the number of other voters separately. This 
analysis found that participants were more likely to say they felt negative about 
negatively discrepant outcomes when they were less responsible. This was 
significant for decreased subjective ratings of responsibility (t(15) = 9.249, p < 
0.001) and choice incongruency (t(15) = 6.179, p < 0.001), but not for objective 
number of voters (t(15) = 0.873, ns). The red line in Figure 3-6 illustrates that 
participants felt more negative affect for lower subjective responsibility trials. 
The regions that had shown an average effect of increasing negative outcome 
discrepancy described above, i.e. middle cingulate cortex (MNI -6, -4, 40) angular 
gyrus (MNI -42, -64, 19) and lateral OFC activity (MNI 42, 38, -8), responded more 
to increasing negative outcome discrepancy within incongruent choice trials 
compared to in congruent choice trials, as described in 3.4.2. These effects were 
apparent within a functional mask taken from the original average effect of negative 
outcomes discrepancy (with a p < 0.005 mask threshold). Within congruent trials 
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alone, posterior cingulate cortex also showed a greater response to increasingly 
negative outcome discrepancy with increasing number of other voters (i.e. linearly 
decreased responsibility) (MNI 12, -37, 31), as did the right angular gyrus (MNI 57, -
58, 34) and dorsal striatum (MNI 9, 8, 16) (see Figure 3-7). This dorsal striatal 
response is interesting in relation to findings that of dorsal striatum involvement in 
self-serving biases (Blackwood et al., 2003; Seidel et al., 2010). 
 
 
Figure 3-6- In red, the figure shows the mean normalised subjective ratings of negative 
feeling, for negatively discrepant outcome trials only, separated according to a median split of 
participants‟ subjective ratings of responsibility. This illustrates that participants felt more 
negative feeling for trials with lower ratings of subjective responsibility. In blue, the mean 
normalised actual outcome discrepancy for the same trials are presented, showing that more 
regretful outcomes are associated with lower subjective ratings of responsibility, as in Figure 3-
5. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3-7- Group SPM data, thresholded at p < 0.005 for display purposes, shown on a 
normalised canonical template brain.  Activity in posterior cingulate (peak 12, -37, 31) and 
caudate body (peak 9, 8, 16) associated with response to increasingly negatively discrepant 
outcomes, where this increase is greater with more other voters (i.e. decreasing objective 
responsibility). This contrast was performed on congruent trials only. Co-ordinates are in MNI 
space. 
 
3.7 General discussion 
In this study, subjective ratings of regret were enhanced by increased 
responsibility, with this self-blame regret recruiting activity in the amygdala as 
discussed in section 3.5 above. Paradoxically, additional analyses showed that 
individuals also actively reduce their feeling of responsibility for relatively worse 
outcomes, in keeping with the model of regret-regulation shown in Figure 3-4. This 
is analogous to a self-serving (self-protective) bias, and may reduce a conscious 
feeling of regret. When participants must make their gamble choice in the complete 
absence of any external force to which they could reasonably transfer blame (i.e. in 
the case of 0 other voters in this task), self-blame remains high, and amygdala 
activity reflects the personal relevance of this experience. On the other hand, as the 
number of other voters increases, the potential to transfer blame does so also. Under 
such conditions, the experience of regret and its associated amygdala response is 
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diluted and cingulate, angular gyrus, lateral OFC and dorsal striatum are more likely 
to be involved.  
The tendency for participants to report feeling less responsible when the 
outcome was relatively worse was associated with increased activity in the angular 
gyrus, a region previously implicated in external attributions of agency (Farrer et al., 
2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; Ruby & Decety, 2001). Similar inferior parietal/angular 
gyrus activation has been previously implicated in regret (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; 
Coricelli et al., 2005). If activation in the angular gyrus is associated with decreased 
sense of responsibility, then previously reported activity here may actually reflect a 
regret-regulatory denial of responsibility for the aversive outcome, rather than the 
experience of regret itself. 
Here, decreased responsibility was also associated with greater negative 
feeling, even though such outcomes elicit less regret. While in keeping with previous 
findings (e.g. Zeelenberg et al., 1998), these results are original here in that I show 
them as trial-by-trial recordings of actual emotional experience. This finding 
provides evidence that regret is dissociable from general negative affect, both 
phenomenologically and in its neural correlates. It is perhaps surprising that lateral 
OFC is involved in negatively discrepant outcomes without responsibility, since both 
medial and lateral OFC have previously been implicated in the experience of regret 
(Camille et al., 2004; Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns, 2008; Chua, 
Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Coricelli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007). 
Medial-lateral differences in OFC involvement in this task may be driven by the 
associated feeling of responsibility. It is temping to speculate that lateral OFC 
response reflects anger, frustration or loss of control in participants, on the realisation 
that other voters produced a bad outcome for the group. The finding of strong 
Chapter 3: How important is self-blame in the experience of regret?
 
Page | 3.27  
 
negative affect associated with low responsibility in the task, along with reports that 
lateral OFC processes the unpleasantness of external stimuli (e.g. Anderson et al., 
2003), supports this view.  
The posterior cingulate, which shows the strongest response to bad outcomes 
for which the individual is not responsible, has been implicated in the selective 
allocation of attention, including cue-induced visuo-spatial bias (Small et al., 2003), 
a bias that may reflect a motivational shift in our attention towards the external world 
(Mesulam, Nobre, Kim, Parrish, & Gitelman, 2001). Frith, Friston, Liddle, & 
Frackowiak (1991) found decreases in posterior cingulate activity during the 
production of willed action relative to externally specified actions, supporting its role 
in externally focused attention. Tomlin et al. (2006) also found similar activity when 
observing a self-relevant decision of another player in a social exchange game, 
hinting that this external focus may be of a particularly social nature. This is also 
fitting with increased posterior cingulate activity during theory of mind tasks 
(Fletcher et al., 1995). While we find similar regions involved when bad outcomes 
were caused by externally enforced decisions, the same areas are not active for the 
main effect of these incongruent choices, suggesting this activity depends on 
evaluation of outcome valence and not simply an attention shift. Others have shown 
middle cingulate cortex activity involved in externally induced pain, either physical 
or emotional, along with induced anxiety (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Kimbrell 
et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000; Nielsen, Balslev, & Hansen, 2004; Ploghaus, Becerra, 
Borras, & Borsook, 2003). Increased activity in posterior cingulate has also been 
implicated in major depression (Ho et al., 1996), while healthy individuals also show 
a posterior cingulate response to threat-related words (Maddock & Buonocore, 
1997). This role of the posterior or middle cingulate cortex in our response to 
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externally induced threats, and the finding that it is also active when we are more 
helpless in avoiding negative outcomes, may suggest a particular importance for 
understanding feelings of helplessness in depression. 
Surprisingly, these results suggest that self-blame regret may be a less 
aversive experience than the feelings of helplessness, frustration and anger associated 
with externally induced bad outcomes. One possible reason for this, as discussed 
above, is that regret-regulatory strategies (e.g. those depicted Figure 3-4) attenuate 
the experience and neuronal representation of self-blame regret. It is also possible 
that outcomes associated with self-blame are less aversive because they allow for 
learning and adaptive modification of future behaviour, while outcomes for which 
we were not responsible are not associated with this „hope‟ for future change. To 
provide some further insight into the behavioural effects of self-blame associated 
outcomes, in the next chapter I question whether we actually learn better when we 
are actively involved in the decisions, e.g. through trial-and-error learning.
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A shorter form of this study is submitted under the following reference: Nicolle, Symmonds 
& Dolan, (2010). Optimistic biases in observational learning of value. 
 
 
Chapter 4. Does agency help or hinder learning? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many instances of everyday learning rely on trial-and-error. Here, we must 
sample between alternative actions and risk unfavourable outcomes in the early 
stages of learning, when action-outcome contingencies are unknown. Learning can 
also occur through observing the successes and failures of others, enabling us to 
acquire knowledge vicariously (i.e. without personal agency). The passivity involved 
in observational learning allows it to support “locally adaptive behaviours without 
incurring the costs associated with individual learning” (Boyd & Richerson, 1988, p. 
30). This benefits of observational learning are ubiquitous in nature. For example, a 
hungry animal can avoid the energy costs incurred in active sampling of optimal 
feeding locations by observing actions and outcomes of conspecifics. A proliferation 
of customer review websites epitomises the utility of learning through the positive 
and negative experiences of others, so obviating our own need for expensive 
decisions.  
Surprisingly, the efficacy of observational learning is rarely studied in the 
context of human value learning. Empirical evidence from animals attests to the fact 
that rewarded behaviour is promoted, and punished behaviour diminished, in passive 
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observers (e.g. Bandura, 1971; Dawson & Foss, 1965; Heyes & Dawson, 1990; 
Mineka & Cook, 1988; Weigl & Hanson, 1980). For example, budgerigars show 
imitation of rewarded behaviours but a diminution of such behaviour if the observed 
consequences are not rewarded, suggesting that vicariously conditioned responses 
are goal-directed and not a mere mimicry of an observed action (Heyes & Saggerson, 
2002; Heyes, 1994). However, despite these data, evidence for the effectiveness of 
observational learning is inconsistent. Church (1959), for example, found that rats 
observing lights predicting a shock to a model do not generalise these contingencies 
to their own risk preferences. 
Several critical differences can be highlighted between vicarious and active 
value learning, which may lead to differences in information acquisition. One 
important factor is motivation, a key variable in Bandura's (1977) social learning 
theory, given that passive observers do not directly incur costs or benefits during 
learning. The previous study finds that responsibility is vital for experiences of 
regret, an emotion we are motivated to avoid. A preparative role of regret would 
suggest that superior learning may occur under conditions in which regret can be 
experienced, associated with the motivation to avoid future regret. Regret can also 
increase vigilance and carefulness, as measured by decision duration and amount of 
information search (Reb, 2008). By being unaffected directly by the outcomes of the 
actor‟s decisions, an observer will not anticipate possible regret, which may result in 
a decreased motivation to learn.  
An alternative view is that emotions might impair learning by distracting us 
from, or “crowding out”, our goals (Loewenstein, 1996). They may also bias our 
memory for the frequency of past events (cf. emotional biases of eyewitness 
testimonies, e.g. Loftus, 1996). Emotions, such as regret, may lead to a distorted 
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(perhaps especially inflated) estimate of the likelihood of future bad outcomes. 
Indeed, excessive anticipation of regret has been linked to procrastination or decision 
avoidance (Janis & Mann, 1977). Consistent with this “dark side of emotion”, 
individuals with attenuated emotional responses to the outcomes of risky decisions 
sometimes show more advantageous decision-making (Shiv, Loewenstein, & 
Bechara, 2005). While regret would clearly be beneficial if it helped us learn from 
past mistakes, it may have unfavourable effects if it drives us towards suboptimal 
decisions, decision delay or avoidance, or excessive anxiety. As such, by not 
experiencing regret, observers might be expected to show relatively improved 
learning. 
Operant and observational learning may also differ in how attention is 
allocated during learning. As discussed above, anticipated emotions may globally 
increase the attention focused on learning as well as the incentive to learn. Moreover, 
recognising a causal link between actions and consequences is vital for learning 
optimal behaviours, and a sense of agency may increase the salience of such 
information. An enhanced salience of counterfactual information, and attention to 
between-option comparisons, may also improve action-outcome contingency 
learning and is predicted to be greater when agents anticipate and experience regret. 
Observers may place less weight on counterfactual information, since regret/relief is 
not expected to occur alongside learning. 
In the three experiments presented in this chapter, I make a controlled 
comparison between active and observational learning in the context of human 
probabilistic value learning. I implemented a task where individuals learnt either by 
active sampling (with associated reward and punishment) or by passive observation. 
I assessed learning efficacy as shown by goal-directed choices and individuals‟ 
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explicit estimates of value. All aspects of the tasks, save for the critical factor of self 
versus other choice, were matched across two modes of value learning. Specifically, 
differences in attention and information were controlled, as participants could track 
the same sequences of outcomes in both learning conditions. Moreover, between-
option counterfactual comparisons could always be made and agency was the only 
regret-related factor manipulated. Motivation to learn was also controlled, since 
participants earned money according to learning performance in both conditions. It is 
important to note, of course, that this control did not preclude the possibility that 
actors and observers would have different internally generated incentives, and 
differences in attention, during learning.   
 
4.2 Experiment 1 
4.2.1 Participants  
17 healthy participants took part in experiment 1. Participants failing to reach 
a criterion of 60% accuracy in either (i.e. both) session were removed from analysis, 
being classified as overall non-learners, i.e. considered as failing to engage 
sufficiently with the task. This was the case only for one participant, leaving 16 
participants for the full analysis (9 female, mean age = 23.8 yrs, SD = 3.0).  
 
4.2.2 Procedure 
Participants completed two sessions on consecutive days. In the first (the 
„actor session‟), participants made choices between four abstract stimuli (letters from 
Agathodaimon font), presented in different pairs on each trial, while concurrently 
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attempting to learn the probability of winning from each. Each stimulus was 
associated with a discrete and constant probability of winning (p{win}), and 
outcomes of each stimulus were drawn independently on every trial. Outcomes of 
both the chosen and unchosen stimuli were then shown sequentially, with yellow and 
red boxes indicating winning and losing outcomes, respectively. Critically, these 
outcomes directly influenced participant‟s earnings for the actor session (with £1 
awarded for each chosen win from 10 randomly selected trials). Participants were 
instructed to choose the stimulus with the highest p{win} on every trial in order to 
maximise earnings.  
On day 2 (the „observer session‟), participants learned the values of a novel 
set of stimuli. Participants were given an instruction that this time they would 
observe choices made previously by another participant, along with their associated 
outcomes. While they were not provided with any information about this other 
participant, they were informed that these were real choices made by a different 
individual in a prior session. Participants were informed that, although they could 
learn from the outcomes of observed choices, these outcomes would not influence 
their own earnings for the observer session. Unknown to them, participants actually 
observed the same sequence of choices they had made in their previous actor session, 
although now with visually novel stimuli (stimulus sets were balanced between 
sessions and across participants). The two sessions were, therefore, matched in terms 
of the information from which they learned. Observer sessions were completed on 
day 2 in order to reduce memory for previous choice sequence. To match for motor 
responses, observers indicated the observed choice on each trial with a button-press. 
Since learning could not be measured in these observation trials, because a free 
choice is not made, test trials were introduced to assess learning in both actors and 
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observers. These comprised 9 blocks of trials (test blocks) at regular intervals 
throughout learning. Here, free choices were made by both actors and observers in 
the absence of outcome feedback (to prevent further learning). Each stimulus was 
presented 6 times in different pairings in each learning block, and 12 times in each 
test block (test pairings further explained in section 4.2.3 below).  
Figure 4-1 illustrates exemplar learning and test trials and indicates the sole 
difference between actors and observers at the time of choice, and in that actors 
received the outcomes of their choices. At the end of each learning session, 
participants also provided explicit estimates of p{win} for each stimulus on each 
session. Here participants were shown each stimulus in turn and asked to explicitly 
write down their estimate of the probability of winning (as a percentage of trials) for 
the stimulus independent of its pairing. State anxiety scores were also collected, 
using the state component of the STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Edward, 1970), to 
test whether any difference in learning efficacy between the two learning sessions 
could be explained by a difference in state anxiety level. 
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Figure 4-1 – Timeline for both actor session and observer session. Learning blocks 
(dark grey) and test blocks (light grey) alternate 9 times, with rests at 3 regular intervals. In 
learning trials, actors make a free choice between a stimulus pair, indicated by the blue box. 
Outcomes of the chosen and unchosen stimulus are then displayed sequentially, with a yellow 
box indicating a win, and red indicating no win. In observer sessions, learning trials differ only 
in participants‟ response. Here, participants wait until the blue box is shown, indicating the 
“other participant‟s” choice, and then press the button corresponding to the selected stimulus. 
Outcomes are presented as in the actor session. In test trials, free choices between stimulus pairs 
are made by both actors and observers, but outcomes are not displayed. 
 
In the observer session, participants were paid based on the (hidden) 
outcomes of 10 choices from the test trials. In their actor session, earnings were 
based on the chosen outcomes of 5 test and 5 learning trials. This matches overall 
financial incentives. Full payment was given after the second session, but 
participants were informed that the earnings of each session were independent. 
Practice for both actor and observer sessions were given at the beginning of the first 
session. 
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4.2.3 Design and analysis 
Analysis was restricted to test blocks where both actors and observers made 
measurable free choices. I used a 2 × 4 × 9 within-subject design with factors for 
learning session (Actor/Observer), gamble pair (80/20, 80/60, 60/40 and 40/20) and 
test block (1 to 9). 
I measured choice accuracy for each pair, over the 9 test blocks, as the 
proportion of times that that participants chose the option with the highest p{win}. 
Probability of choosing each stimulus independent of pairings was also assessed. To 
eliminate differences in individual learning ability, I measured within-subject 
changes in choice accuracy between the two sessions. Analyses were two-tailed to 
test for both increases and decreases in learning against the null hypothesis of no 
significant change between the two learning sessions. I also tested for an effect of 
session on explicit estimates of p{win} for each stimulus and on state anxiety.  
Reaction times (RTs) were analysed using a 2 × 2 × 9 ANOVA, with factors 
comprising learning sessions (Actor/Observer), size of probability discrepancy 
between the two gambles in the pair (80/20 versus 80/60, 60/40 and 40/20) and test 
block (1 to 9). I predicted an effect of probability discrepancy on RT, since 80/20 
pairs were considered to allow for easier value discrimination than 80/60, 60/40 or 
40/20 pairs. 
 
4.2.4 Results 
A repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant effect of learning over 
the 9 test blocks (F[8,120] = 7.72, p < 0.0001), such that accuracy improved over 
time. This effect interacted significantly with gamble pair (F[24,360] = 2.80, p < 
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0.0001), with accuracy improving more steeply for 80/20 and 80/60 pair choice, than 
for the two remaining pairs.  
I also found a main effect of the gamble pair on accuracy (F[3,45] = 7.41, p < 
0.001), an effect that also interacted significantly with session (F[3,45] = 3.76, p < 
0.02). Post-hoc paired t-tests showed this interaction was driven by a difference in 
actor and observer accuracy for the 40/20 pair alone, such that observers were 
significantly less accurate in such decisions (t[15] = 3.0, p < 0.01) (Figure 4-2). 
There was no interaction of session × gamble pair × test block, suggesting that 
observers‟ low choice accuracy for the 40/20 pair was not modulated by time. 
Figure 4-2 – Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs. Pairs are labelled according to 
the probability of a win for each stimulus. Choice accuracy is measured as the probability that 
participants chose the stimulus with the highest probability of a win. Actor and observer 
learning differed only for the 40/20 p{win} pair, with observers showing significantly lower 
accuracy compared to actors. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
Participants‟ explicit estimates of stimulus p{win} also showed a specific 
impairment in learning in relation to lower p{win} options (Figure 4-3). A repeated-
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measures ANOVA showed a gamble × session interaction in estimates of p{win} 
(F[3,45] = 7.29, p < 0.0005), such that p{win} for the 20% win option was 
significantly overestimated through observation compared to action (t(15) = 4.61, p < 
0.005). Observers‟ individual choice preference in 40/20 test choices was also 
strongly associated with the degree to which the 20% win gamble was overvalued 
when observing compared to acting (R
2 
= 0.29, p < 0.05).  
 
 
Figure 4-3 - Participants‟ estimated probability of a win (p{win}) for each stimulus, 
learned during the actor and observer sessions, plotted against the actual p{win} for each 
stimulus. Observers significantly overestimated the p{win} for the 20% win stimulus, compared 
to actors. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
Test trial RT‟s were influenced by how much a gamble pair deviated in 
p{win}, such that participants were slower to choose between gambles with a close 
p{win} (80/60, 60/40, 40/20, mean = 1146 ms, SD = 54 ms) compared to distant 
p{win} pairs (80/20, mean = 960 ms, SD = 43 ms) (F[1,15] = 125.81, p < 0.0001). 
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There was also a main effect of test number, with participants becoming quicker with 
time (F[8,120] = 14.60, p < 0.0001). This effect interacted with stimulus pair such 
that this RT speeding was greatest for the 80/20 pair (F[8,120] = 4.31, p < 0.0001). 
There were no effects of session (mean actor = 1039 ms, SD actor = 51 ms, mean 
observer = 1067 ms, SD observer = 50 ms), showing that the difference found 
between observational and operant learning was not due to RT differences. Mean 
state anxiety scores for actor and observer sessions were 14.3 (SD = 8.11) and 13.4 
(SD = 7.85) respectively, and did not differ significantly, indicating that the 
difference found between observational and operant learning was also not due to 
differences in state anxiety. 
 
4.2.5 Discussion 
The results from Experiment 1 show that, while value learning through trial-
and-error is highly accurate, observational learning is associated with erroneous 
learning of low-value options. In essence, observational learners show a striking 
over-estimation of the likelihood of winning from the lower-value options, a fallacy 
leading to impaired accuracy when choosing between two low-value options. This 
learning difference was apparent even though monetary incentives and visual 
information were matched across actor and observer learning. 
Two potential design weaknesses can be identified in Experiment 1. First, by 
yoking the sequence of actor choices to participants‟ subsequent observer session, to 
match actor and observer learning for information presented, I was not able to 
counterbalance session order. Since participants also learnt about novel stimuli in the 
second session, learning may be worse solely because the task has switched. To 
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explicitly address these issues, I designed a second study (Experiment 2) to test for 
changes in learning between two actor sessions, with stimuli for each session taken 
from the equivalent sessions of Experiment 1. I predicted participants would show 
improved learning in the second actor session, due to generalisation of learning 
strategy, despite the novel stimuli. 
Secondly, in Experiment 1 it is impossible to distinguish between over-
valuation of low-value options versus overestimation of low probabilities. To address 
this, I conducted an additional experiment (Experiment 3) which reversed the 
framing of learning such that participants now learn in order to avoid losing, rather 
than to reap a reward. In so doing, options with the highest value were now 
associated with the lowest probability of losing, allowing for explicitly dissociation 
of probability and value. 
 
4.3 Experiment 2 
4.3.1 Participants 
17 new participants took part in experiment 2. Again, one participant was 
excluded due to a failure to reach an a priori accuracy criterion. 16 participants 
remained (6 female, mean age = 31.2 yrs, SD = 10.6). 
 
4.3.2 Procedure and analysis 
Here participants performed two actor sessions on consecutive days, using the 
same procedure and stimuli as in Experiment 1. As in experiment 1, novel stimuli 
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were used in the second session, and these were identical to those used in the 
observer session of Experiment 1 (visually and in associated p{win}). Explicit 
estimates of p{win} were also assessed after each session. While Experiment 2 used 
the same design as Experiment 1, critical analyses now involved the between-subject 
interactions in relation to findings from Experiment 1. I term Experiment 1‟s 
participants the AO group, and Experiment 2‟s participants the AA group. 
 
4.3.3 Results 
Choice accuracy was again measured as the probability that participants 
chose the stimulus with the highest p{win}. When analysing the data just within the 
AA group, I found a main effect of session (F(1,15) = 6.40, p < 0.05) such that 
accuracy was higher on the second session. There was also a main effect of gamble 
(F(3,45) = 5.64, p < 0.005), and of test block (F(8,120) = 4.36, p < 0.001), and an 
interaction between these two factors (F(24, 360) = 1.591, p < 0.05). Including a 
between-subject analysis against the AO participants of Experiment 1, I found a 
session × group interaction (F(1,30) = 7.28, p < 0.02), and a session × gamble × 
group interaction (F(3,90)=3.68, p<0.02), highlighting the specific impairment of 
observational learning for low value options shown in Experiment 1 (Figure 4-4).  
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Figure 4-4 – Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs in Experiment 2‟s AA group. 
Pairs are labelled according to the probability of a win for each stimulus. Error bars show the 
standard error of the mean.  
 
Estimated probability of a win (p{win}) for each stimulus, learned during the 
first and second actor sessions of Experiment 2‟s AA participants, is plotted in 
Figure 4-5 against the actual p{win} for each stimulus. There was a significant main 
effect of gamble (F(3,45) = 67.87, p < 0.0001) but the gamble × session interaction 
seen in Experiment 1 was no longer found. When comparing Experiments 1 and 2, 
there was a significant session × group interaction (F(1,30) = 7.59, p < 0.01) and a 
trend session × gamble × group interaction (F(3,90) = 2.70, p = 0.051). 
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Figure 4-5 - Participants‟ estimated probability of a win (p{win}) for each stimulus, 
learned during the two actor sessions of Experiment 2‟s AA group, plotted against the actual 
p{win} for each stimulus. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
4.3.4 Discussion 
While a significant main effect of the gamble pair on accuracy is still 
apparent in Experiment 2, this effect no longer interacted with session. There was, 
however, a main effect of session, such that AA participants showed an improved 
accuracy from the first to the second session, and this effect interacted with 
participant group (i.e. AA versus AO). A session × gamble × group interaction again 
highlighted a specific impairment of observational learning for low value options. 
Explicit estimates of p{win} were also more accurate in both sessions of the AA 
group. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that impaired learning in the observer 
session of Experiment 1 cannot be attributed to a temporal order effect or to the 
learning of novel stimuli. The AA group actually showed improved learning in the 
second session, perhaps attributable to generalisation of learning strategies. 
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4.4 Experiment 3 
4.4.1 Participants 
16 new participants took part in Experiment 3 (7 female, mean age = 21.1 yrs, 
SD = 1.8). 
 
4.4.2 Procedure and analysis 
Experiment 3 utilised the same procedure and tasks (both actor and observer) 
as in Experiment 1, but with modified instructions and monetary incentives. 
Participants were now initially endowed with £10 per session. Instead of earning 
money from yellow boxes in the task, participants were informed that they would 
lose money from red boxes. In this way, the punishing power of the red boxes was 
assumed to attract more attention than in Experiment 1. At the end of the task, 
participants provided explicit estimates of the probability of losing (p{loss}) for each 
stimulus, in place of the p{win} estimates in Experiment 1.  
Again, while Experiment 3 used the same design as Experiment 1, between-
subject interactions with the findings from Experiment 1 were critical. I term 
Experiment 3‟s participants the AO-loss group. 
 
4.4.3 Results 
When analysing the data just within the AO-loss group, I found main effects 
of session (F(1,15) = 13.36, p < 0.005), gamble (F(3,45) = 13.98, p < 0.001) and test 
block (F(8,120) = 3.831, p < 0.001). I also found an interaction of session × gamble 
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(F(3,45) = 12.15, p < 0.0001), and gamble × test block (F(24,360) = 4.47, p < 0.001). 
The session × gamble effect was, as in Experiment 1, driven by observers showing 
significantly lower accuracy for the 40/20 p{win} pair compared to actors (t(15) = 
5.89, p < 0.0001) (Figure 4-6). The effect of group, i.e. AO participants in 
Experiment 1 versus AO-loss participants in Experiment 3, interacted only with the 
main effects of session (F(1,30) = 4.39, p < 0.05) and of gamble (F(3,90) = 3.36, p < 
0.05). 
 
 
Figure 4-6 – Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs in Experiment 3‟s AO-loss 
group. Pairs are labelled according to the probability of a win for each stimulus. Error bars 
show the standard error of the mean. 
 
Estimated probability of a loss (p{loss}) for each stimulus, learned during the 
actor and observer sessions of Experiment 3‟s AO-loss participants, is plotted in 
Figure 4-7 against the actual p{loss} for each stimulus. There was a significant main 
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effect of session (F(1,15) = 12.86, p < 0.005) and of gamble (F(3,45) = 75.85, p < 
0.0001), along with a gamble × session interaction (F(3,45) = 8.87, p < 0.0005). 
Analogous to Experiment 1, observers significantly underestimated the p{loss} for 
the 80% loss (20% win) stimulus, compared to actors.  
 
 
Figure 4-7 – Estimated probability of a loss (p{loss}) for each stimulus, learned during 
the actor and observer sessions of Experiment 3‟s AO-loss participants, plotted against the 
actual p{loss} for each stimulus.  Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
With data from Experiments 1 and 3 collapsed, Figure 4-8 shows the 
frequency chosen of the 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% win options, in each of the 9 test 
blocks. Choice frequencies are shown for actor learning (filled lines) and observer 
learning (broken lines). Unconnected dots show the actual cumulative frequency of 
wins for each stimulus in the learning trials preceding each test block, which are 
identical for actors (diamonds) and observers (crosses). Actors can be seen to learn 
quickly the low value of choosing the 20% win option, avoiding this choice on the 
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majority of trials, while observers show a higher tendency to choose this option. 
Actors also demonstrate an apparent overvaluation of the 40% option, likely owing 
to their accurate realisation that it is of a higher value than the 20% win option and 
resulting from an attempt to polarise the two values.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-8 – Frequency chosen of the 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% win options, in each of 
the 9 test blocks across both Experiments 1 and 3. Choice frequencies are shown for actor 
learning (filled lines) and observer learning (broken lines). Unconnected dots show the actual 
cumulative frequency of wins for each stimulus in the learning trials preceding each test block, 
which are identical for actors (diamonds) and observers (crosses). 
 
4.4.4 Discussion 
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was replicated but now within the loss domain, with this effect being driven solely by 
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results of Experiment 1, supporting an over-valuing of the lowest value options (i.e. 
participants underestimated p{loss} for the 80% loss option) rather than an 
overestimation of small probabilities (participants showed high estimation accuracy 
for options with the lower p{loss}). 
 
4.5 Understanding the difference at the mechanistic level 
The aim of this study was to test if differences exist between operant and 
observational learning in the context of probabilistic value learning in healthy 
humans and, if so, where such differences lie. The wider goal is to understand the 
effect of agency (or a lack thereof) in learning. Given that I found significant 
differences in learning about low value options between operant and observational 
learning, this opens a question concerning what exactly brings about this difference 
at a mechanistic level. The findings of Experiment 2 indicate that the observational 
learning failure is not an effect of task order or task-switching. The results of the 
frame reversal in Experiment 3 indicate that the failure is specific to learning about 
low value options, not in estimating low probabilities. Moreover, the effect was not 
associated with differences in the amount or type of information from which 
participants could learn or to differences in monetary incentive, since these were 
matched across both learning conditions. Differences in state anxiety and in RT also 
cannot explain the effect. One way by which the underlying mechanisms of each 
form of learning may be understood is through a model-based approach.  
An explanation for these findings might be that observers are less motivated 
by anticipated regret and do not take into account outcomes of unchosen options. In 
such a case, this fictive information will have less weight when updating the value of 
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each option in a pair. Moreover, since low value options are chosen less often, they 
are less likely to be updated in this preferential update model. I tested this 
hypothesis, that observers take the outcomes of unchosen options less into account 
compared to actors
3
, by fitting a reinforcement learning model separately to the actor 
and observer sessions of participants. In this model, two separate learning rates were 
fit for chosen and unchosen options. Although these were unconstrained in model 
estimation, my prediction was that actors would show no difference between their 
learning rates for chosen and unchosen options, while observers would show a 
markedly lower learning rate for unchosen options.  
 
4.5.1 Computational model 
The precise model was based on a commonly used reinforcement learning 
model, whereby the probability of winning for each outcome is updated trial-by-trial 
on the basis of outcomes experienced (or observed). These values are then converted 
into choice probabilities and these are then compared to the actual choices made by 
participants in the test blocks, in order to determine the fit of the model. 
The model employs a Rescorla-Wagner update of value of stimulus i  at time 
t  (or 
i
tV ) (Equation 5), based on the difference between the expected reward and the 
reward experienced or observed for the particular stimulus on each trial (
i
tr ), where 
1,0r . This difference is termed the prediction error and is weighted by a free 
parameter,  , which determines participants‟ learning rate (or speed of update). 
                                                 
3
 Note that feedback was always given for outcomes of both chosen and unchosen options for 
both actors and observers. Therefore, any asymmetric effect of chosen options would indicate an 
attentional bias rather than an objective lack of information about the unchosen option. 
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The model, which I term a “choice-dependent learning” model, allows for an 
asymmetry between the learning rates of chosen and unchosen choice options.  
 
Equation 5 )( 11
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t VrVV  
 
Values were updated based on outcome feedback during the learning blocks 
of the task. Given the value of each stimulus at the end of each learning block, the 
probability of choosing stimulus i  ( i
p ) in the following test block is then estimated. 
This is performed using the logit transform in Equation 6, where 0 and 
determines the randomness of the decision (with larger numbers indicating more 
random choice). This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the 
probability of taking one of two actions according to their associated relative action 
values.  
 
Equation 6 
2,1
)exp(
)exp(
j
j
i
V
V
i
p
 
 
 
The model was fit to choices made during the 9 test blocks of each session. I 
compared the fit of this choice-dependent learning model to two control models. In 
the first, the “choice-independent learning” model, both the chosen and unchosen 
stimuli of each pair are updated equivalently (with just one ). In a second control 
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model, the learner preferentially updates only the chosen option on each trial 
(“chosen-only” model), while the value of the unchosen option is never updated (also 
with just one ). The models were fit to all 32 participants‟ choices from both 
experiment 1 (the AO group) and experiment 2 (the AO-loss group), since both 
groups were found to show the same behavioural effects. Each model was fit to test 
trial choices in actor and observer sessions of each participant separately. Note that 
the two control models contain only two free parameters, while the hypothesis-driven 
model contains three. Therefore, negative log likelihoods of each model was 
penalised for the complexity of the model (i.e. the number of free parameters) by 
calculating the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
 
4.5.2 Results 
All models fit better to actors (choice-dependent summed BIC = 4692.31, 
choice-independent summed BIC = 4880.30, chosen-only summed BIC = 5501.45) 
than to observers (choice-dependent summed BIC = 6365.02, choice-independent 
summed BIC = 6741.90, chosen-only summed BIC = 6780.78). Note that smaller 
BIC scores indicate a better fit to the data. The relatively poor fit to observer choices 
overall suggests that no model fully captures mechanisms underlying observational 
learning in this task. This may be because observers‟ choices are generally more 
random, and so more difficult for the model to predict, an aspect apparent in the 
parameter comparisons outlined below. Overall, however, all models fit both actor 
and observer choices better than a completely random choice model (summed BIC = 
9582.07). 
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The choice-dependent learning model provided the best fit to both actor and 
observer choices in this task. The choice accuracies predicted by this model, 
generated using the mean best fitting parameters, are plotted in Figure 4-9, separately 
for actor and observer test trial choices between each of the gamble pairs used. The 
model captures well the poor accuracy when observers choose between the 40% and 
20% win options.  
These predicted choice accuracies are generated through the model based on 
the probability of choosing the best option of each pair, as estimated by the softmax 
function. Therefore, accuracy depends on how easily the values of each option in a 
pair can be discriminated, along with the level of noise in the decision process (i.e. 
the temperature of the softmax). I found no significant difference between the 
temperatures of the softmax (i.e. β) of actor and observer learning (mean actor = 1.09 
± 0.14, mean observer = 1.19 ± 0.46, t(31) = 1.13, ns). Since actors and observers 
actually witnessed identical stimulus pairs and outcomes, any difference in the way 
options are valued must be ascribed to the learning rates. The best fitting learning 
rates for actor and observer‟s learning of chosen and unchosen options (averaged 
across participants) are shown in Figure 4-10. These showed a trend significant 2-
way interaction (F(1,31) = 3.54, p = 0.069) such that, while actors and observers did 
not differ in their learning rate for chosen options (t(31) = 0.29, ns), observers 
showed a significantly lower learning rate for unchosen options compared to actors 
(t(31) = 2.23, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 4-9 – Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs, as predicted by the softmax 
function of the choice-dependent learning model, using the mean best fitting learning rates and 
temperature of the softmax. Pairs are labelled according to the probability of a win for each 
stimulus. Choice accuracy is measured as the probability that the model chooses the stimulus 
with the highest probability of a win.  
 
 
Figure 4-10 – Mean best fitting learning rates (optimised separately for chosen and 
unchosen stimulus options) as predicted by the choice-dependent learning model for actor and 
observer sessions. 
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
80/20 80/60 60/40 40/20
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 c
h
o
ic
e
 a
c
c
u
ra
c
y
Choice pair (in probability of win)
Actor
Observer
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Chosen Unchosen
M
e
a
n
 α
Actor
Observer
Chapter 4: Does agency help or hinder learning?
 
Page | 4.26  
 
Trial-by-trial stimulus values, predicted by the choice-dependent learning 
model were generated using the mean best fitting α and β across participants, and are 
shown in Figure 4-11. This figure illustrates especially close values of the 20% and 
40% win options in observational learning, driven by the low learning rate associated 
with learning of unchosen options. The result of this is that the values of these two 
options are less easily discriminated by observers, leading to low accuracy when 
choosing between these options. The pattern of choice accuracy, value 
discriminability and learning rates for the two worse fitting control models (choice-
independent model and chosen-only model) are available in Appendix B and do not 
show such effects. 
 
 
Figure 4-11- Stimulus values predicted for a) actor learning, and b) observer learning 
by the choice-dependent learning model, using the mean best fitting parameters across 
participants as the learning rates and the temperature of the softmax function. These values are 
shown for the four stimuli, each associated with a unique probability of winning (80%, 60%, 
40% and 20%). Note that the flat portions of each line reflect the blocks of test trials. Here 
learning does not take place, as outcome feedback is not given. 
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4.5.3 Discussion 
The choice-dependent learning model captures a reduced accuracy associated 
with observational learning of low value options, explaining it in terms of a low 
learning rate for unchosen, compared to chosen, options. These results are in keeping 
with a hypothesis that observers are less likely to use fictive (what-might-have-been) 
information in their learning of probabilistic value. This selective attention may be 
related to a lack of motivation that is usually engendered by possible regret. 
Specifically, fictive information is likely to be of less relevance for observers, for 
whom a lack of agency and direct impact of outcome precludes the possibility of 
experiencing regret. 
This model does not provide a full explanation of the mechanism underlying 
observer learning, however, since it does not fit to observer choices as well as to 
actor choices. This is perhaps, in part, because observer choices are relatively noisier 
(as shown by a higher temperature of the softmax). Moreover, the values plotted in 
Figure 4-11b do not capture the particular over-valuation of the 20% win option as 
shown in Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-7. Future work will need to consider alternative 
models of observational learning in a value learning context, and to explicitly test 
models associated with optimistic overvaluation of low value options. Better models 
could also test the possibility observers do not update based on losses in the same 
way as do actors. Another possibility is that both actors and observers have an 
initially high prior for the value of options, but learning through trial-and-error 
corrects that prior for actors in a way that observational learning does not. Functional 
imaging studies might also be useful in understanding the mechanisms underlying 
the observational bias in learning. For example, we might predict differences in the 
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way that reward (or fictive) prediction errors are coded in the brain during each form 
of learning, which may aid in explaining the inefficient learning through observation. 
 
4.6 General discussion 
Experiments 1 and 3 of this chapter both show an overvaluation of low value 
options during observational learning, an effect evident across implicit (i.e. choice 
preference) and explicit indices of subjective value. This difference was evident 
despite the observational and operant learning tasks being matched for visual 
information, as well as monetary incentive to learn. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows 
generally improved learning between two operant learning sessions despite the time 
delay and the novel stimuli. These results are intriguing since neither social learning 
theories nor reinforcement learning approaches explicitly predict that action-outcome 
contingency learning should depend upon the manner through which they are 
learned. Moreover, recent neuroimaging studies in humans report neuronal responses 
to errors (Koelewijn, van Schie, Bekkering, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008; van Schie, 
Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004; Yu & Zhou, 2006) and success (Mobbs et al., 
2009) observed from the behaviour of others, comparable to those seen in response 
to self-experienced outcomes, meaning one might predict little difference in learning. 
Experiment 3 also shows that the deficit in observational learning is specific to 
valuation of low value options, rather than an imprecision when estimating low 
probabilities, showing that observers are biased to (inappropriately) discount the 
chance they will experience negative outcomes seen to be incurred by others. 
In contrast to a view that being responsible may create an “emotional 
clouding” effect on learning, these results suggest that agency produces no such bias 
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during action-outcome learning. In fact, here I show that learning is more efficient in 
a context of agency, and that it is rather observational learning that exhibits a 
suboptimal bias. The improved learning through trial-and-error may reflect a greater 
vividness and self-relevance of direct experience (Helweg-Larsen, 1999; Stapel & 
Velthuijsen, 1996) or reflect improved recall of one‟s own actions (Weinstein, 1987, 
see also Tversky & Kahneman's availability heuristic, 1974). Such an interpretation 
accords with findings that directly experienced information is given greater weight 
than observed information in guiding future behaviour in social games, even if both 
are equally informative and equally attended (Simonsohn, Karlsson, Loewenstein, & 
Ariely, 2008).  
Actors and observers appear to differ in how attention is directed during 
learning. Specifically, the results of the model comparison suggest that an observer‟s 
poor learning can be explained by an inattention to the outcomes of options not 
selected by the actor. This hints that fictive information, with associated agency, is 
important for optimal value learning. Moreover, this is in keeping with an enhanced 
salience of between-option counterfactual comparison and the experience of regret 
with agency. However, I acknowledge that this choice-dependent model does not 
fully capture an overestimation of low value options shown by observers. This 
particular finding reflects a behavioural manifestation of an optimistic bias, 
demonstrating a tendency to underweight the prospect of the most negative 
experience. A problem for interpretation here is that low value options were also 
those that were chosen less often during learning, and therefore value and choice are 
conflated. Future work will need to explicitly test learning models associated with 
optimistic overvaluation of low value options. 
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Could optimistic overvaluation in observers be connected with a lack of 
regret (or inattention to counterfactual information) during learning? Optimistic 
biases are pervasive in all forms of learning. During trial-and-error learning, 
however, a greater motivation to avoid bad outcomes, and to feel skilled as decision-
makers (i.e. avoid regret), may drive actors to overcome this bias. Indeed, learning 
through direct experience is shown to lead to increased realism in estimating risk, 
thus reducing an optimistic bias (Burger & Palmer, 1992; Helweg-Larsen, 1999; Van 
der Velde, Van der Pligt, & Hooykaas, 1994; Weinstein, 1987, 1989). Passive 
observers, on the other hand, do not have this focus on their ability as skilled 
decision-makers, with their attention instead being directed to the quality of the 
choices made by an observed other. However, a recognised tendency for individuals 
to show an external attribution for failures and an internal attribution for successes 
(as discussed in Chapter 3) might interfere with accurate learning of action-outcome 
contingencies. Specifically, such an attribution bias distorts observational learning 
through a tendency to attribute an observed actor‟s failures to internal (i.e. 
dispositional) causes, encouraging an observer to believe they are less likely to fail or 
lose themselves. On the other hand, the actor‟s successes are perceived as externally 
determined, easily obtainable, and not due to any exceptional skill in the actor. 
Optimism often has such a socially comparative nature as when we tend to 
overestimate our own strengths and resources, while discounting those of others 
(Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). This bias is likely to be associated with the protection of 
self-esteem and avoidance of social anxiety (e.g. Hirsch & Mathews, 2000), coupled 
with a desire to be better than others (Weinstein, 1989), and can explain a tendency 
to feel that one is less likely to experience the negative events experienced by others 
(Weinstein & Lachendro, 1982).  
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A general conclusion, on the basis of these data, is that active involvement, 
along with direct experience of rewarding or punishing outcomes, leads to improved 
learning of the consequences of our actions, compared to learning through passive 
(and inconsequential) observation. The observer bias also indicates that actors and 
observers implement different weightings for positive and negative experiences as 
they sample outcomes. These findings also have implications for how we should 
apply learning theory to vicarious learning, as classical models assign no differences 
to these alternative models of learning.  
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This study was completed in collaboration with Ray Dolan, Dominik Bach and Wako 
Yoshida. 
 
 
Chapter 5. The behavioural impact of experienced 
regret 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous study found that learning is more efficient when occurring 
through trial-and-error than through observation. In the former, causal links between 
our own actions and their outcomes can be made, and these can directly update value 
predictions important for guiding future decisions. Trial-and-error learning also 
allows for the potential to experience regret from mistakes, as well as relief from 
achievements. However, the experiment in Chapter 4 did not explicitly test 
behavioural responses to regret. While it is commonly assumed that our future 
decisions can be biased by counterfactual information, it is surprising that trial-by-
trial influences of regrettable outcomes on immediately subsequent behaviour are not 
well understood. This was the inspiration for the next study of this thesis.  
By incorporating regret into computations of expected utility, as the weighted 
difference between an outcome obtained from a performed action and the best 
possible outcome of a foregone action, economic models help to explain choices in 
the presence of anticipated regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Savage, 
1951). In such models, anticipated regret is computed based on outcome probabilities 
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known by the decision-maker at the time of choice. It is unclear from this literature 
whether experiences of regret are assumed to have the same impact on behaviour as 
this anticipated regret. As discussed in Chapter 1, our goals and expectations 
consequent upon the actual experience of regret may not be equivalent to those when 
anticipating possible future regret. 
A common assumption in theoretical discussions, and computational 
modelling, of regret is that it is a highly aversive emotion that motivates choices that 
avoid its future re-occurrence. Recent reinforcement learning approaches have been 
useful in understanding learning of regret avoidance. By calculating the level of post-
decision regret on each trial, and incorporating this into the valuation of future 
actions, these models do well in predicting behaviour in various forms of decision 
task (e.g. Ert & Erev, 2007; Marchiori & Warglien, 2008). The assumption is that 
past experiences of regret enhance anticipated regret for the relevant actions during 
future decisions, which manifests as a bias away from repeating previously regretted 
choices. Such models are fitted to choices in tasks that require participants to learn, 
through experience, which choice options are associated with the lowest anticipated 
regret. Therefore, while they provide a first step in understanding the behavioural 
impact of experienced regret, they do not actually address this behavioural impact 
independent of differences in anticipated regret (i.e. since experienced regret is 
confounded with anticipated regret). 
The aim of this third study was to explore the impact of regret-related 
outcomes on subsequent choice in repeated gambling decisions. I hypothesised that 
previous outcome would indeed influence subsequent choice, and that this influence 
would depend upon a comparison between the received and foregone outcomes, as 
well as whether or not the decision maker was responsible. This was, however, an 
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exploratory study in that several behavioural effects were considered to be possible, 
as discussed below.  
One possibility is that decision-makers would show avoidance of previously 
mistaken bet choices. This may be because experienced regret is used in updating the 
expected likelihood of experiencing regret from a choice in the future, and is in 
keeping with an indirect impact of experienced emotion described in Chapter 1 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). However, there may be other direct behavioural 
impacts unique to experienced, over anticipated, regret. For example, Zeelenberg, 
Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt (1998) showed that, compared to 
disappointment, regret encourages a desire to make up for a mistake and allow a 
second chance, although such compensatory responses need not necessarily involve 
typical avoidance. Connolly & Zeelenberg (2002) suggest that a common response to 
regret is to make more „normal‟ decisions or „safer‟ decisions, and thereby help an 
individual feel their decisions are more justified. Moreover, in a reanalysis of data 
gathered by Liu et al. (2007), Sommer, Peters, Gläscher, & Büchel (2009) found that 
decision-makers were actually less likely to switch decision after a regret-related, 
compared to a relief-related, outcome suggesting that regret may encourage choice 
repetition rather than avoidance. In a conceptually similar suggestion, Loftus & 
Loftus (1983) propose that „chasing‟ behaviour (or repeated gambling) in response to 
near-misses provides gamblers with the opportunity to eliminate the impact of regret 
by potentially making up for their mistakes. 
In this study, I used a simple gambling task in which one level of operational 
objective regret (and one of relief) could be induced on each trial. While outcomes 
(win or loss) were out of participants‟ control, their choice of monetary bet (which 
could either be a 50p or 10p bet) was within their control. Therefore, it was assumed 
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that they would implicitly compare the outcome received from their bet choice with 
the one that might have been had they placed the alternative bet (conceptually similar 
to prior operationalisations of a fictive error, see Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & 
Montague, 2007). Since my main question concerned behavioural responses to these 
regret-related outcomes, anticipated regret was held constant across the two gamble 
choices. This was achieved because either of the two possible bets (10p and 50p), 
made with the aim of winning the corresponding extra amount, could result in an 
outcome that could have been better from the alternative bet choice (in the form of 
10p wins or 50p losses). 
To address the motivational impact of these regret-related outcomes on 
subsequent choice, I compared choice propensities following each outcome type. 
Since regret also depends upon being responsible for the choice (as shown in Chapter 
3), any behavioural impact of regret-related outcomes was assumed to depend upon 
agency. Therefore, a further feature of the design was that I varied agency over the 
bet selection. I was particularly interested in the tendency to avoid versus repeat 
previously regret-related choices. In this task, the 50p stake is considered the riskier 
choice, due to greater variance in possible outcome magnitude (Markowitz, 1952). 
This asymmetric risk of the bet options meant I was also able to address whether 
regret-related outcomes encourage either risk-seeking or risk-averse future 
behaviour.  
Finally, I did not test subjective feelings of regret in this study, since the 
focus was on behaviour. Guided by the economic literature, and by the findings from 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, here I considered regret to depend upon the (upward) 
counterfactual context of a received outcome, as well as a sense of responsibility for 
the bad choice. In Chapter 3, I find that such outcomes do indeed elicit feelings of 
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regret, while others also provide evidence in support of this (e.g. Camille et al., 2004; 
Coricelli et al., 2005; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 
1997). This operationalisation of regret is also widely used in other accounts of 
regret and fictive error without recourse to subjective ratings (Bell, 1982; Ert & Erev, 
2007; Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; 
Marchiori & Warglien, 2008), further validating this approach. 
 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants and design 
24 participants (15 female) took part in the experiment. Participants were 
aged 19-33yrs (mean 24.1 yrs). 
Trials were ascribed to four categories, in a 2 × 2 repeated-measures design 
that was conditional on the outcome of the previous trial. The two factors were 
outcome (win/loss) and stake (high 50p/low 10p). In addition, by including a no-
agency control condition (see below), I also addressed how any tendency to repeat 
the same choice after each outcome type interacted with agency (in a 2 × 2 × 2 
design, now with the additional factor of agency versus no-agency).  
 
5.2.2 Experimental procedure and analysis 
Participants were given an initial endowment of £10 and subsequently 
performed a gambling task in which they placed high (50p) or low (10p) bets 
repeatedly on uncertain gambles. Participants were not informed of the relative 
probabilities of winning versus losing on each gamble, although these were in fact 
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fixed at 50%. Participants were presented with a computer-simulated pack of red and 
blue cards turned face-down and were informed that the top card would be 
overturned on each trial. After placing their bet at the start of each trial, participants 
received a binary outcome of either a win (if the card was blue, as on 50% of trials) 
or a loss (if it was red, as on the remaining 50%). Depending on this outcome, 
participants either won or lost their selected bet stake. Therefore, four possible 
outcomes were each associated with an alternative outcome that would have been 
realised had participants placed the alternative bet stake. Outcomes could be „regret-
related‟, where the received outcome would have been better had the other bet been 
placed (as in a 50p loss or 10p win), or „relief-related‟, where the outcome would 
have been worse had the other bet been placed (as in a 50p win and 10p loss). 
Cumulative winnings were not shown, to minimise possible „wealth‟ effects (cf. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).   
The probability of a win was fixed at chance with a win being completely 
independent of the bet stake placed by participants. Therefore, the expected value 
(EV) of each stake option was, on average, zero pence thus meaning that there was 
no financial incentive for participants to favour either stake (other than any 
individual risk preferences which - as is standard - were assumed to be sufficiently 
stable over time and should not be influenced by preceding-trial outcome in the 
manner assessed here). A 50p stake can be considered the riskier choice, with risk 
defined as the variance in reward magnitude around the mean EV of zero pence 
(Markowitz, 1952). With only two choice options available, participants were always 
aware of the outcome that would have ensued had they placed the alternative stake. I 
expected that such counterfactual information would bias future choice (e.g. Mellers, 
Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999).   
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Importantly, on 3/4 of trials participants were responsible for choosing the 
stake, with these trials providing the „agency‟ conditions (Figure 5-1-a). Trials in 
which participants were not responsible for the bet placed (this being selected by the 
computer instead and then executed by the participant) constituted a „no-agency‟ 
condition that served to control for valence of outcome (Figure 5-1-b). This allowed 
for behavioural effects of agency-specific regret (i.e. outcomes worse than what 
would have arisen from the alternative bet choice) to be disambiguated from mere 
aversive outcome effects (i.e. such an outcome regardless of agency). The no-agency 
trials comprised the remaining 1/4 of trials on which participants were instructed to 
place the bet chosen by the computer.   
 
Figure 5-1 – Timeline of a) an agency trial, and b) a no agency control trial. 
Participants see a simulated pack of red and blue cards turned face-down and are required 
either to make a free-choice of betting either 50p or 10p (in an agency trial) or to place the bet 
selected by the computer (in a no-agency trial). The outcome of the bet is then revealed followed 
by an inter-trial interval. 
 
To assess the immediate behavioural effects of experienced regret-related and 
relief-related outcomes, the dependent measure comprised participants‟ trial-by-trial 
tendency to bets 50p at trial t ( tp )50p( ) contingent upon the outcome and agency 
of trial t-1. In particular, I tested how choices following the two regret-related 
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outcomes (50p losses and 10p wins) differed from those following relief-related 
outcomes (50p wins and 10p losses), and also how any effects depended on whether 
or not outcomes were associated with agency. Since participants could only make a 
free choice on agency trials, only these trials were used to calculate the dependent 
measure (at trial t), and the number of these were matched for the number of 
preceding agency and no agency trials (120 trials each). Actual wins and losses were 
randomised throughout, while the overall number of trials falling into the two stake 
levels was choice-dependent.  
Participants each played four 8-minute runs of the game. Each game included 
blocks in which only agency trials were played (such that dependent measure trials 
were always preceded by an agency trial at t-1) and blocks in which agency and no-
agency trials alternated (such that dependent measure trials were always preceded by 
a no-agency trial at t-1). Participants were informed that the outcomes from a random 
selection of 100 trials, selected after the experiment, would determine their earnings 
for the entire experiment. Since participants did not know which trials would be 
selected, they were assumed to treat all trials as having an equal potential impact on 
their financial gain. 
 
5.3 Results 
The dependent measure was participants‟ trial-by-trial tendency to bet 50p at 
trial t contingent upon the outcome and agency of trial t-1 (i.e. tp )50p( ). Overall 
participants did not show a bias towards choosing either bet (mean tp )50p( = 0.46, 
SE = 0.03), in that they did not significantly deviate from 0.50 (t(23) = -1.59, p = 
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0.13). There was, however, a trend level significant main effect of agency at t-1 on 
tp )50p(  (F[1,23] = 3.98, p = 0.058), such that participants preferred to opt for the 
safer 10p bets when they had been the agent on the preceding choice (mean 
tp )50p(  = 0.44, SE = 0.03), compared to when they had not been the agent (mean 
tp )50p( = 0.48, SE = 0.03). 
With this overall bias towards betting 10p more than 50p at trial t, it is 
particularly interesting that one outcome type encouraged the opposite behaviour. 
This exception was after 50p losses with agency (see Figure 5-2), with 19 out of 24 
participants showing a higher tp )50p(  after the regret-related 50p loss than after 
the relief-related 50p win.  
A Stake × Outcome interaction was found in the effect of agency outcomes, 
but not in no agency outcomes (stake × outcome × agency interaction, F[1,23] = 
6.70, p < 0.02). This effect was such the two loss-based outcomes with agency 
motivated opposite bet selections on the subsequent trial, while wins did not show 
such difference. Relief-related 10p losses (where a 50p bet would have incurred a 
worse outcome) encouraged a repetition of the 10p bet, which would be in accord 
with a traditional regret-minimax theory whereby relief would increase the value of 
repeating the bet again. However, regret-related 50p losses (where a 10p bet would 
have incurred a better outcome) encouraged the 50p bet to be repeated subsequently, 
which would not be in keeping with models in which regret would decrease the value 
of repeating the same bet again. 
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Figure 5-2 – Probability of choosing the 50p stake at trial t, after a win or loss, of the 
50p or 10p stake at trial t-1. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
One possible explanation for this effect might invoke the phenomenon of the 
gambler‟s fallacy, whereby the probability of a win is (mis)perceived to increase 
after a loss and decrease after a win (e.g. see Croson & Sundali, 2005). However, 
such an explanation would predict that both 10p and 50p losses would equally 
encourage the higher risk 50p bet on the next trial, since any loss should encourage 
the same misperception of probability. There was no main effect of outcome at t-1 
(F[1,23] = 0.07, p = ns), and no interaction between agency and outcome (F[1,23] = 
0.01, p = ns), suggesting that losses overall did not impact on choices in the next 
trial. Furthermore, gambler‟s fallacy alone would not predict the difference observed 
between agency and no agency conditions. Thus the behavioural pattern of results 
was not explicable solely by gambler‟s fallacy. 
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It is also important to note that the effects might be explained by decision 
inertia (i.e. repeat the same bet) after both the relief-inducing 10p loss and regret-
inducing 50p loss, and may not be associated with regret at all. This type of 
behaviour could be driven by feelings of disappointment with an absolute loss as 
indicated by Zeelenberg et al. (1998), who reported that disappointment, in contrast 
to regret, is associated with a desire to avoid the situation and to do nothing. 
However, this line of argument would not explain the crucial interaction with 
agency, a core component of regret. Therefore, it is difficult to provide a clear 
account of why this form of decision inertia would occur here. Moreover, in the 
fMRI replication of the task presented in next chapter, we found no evidence for the 
bias to repeat 10p after a 10p loss, while the tendency to repeat 50p more after a 50p 
loss than after a 50p win was still evident, suggesting that the effect of 10p losses is 
less consistent. 
 
5.4 Testing a „regret-minimax‟ learning model 
The observed tendency to repeat previously regret-related bets is contrary to 
expectations from those traditional learning models that update the value of a choice 
as a function of either standard or regret-based (or fictive) prediction-errors (e.g. 
Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague, 2007; Marchiori & Warglien, 2008; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). On such accounts the value of a choice option should be 
incrementally decreased for negative or regrettable outcomes. Such learning models 
are therefore expected to provide a poor fit to the choice behaviour I observe.  
I tested this prediction with a form of regret-minimax learning model, which 
maintains that decision-makers will avoid choices with the greatest anticipated 
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regret. Here, similar to the neural network built by Marchiori & Warglien (2008), 
past experiences of regret act to reduce the anticipated value of repeating the 
previously regret-related bet choice. Therefore, this model assumes that experienced 
regret translates into anticipated regret in a linear and monotonic way, and that this 
increased anticipated regret then reduces the value of repeating the previously 
regrettable choice.  
 
5.4.1 The model 
At the outcome of each trial, the model employs a Rescorla-Wagner update of 
anticipated probability of receiving a win ( twinp )( ) (Equation 7), based on the 
reward obtained on that trial ( tr
~
), where 1,0~r . This update is weighted by a free 
parameter, , which determines participants‟ learning rate (or speed of update). 
 
Equation 7 ))(
~()()( 11 tttt winprwinpwinp  
 
Next, the value of the choice made on the previous trial ( )(1 iQt ) is calculated 
as a function of the expected values of winning and losing from that action ( )(iA ) 
based on the outcome just obtained, as in Equation 8. 
  
Equation 8 ))(1)(()()()(1 ttt winpiAwinpiAiQ  
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The core of this regret-minimax model is that )(
~
1 iQt  is reduced when )(iA
results in a regrettable outcome. This negative reinforcement is implemented by 
subtracting tR  from )(1 iQt , where tR  is the difference between the obtained and 
foregone outcomes of trial t (Equation 9). This term in the model is reminiscent of 
the modified expected utility introduced in the Chapter 1 (sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2). 
Note that I use a new variable tr  for the reward obtained, where 1,1r . tR  is 
positive if regret is experienced, such that )(
~
1 iQt  is reduced in the case of the two 
regret conditions, i.e. when there is a 10p win or a 50p loss. tR  is negative if relief is 
experienced, such that the value of repeating )(iA  on the next trial (i.e. )(
~
1 iQt ) is 
increased in the case of the two relief conditions, i.e. when there is a 50p win or a 
10p loss. By nature of these outcomes being relief-related, the regret-minimax model 
predicts that they would not generate anticipated regret, thus encouraging greater 
desire to repeat the bet again. So where action i  is taken and action j  is not taken, 
  
Equation 9 ))()(( iAjArR tt  
 
The regret-minimax model also allows for the possibility of an asymmetry 
between the regret of winning 10p (where a 50p bet would have been better) and the 
regret of losing 50p (where a 10p bet would have been better). Consequently, tR  is 
weighted by the parameter  when the regret follows a 10p win, and by  when it 
follows a 50p loss. It was predicted that , but these parameters were not 
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constrained in model estimation. So where 10)1(iA  and 50)2(iA , and 
where 
1c  and 2c , 
  
Equation 10 titt RciQiQ )()(
~
11  
   
Given the value associated with making each choice option, the associated 
probability of making each choice is estimated through the logit transform in 
Equation 11, where 0  (with larger numbers indicating more random choice).  
This is a standard stochastic decision rule that calculates the probability of taking one 
of two actions according to their relative action values.  
Equation 11 
2,1
)(
~
exp(
))(
~
exp(
)(
j
jQ
iQ
ip
 
 
5.4.2 Fitting the model 
I fit the four free parameters ( , ,  and ) to individual participants‟ 
choice data and adjusted these to maximise the likelihood of the choices given the 
model. One participant was removed from this model fitting process, leaving a total 
of 23 participants. This exclusion was due to the subject choosing the high-risk 50p 
bet less than 10% of the time, making parameter estimation problematic.  
I compared this model to a default expected value (EV) model, where choices 
were dependent solely on the action values without any impact of tR  (this model had 
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only the  and  free parameters, and where )(1 iQt  is calculated as in Equation 
8).  The models were only applied to agency trials to constrain their complexity and 
to improve parameter estimation. Choices immediately following no-agency trials 
were modelled as random. 
 
5.4.3 Results 
This regret-minimax model did not perform any better than the control EV 
model (summed BIC [regret minimax] = 5658.98, summed BIC [EV] = 5578.65) or a 
random choice default model (summed BIC [random] = 5662.37). Note that smaller 
BIC scores indicate a better fit to the data. The mean best fitting learning rate ( ) 
across participants was 0.61. The temperature of the softmax ( ) was 0.22. The 
mean regret parameters (η for 10p wins, and λ for 50p losses) were heavily affected 
by outliers, such that mean η = 1476.14 and mean λ = 39.08. However, the 
hypothesis that  did not hold (median λ = 0.004, median η = 0.133). These 
parameter fits hint at the observed behavioural response to the regret-related 50p loss 
condition in particular being opposite to what is predicted by the regret-minimax 
model, while the response to 10p wins deviates less from what is predicted by the 
model. This interpretation must be made with caution, however, since the model 
could not be fit well to actual choices. 
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Figure 5-3 – Bars illustrate the choice propensities predicted by the regret-minimax 
model, showing the probability of choosing the 50p stake at trial t, after a win or loss, of the 50p 
or 10p stake at trial t-1. Broken lines indicate the choice propensities observed in participants‟ 
actual choices (i.e. see Figure 5-2). Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the choice propensities predicted by the models, using the 
optimal fitting parameters for each participant. The observed behavioural response to 
10p losses with agency is in general accord with the regret-minimax model, in that 
these relief-related outcomes tend to encourage a repetition of the relatively good 
10p bet choice on the subsequent trial (although actual choices are more random than 
the model predicts). However, the impact of a 50p loss is most intriguing; as such 
outcomes appear to have the opposite effect on behaviour to that predicted by 
standard models of regret-minimax. The model also predicts that 10p wins encourage 
a slightly greater tendency to bet 50p on the next trial compared to 50p wins, due to a 
decreased value of betting 10p after a regrettable 10p win. Again the observed data 
points to an opposite tendency, although not significantly. Here the data shows a 
slightly decreased tendency towards the 50p bet compared to 50p wins. Both regret-
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related outcomes, then, appear to encourage participants to repeat, rather than avoid, 
the regrettable choice on the subsequent trial. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
Regret is widely regarded to exert a unique biasing influence on future 
behaviour (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). A general assumption of past research has 
been that regret motivates decision-makers to avoid actions that might engender its 
future occurrence. Here, however, I provide evidence that outcomes fitting the main 
criteria necessary for inducing regret may not always promote this typical avoidant 
behaviour on a subsequent choice. Rather, the findings point to a tendency to repeat 
the previously regret-related choice. 
Previous studies of regret have assessed choices in the presence of anticipated 
risk of regret (e.g. Mellers et al., 1999). Since the task I used here explicitly 
controlled the probability of regret from each bet option, it is intriguing that the 
observed response to experienced regret is different to what is expected from 
traditional theories. This suggests that critical differences exist in the impacts of 
anticipated and experienced regret on future choice. Loewenstein & Lerner (2003) 
also make this distinction between anticipated and experienced emotions, and argue 
that the latter can impact behaviour in two ways. They can either indirectly affect 
behaviour through modifying expected consequences (and/or anticipated emotions), 
or they can influence behaviour directly. A direct impact may be to promote 
behaviour that regulates the current emotional experience rather than to prepare for 
future avoidance of such experiences.  
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One possible explanation for the regret-related choice repetition relates to an 
emerging view that regret invokes cognitive regulatory strategies, such that feeling 
better about a mistake may trade off against a more pre-potent desire to improve 
future behaviour (Roese & Olson, 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). For example, 
on narrowly missing a bus, we can reduce feelings of regret with self-justifying 
thoughts such as “I couldn‟t have run any faster” or “I couldn‟t have known to leave 
home earlier”. When an individual believes it is possible to make up for a previous 
mistake, future decisions may reflect this belief, either aiming for material 
compensation or for protection of self-esteem with a later successful decision. 
Repeating a previously regret-related choice, as I observer here, might provide such a 
way for the decision-maker to make up for the prior mistake. This view resembles a 
direct impact of experienced emotions, as described above.  
This possibility of compensatory choice repetition after regret invokes a 
possible link between regret-regulatory strategies on the one hand, and the well 
recognised role of „chasing‟ in problem gambling (Lesieur, 1977), on the other. In 
the latter, there is a continuation of gambling after a series of losses. It has also been 
suggested that the phenomenon of a “near miss”, which depends on comparison of an 
obtained outcome with a close better counterfactual outcome, may encourage chasing 
in the context of gambling (Reid, 1986). Moreover, a chasing strategy may provide 
gamblers with a potential means of reducing feelings of regret (Loftus & Loftus, 
1983). This possible link with compulsive gambling with be discussed further in 
Chapters 6 and 8.  
Rather than an active attempt to make up for the mistake, repetition of a 
previously regret-related outcome may also be associated with decision inertia. 
Notably, mistakes arising from decisions to repeat a previous course of action are 
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sometimes associated with relatively less regret than mistakes arising from a new 
course of action, even if the two outcomes are objectively equally aversive. Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Chen (1995) found that such inflated emotional response to mistaken 
decisions to switch actions was also associated with stronger attempts at dissonance 
reduction. Furthermore, such an asymmetry may then encourage a bias towards 
repeating a previous action in future decisions as a form of regret-minimising 
strategy (e.g. Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Ritov & 
Baron, 1990). Conceptually similar are findings that positive experiences can 
promote variety or novelty seeking (Kahn & Isen, 1993), while negative experiences 
may lead to a fear of novelty and may make an individual more likely to stick to 
familiar choices. The possibility that this form of decision inertia is promoted by 
experiences of regret will be followed up explicitly in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
Ritov (1996) observes that people prefer high-risk/high-gain gambles, over 
low-risk/low-gain gambles, but only when they expect to receive feedback of the 
unselected alternative. Therefore, an alternative explanation for the current findings 
could be that a tendency to place the 50p bet more after 50p losses with agency than 
after any other outcome may reflect a risk-seeking bias. Risk-seeking may arise from 
the anticipation of missing a large win in the future. Indeed, incorporating a regret 
function into a model of investment decisions predicts that a regret-averse decision-
maker may become risk-seeking for fear of missing out on a large gain (Michenaud 
& Solnik, 2008). This is also in general accord with a prospect theoretic account of 
increased risk-seeking in a frame of losses, where losses here are relative to a better 
alternative. Similar predictions are made in a reinforcement learning context, when 
sequences of negative experiences tend to encourage increased risk-seeking in the 
short-term but more risk-neutral behaviour in the long-term (March, 1996). However, 
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that regret-related 10p wins do not encourage the same risk-seeking behaviour 
creates a problem for this interpretation. It is possible that the findings reflect a 
mixture of risk-seeking for fear of missing the large gain that would compensate for 
the previous mistake, and repetition perhaps reflecting either decision inertia, or a 
desire to justify the previous decision. Future work will need to address which of 
these provide the best explanation of the results here. 
Each of the above possible explanations cannot explain why the 10p win 
condition does not elicit identical behaviour as the 50p loss condition, when the level 
of operational regret associated with the two outcomes types are equivalent (i.e. the 
objective difference between the obtained and foregone outcomes is equal in each 
case). One possibility is that the impact of regret in a losing domain is greater than in 
a winning domain. Otherwise, this asymmetry might be driven by the nature of bet 
stake rather than the nature of the outcome, such that the subjective experience of 
regret following a risky 50p bet may be stronger than following a safer 10p bet. This 
may be attributable to a 50p bet being riskier, in so far as it has greater associated 
outcome variance, which may allow for easier construction of upward 
counterfactuals, stronger feelings of responsibility and greater outcome reversibility. 
Additionally, theories based on the role of decision justifiability in regret propose 
that opting for safer decisions reduces the pain of any resulting regret, since such 
decisions can be more easily justified by the decision-maker (Connolly & 
Zeelenberg, 2002). While the present study focused on behavioural effects, ratings of 
the subjective experience of regret during this type of task might shed light on this 
asymmetry.  
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This chapter is based largely on Nicolle, Bach, Driver and Dolan (2010). A role for the 
striatum in regret-related choice repetition. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, early access. 
 
Chapter 6. A role for the striatum in regret-related 
choice repetition 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that the prototypical economic 
perspective of regret-avoidant behaviour may be more fitting with an impact of 
anticipated regret, and that experienced regret may be associated with different 
expectations or goals. In particular, one view is that regret invokes cognitive 
regulatory strategies, such that we mentally reconstruct an event or its antecedents in 
order to make ourselves feel better about mistaken choices (Pieters & Zeelenberg, 
2007; Roese & Olson, 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). The results of the previous 
chapter show that decision-makers will repeat a previously regret-related choice, 
especially if this gives the chance of a better return - behaviour which may reflect a 
strategy aimed at compensating for a previous mistake. It is unclear, however, 
whether repetition of such choices acts to regulate the current experience of a 
regrettable outcome or whether it reflects some higher-order goal-directed behaviour 
that aims to regulate the future experience of regret. 
Here I use fMRI, and the same gambling task as used in the previous chapter, 
to explore the neuronal mechanisms underlying such regret-related behaviour. As in 
the previous chapter, the task allows us to explicitly manipulate experienced regret 
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(considered as resulting from the operationally regret-related nature of a received 
outcome as before), while holding anticipated outcome probabilities relatively 
constant. I expected to replicate a tendency for participants to repeat bets that on the 
immediately preceding trial had resulted in a regret-related, compared to a relief-
related, outcome. As shown in the previous study, this effect was expected to be most 
evident after the 50p loss condition with associated agency. 
For the fMRI predictions, a recent review of the relevant imaging literature 
by Sommer et al.(2009) is of particular importance. Here the authors suggest that the 
brain regions found to be involved in regret depends largely on the task used. In tasks 
that requiring the decision-maker to make choices between options with an 
associated level of anticipated regret, the OFC tends to be recruited (e.g. 
Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns, 2008; Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, 
Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Coricelli et al., 2005). On the other hand, Sommer et al 
argue that tasks requiring an individual to make choices based on previous 
experience (e.g. Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague, 2007), tend to implicate 
the striatum rather than the OFC. This may be because, as Sommer et al suggest, the 
learning signals activated by the experiences in these repeated choice tasks may 
depend heavily on the striatum. Since the task used here, and in the previous chapter, 
involves choosing between bets of differing levels of risk, we may also expect 
striatal involvement in the regrettable outcomes. I predicted that activity in striatum, 
a region that encodes both passive and action-contingent reward (O'Doherty et al., 
2004), should be attenuated for regret-related outcomes compared to relief-related 
outcomes. Critically, given the findings of Chapter 3, I also predicted that any such 
reduction should be dependent upon participants being responsible for the bet 
selection (i.e. having agency). This is important since fictive error signals in the 
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striatum would bear a closer relation to the psychological construct of regret if they 
are found to depend on agency.  
If responses in the striatum act as learning signals for guiding future 
behaviour, then regret-related signals here may also influence resulting behaviour. 
To address the possibility of a specific motivational impact of (the operationally 
defined) regret on choice repetition, I specifically tested for BOLD responses that 
would distinguish choices made following a previously regret-related outcome, from 
choices following a previously relief-related outcome. Moreover, while ventral 
striatum have been widely implicated in reward learning, dorsal striatum is 
commonly implicated in goal-directed action (Wickens, Budd, Hyland, & 
Arbuthnott, 2007), and so I predicted that a similar anatomical dissociation may be 
found in relation to our behavioural responses to experienced regret. Since the 
predicted choice repetition strategy would be in apparent conflict with the relatively 
decreased value of the regret-related outcome, I also tested for conflict-related 
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex when such choices are made, a region 
commonly involved in the monitoring of conflict (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
& Cohen, 2001) as well as being involved in choice avoiding vs. repeating (Bush et 
al., 2002; Critchley et al., 2003). 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants and design 
I recruited 20 participants (10 female) to take part in the experiment. 
Participants were aged 20-38 yrs (mean = 25.6 yrs). Three participants were removed 
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from the fMRI analysis due to faulty T1 images and resulting problems with image 
normalisation, but those participants were included in the behavioural analysis for 
completeness. 
 
6.2.2 Experimental procedure and behavioural analysis 
The same task was used as in the previous chapter‟s behavioural experiment. 
Again, trials were ascribed to four categories, in a 2 × 2 repeated-measures design 
that was conditional on the outcome of the previous trial for the behavioural analysis. 
For the fMRI analysis, onsets were modelled at the time of outcome feedback, and 
were separated according to outcome type. The two factors were outcome (win or 
loss) and stake (high 50p or low 10p). In addition, by including a no-agency control 
(as in the previous chapter), I could also explore how any tendency to repeat the 
same choice after each outcome type interacted with agency (in a 2 × 2 × 2 design, 
now with the additional factor of agency versus no-agency). In contrast to the 
procedure of the previous chapter, the no-agency trials were now randomly 
interleaved with the agency trials in an event-related design. 
Participants each played five 8-minute sessions of the game in the scanner, 
each including 120 trials (2/3 agency trials). Participants were again informed that 
the outcomes from a random selection of 100 trials, selected after the experiment, 
would determine their earnings for the entire experiment. Since participants did not 
know which trials would be selected, they were assumed to treat all trials as having 
an equal potential impact on their financial gain. 
The main behavioural dependent measure comprised participants‟ trial-by-
trial tendency to repeat (versus avoid) at trial t the bet placed at trial t-1. Actual wins 
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and losses were randomised throughout, while the overall number of trials falling 
into the two stake levels was choice-dependent. I also explored how any tendency to 
repeat the previous bet, contingent upon the outcome of the previous trial, changed 
from early runs (1-3) to late runs (3-5) of the game. Finally, I acquired reaction time 
(RT) data. Analysis of current RT to select the bet (on agency trials) was conditional 
on the outcome of the previous trial (which could be an agency or no-agency trial). 
 
6.2.3 Imaging acquisition and processing 
Scanning procedure was similar to that used in Chapter 3, but using a 
sequence of slightly lower resolution. The following imaging parameters were used: 
40 oblique transverse slices, slice thickness = 2 mm, gap between slices = 1 mm, 
repetition time TR = 2.4 s, α = 90o, echo time TE = 30 ms, bandwidth BW = 3551 
Hz/pixel, bandwidth in PE direction BWPE = 47.3 Hz/pixel, phase-encoding (PE) 
direction anterior-posterior, field of view (FOV) = 192 × 192 mm
2
, matrix size 64 × 
64, fat suppression. BOLD sensitivity losses in the orbitofrontal cortex and the 
amygdala due to susceptibility artifacts were minimised by applying a z-shim 
gradient moment of -0.4 mT/m*ms, a slice tilt of -30° and a positive PE gradient 
polarity (Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs, & Deichmann, 2006).  
Image preprocessing and data analysis were implemented using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software in Matlab7.4 (SPM5; Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, at UCL), as described in Chapter 2, section 2.4. 
 
  
Chapter 6: A role for the striatum in regret-related choice repetition
 
Page | 6.6  
 
6.2.4 Imaging analysis 
For each participant, I constructed two event-related general linear models 
(one to explore the response to the outcome of the current trial, and a second to test 
trial-to-trial effects). In the first model, 8 regressors of interest were included to 
allow us to assess BOLD-signal response patterns to the 8 outcome categories. These 
8 outcome categories were conditionalised on the outcome of the current trial, with 
the three orthogonal factors of agency or no-agency; win or loss; plus 50p or 10p 
stake. Given a short trial length (of 4 seconds on average) I modelled trials as 
compound events, accounted for by one regressor onset per trial, at the time of 
outcome feedback. These onsets were modelled by stick-functions, and then 
convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function and its temporal 
derivative. Motion parameters defined by the realignment procedure were entered as 
6 regressors of no interest, along with 17 additional regressors of cardiac phase (10 
regressors), respiratory phase (6 regressors) and respiratory volume (1 regressor).  
I generated statistical parametric maps from the contrasts of interest, which 
included the main effects of win vs. loss, high stake vs. low stake, and agency vs. no 
agency along with their interactions. The interaction of critical interest was between 
all three factors, specifically indicating increased or decreased activity for the regret-
related outcome types relative to the relief-related outcome types, on agency trials in 
particular. For this contrast I was particularly interested in a priori regions of interest 
(ROIs) within the striatum (including the caudate and putamen regularly implicated 
in both absolute and relative reward processing, e.g. Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, 
Noussair, & Berns, 2008; Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; 
Coricelli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007; O'Doherty et al., 2004). The critical interaction 
sought was for activity greater for 50p wins than for 50p losses but conversely 
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greater for 10p losses than for 10p wins, specifically when participants were agents 
of the stake choice.  
A second model for each participant separated the 8 outcome-contingent 
regressors according to which bet-stake was chosen on the subsequent trial, giving us 
16 regressors of interest and allowing us to explore differences in outcome-related 
responses when participants then repeat versus avoid the same choice. Again onsets 
were modelled with stick-functions at the time of outcome feedback, then convolved 
with a canonical haemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative. Since 
trials followed by a no-agency control trial (i.e. when there was no free choice on the 
subsequent trial) could not be categorised with respect to a later choice by the 
participant, these were included as a single regressor of no interest. I generated 
statistical parametric maps from the contrasts of interest. To assess the mechanism 
underlying the behavioural response to regret-related outcomes in the task, I tested 
the 2-way interaction of [„repeat‟ > „avoid‟ after regret] > [„repeat‟ > „avoid‟ after 
relief], where losing 50p and winning 10p with agency were considered operationally 
as regret-related, while winning 50p and losing 10p with agency were considered 
operationally as relief-related. This contrast allowed us to explore the brain networks 
involved in a tendency to repeat previous regret-related choices more than previous 
relief-related choices (as observed in the previous chapter‟s behavioural study). 
Based on a possible dorsal-ventral dissociation in the roles of the striatum in reward 
learning and goal-directed action (Wickens et al., 2007), I constructed separate ROIs 
within the left and right dorsal and ventral striatum. A hypothesised involvement of 
the ACC in possible conflict monitoring, potentially arising since the above 
behavioural strategy would be in apparent conflict with the relatively decreased value 
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of the regret-related outcome, also led us to test the same contrast within an 
anatomical ROI for bilateral ACC.  
 
6.3 Behavioural results 
As in the previous study, I found an increased tendency toward repeating the 
50p bet after a regret-related 50p loss (when having been the agent). Here, this effect 
was found to reflect an early bias, which diminished significantly with increasing run 
number (stake × outcome × run, F(4,72) = 3.229, p < 0.05). When the outcome was 
associated with no-agency, neither the stake × outcome effect (F(1,18) = 2.896, n.s.) 
nor its interaction with run number (F(4,72) = 0.567, n.s.) was significant. 
Figure 6-1 shows the probability of betting 50p at trial t, contingent on each 
outcome associated with agency at t-1. The early bias for repeating, compared to 
avoiding, a previously regret-related choice was a trend for regret-related 50p losses 
in runs 1 (t(19) = 1.830, p = 0.083) and significant in run 2 (t(19) = 2.759, p < 0.02). 
A tendency for participants to repeat 10p bets more than 50p bets was evident 
overall, and was found to interact significantly with agency (F(1,18) = 26.892, p < 
0.001), an effect also found in the previous chapter and suggests participants are 
generally risk-averse when agents. Again, this was the case in all but those trials that 
followed a 50p loss with agency, when participants evidently preferred to repeat the 
50p bet. 
In this replication, a significant reaction time (RT) effect was also found (for 
RT to place the next agency bet) with participants being significantly quicker to 
respond after regret-related outcomes (that were obtained with agency), compared 
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with relief-related outcomes (also with agency, t(19) = 2.868, p < 0.01), or compared 
with the equivalent outcomes with no agency (t(19) = 2.159, p < 0.05). Speeded RTs, 
in response to regret (Figure 6-2), accord with some previous results (Chua et al., 
2009). 
 
Figure 6-1 – Increased tendency to repeat, at trial t, the 50p bet after a regret-related 
50p loss than after a relief-related 50p win at trial t-1. 10p wins and losses show no such 
difference in their effects on subsequent choice. Choice behaviour is shown for each of the 5 
runs for trials associated with agency only, as no agency outcomes do not show differences in 
their effects on subsequent choice.   
 
 
Figure 6-2 – The figure shows quickened reaction times (RT in ms) at trial t after 
outcomes that would have been better from the alternative choice (Regret at t-1) compared to 
outcomes that would have been worse from the alternative choice (Relief at t-1), but only when 
trial t-1 was associated with agency.  Error bars show the standard error of the mean.     
 
Chapter 6: A role for the striatum in regret-related choice repetition
 
Page | 6.10  
 
6.4 fMRI results 
6.4.1 Main effects 
The fMRI main effects are shown in Table 6-1. Increased activity for wins 
compared to losses overall was seen in bilateral ventral striatum (whole-brain FWE 
corrected at p<0.05); see Figure 6-3a. This pattern of increased activity was also 
significantly greater for 50p wins relative to 10p wins bilaterally (small-volume FWE 
corrected at p<0.05, in the whole striatum), and is consistent with previous reports of 
striatal responses to rewards compared to losses (Delgado, Nystrom, Fissell, Noll, & 
Fiez, 2000; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). I found no 
significant interaction of this response with agency, indicating that the overall 
response to wins was not dependent on being responsible for the choice. No areas 
were significantly more active for all losses compared to all wins overall. For 
completeness, the main effects of agency and of stake are also presented in Table 
6-1. 
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Table 6-1 - The table shows significant activation for the main effects of outcome, stake 
and agency at the time of outcome.  Note that no significant voxels were found for the main 
effect of loss > win. 
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6.4.2 Activity reflecting what-might-have-been 
A significant stake × outcome interaction reflected increased activity in 
bilateral ventral striatum for the two counterfactual outcomes where an outcome 
could have been worse (i.e. winning 50p and losing 10p) relative to when outcomes 
could have been better (i.e. losing 50p and winning 10p), at p < 0.05 FWE corrected 
for the whole striatum; see Figure 6-3b. This finding is consistent with the expression 
of a counterfactual signal in bilateral striatum, as reported previously (Chandrasekhar 
et al., 2008; Chua et al., 2009; Coricelli et al., 2005). The peak activity for this effect 
was slightly more anterior and dorsolateral within the putamen, compared to the 
main effect of wins. In a region of left putamen, this stake × outcome interplay was 
further dependent on having choice responsibility, i.e. agency (with the three-way 
interaction surviving FWE correction at p < 0.05 when using a functional ROI taken 
from the orthogonal 2-way interaction), thus reflecting a relief > regret difference 
(see Figure 6-3c). A corresponding cluster in the right putamen showed a similar 
effect at a lower significance level (p < 0.002 uncorrected, mentioned here as it 
points to there being no hemispheric differences in this effect). I found no regions 
where activity increased during the outcomes that could have been better versus 
worse, or showing such a pattern that interacted with agency (i.e. showing putative 
regret > relief effects). 
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Figure 6-3 – Group SPM data, thresholded at p < 0.001 for display purposes, shown on 
a normalised canonical template brain.  a) Activity associated with overall Win > Loss.  b) 
Activity associated with counterfactual context, where (50p bet > 10p bet) win > (50p bet > 10p 
bet) loss.  The upper right plot shows the mean beta values for the four outcome types (collapsed 
across agency) in the peak voxel at 24, 6, -9, with absolute outcome value increasing left to right 
on the x axis.  c) SPM for the three-way interaction under which the stake x outcome interplay 
(as per b) was greater for agency compared to no agency trials.  The lower right plots show the 
mean beta values for the eight trial types in the peak voxel at -15, 3, -9.  Error bars show the 
standard error of the mean.  Co-ordinates are in MNI space.    
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6.4.3 Dorsal striatum reflects the tendency to repeat regret-related 50p 
losses 
To address what drives participants to repeat a regret-related bet choice on 
the immediately following trial, I divided outcomes into those where participants 
chose to repeat the same choice on the subsequent trial (“repeat” trials) and those 
where they avoided the same choice (“avoid” trials). Activity in left dorsal putamen 
(Figure 6-4) was greater when participants subsequently repeated a preceding regret-
related choice (small-volume FWE corrected p < 0.05), but showed no significant 
difference between choices to repeat versus avoid after relief-related choices (peak 
MNI -24, 9, -3). I did not find any region with significantly increased activity when 
participants chose to avoid the previous bet after a regret-related outcome. 
Furthermore, no regions significantly reflected choice following outcomes associated 
with no agency. I found that activity in right dorsal striatum during 50p losses with 
agency showed a significant linear decrease from early to late runs relative to activity 
during 50p wins with agency (small-volume FWE corrected in the whole striatum, p 
< 0.05). This may reflect the increased behavioural tendency to repeat regret-related 
50p losses in early runs (cf. Figure 6-2a). 
Activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, MNI 3, 33, 24) also showed a 
significant interaction of choice and previous outcome (small-volume FWE corrected 
p<0.05), apparent in the same contrast that had revealed the left dorsal putamen 
response. This region showed increased activity associated with the subsequent 
choice to “repeat” a previously regret-related bet, and decreased activity associated 
with the subsequent choice to “repeat” a previously relief-related bet. Activity here 
did not differentiate regret- and relief-related outcomes when it came to decisions to 
“avoid” on the next trial. 
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Figure 6-4 – Group SPM data thresholded at p < 0.001 for display purposes and shown 
on a normalised canonical template brain, showing activity for agency-related outcomes. The 
plot shows activity in left putamen for the contrast (repeat > avoid after regret) > (repeat > 
avoid after relief), with the mean beta values in the peak voxel for the left putamen at -24, 9, -3, 
shown for all outcome types with agency when the following choice was to repeat or avoid.  
Error bars show the standard error of the mean.  Co-ordinates are in MNI space. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The finding that healthy decision-makers show a behavioural tendency to 
repeat a previously regret-related choice is replicated here under the condition of 50p 
losses. Here I found this only during early runs (see Figure 6-2a), suggesting that it is 
an early bias (a pattern not found in the previous study perhaps because fewer trials 
were used). Again, one attempt to explain such behaviour invokes the gambler‟s 
fallacy, whereby the probability of a win is (mis)perceived to increase after the 
experience of a loss and decrease after a win (e.g. see Croson & Sundali, 2005), thus 
encouraging a higher risk bet after a loss. It is conceivable that such an effect might 
diminish over time (as for the behavioural pattern here) if participants estimated the 
outcome probabilities with more precision over time. But the gambler‟s fallacy alone 
would not explain the differences I observed under conditions of agency versus no-
agency. Furthermore, an analysis of sequences of identical outcomes did not reveal 
y = 9
Lef t Right
Repeat at t
Avoid at t
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any significant tendency to place a 50p bet more after losses than after wins when 
more losses were experienced in a sequence, although that would be expected from 
the gambler‟s fallacy. 
The aim of this study was to investigate neural mechanisms underlying 
regret-related choice repetition when participants were responsible for their choice. I 
found increased activity in the dorsal striatum when subjects made such choices. 
While I did not find OFC involvement in regret-related outcomes (as might be 
predicted from the literature review in Chapter 1, section 1.4), this is in keeping with 
the suggestion by Sommer et al. (2009) that the learning signals important in a task 
such as this one (with these signals being elicited by experienced, rather than 
anticipated, regret) depend upon striatal more than OFC activity. 
Previous fMRI studies show the striatum is important for processing primary 
rewards (e.g. O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley, & Dolan, 2002) as well as more 
abstract rewards, including money (Delgado et al., 2000), romantic love (Aron et al., 
2005) and humour (Mobbs, Greicius, Abdel-Azim, Menon, & Reiss, 2003). Along 
with processing passive receipt of rewards (O'Doherty et al., 2004) the striatum is 
also implicated in encoding of action-outcome contingencies (Delgado, Miller, Inati, 
& Phelps, 2005; Tanaka, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2008). Moreover, it encodes 
violations of our expectations for such contingencies, in the form of prediction-errors 
signals, which reinforcement learning models show to be central to guiding future 
behaviour (Barto & Sutton, 1998; Berns, McClure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001). 
While prediction errors relate to within-option counterfactual comparisons, the regret 
literature also implicates striatum in processing of rewards relative to between-option 
(i.e. choice dependent) counterfactual reference points (Chandrasekhar et al., 2008; 
Chua et al., 2009; Coricelli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007; Lohrenz et al., 2007). The 
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finding of relatively increased activity in ventral striatum during relief-related 
outcomes is consistent with this behaviour-dependent coding of rewards in the 
striatum. Furthermore, I find a critical role for agency in this pattern of activity, as 
expected from Chapter 3, thus further contributing to the ongoing debate regarding 
the role of responsibility in regret and relief. 
I found activity in ventral striatum that reflected the subjective value of the 
experienced outcome relative to what-might-have-been under a different choice 
(Figure 6-3c). However, activity in dorsal striatum was particularly involved in the 
behavioural response, i.e. regret-related choice repetition (Figure 6-4). Evidence for a 
dorsal-ventral dissociation in the roles of the striatum in reward learning and goal-
directed action may be of importance here (for review see Wickens, Budd, Hyland, 
& Arbuthnott, 2007). Such functional-anatomical dissociation might allow 
independent processing of more „emotional‟ responses versus behavioural responses 
to regret-related events. While not always being a conventionally regret-avoidant 
response, dorsal striatum responses appear to permit selection of future actions that 
may nonetheless bring the decision-maker toward higher-order goals, such as making 
up for a past mistake. This aspect of my findings is in general accord with previous 
work showing the dorsal striatum to be especially important in stimulus-response-
reward learning, while the ventral striatum is important for stimulus-reward 
prediction (Delgado et al., 2005; O'Doherty et al., 2004; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez, 
2004). O'Doherty et al. (2004) proposed that the ventral and dorsal striatum play 
dissociable roles in the control of our action, with the former serving a “critic” role 
important for passively predicting the value of future states, while the latter serves an 
“actor” role involved in updating stimulus-response-reward associations and 
reinforcing, or gating, the selection of future high value actions. Dopaminergic 
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projections to the dorsal and ventral striatum originating from different sources (from 
the substantia nigra (SN) and VTA respectively) may provide a neurophysiological 
basis for their different roles (see review by Wickens et al., 2007). Here my findings 
add a new line of support for such a functional dissociation along the dorsal-ventral 
axis of the striatum, while also showing for the first time such dissociation in a 
context where rewards are relative to their counterfactual alternatives. 
Activity in dorsal striatum has also been found to reflect choice-induced 
modifications of value. For example, Sharot, De Martino, & Dolan (2009) found 
increased caudate activity associated with post-choice increases in the subjective 
value of the selected option. They proposed that this increased activity may be 
associated with a desire to reduce cognitive dissonance. Their findings suggest a role 
for dorsal striatum in higher-order, temporally delayed, goal-directed action. 
Similarly, the present findings may reflect a role of the dorsal striatum in updating an 
increased subjective value of repeating a previously regret-related choice, perhaps 
motivated by a desire to make up for our mistakes. Tanaka et al. (2004, 2007) have 
found the dorsal striatum to be active when choosing larger delayed rewards in 
favour of smaller immediate rewards, supporting its role in the motivation of actions 
toward longer-term goals, while more ventral regions of the striatum were active 
when choices were more impulsive, i.e. in favour of the smaller immediate rewards. 
From such previous work, I questioned whether value related signal, 
observed in ventral striatum, may be regulated or modified by adherence to higher-
order behavioural goals. There was no evidence that decreased ventral striatal 
activity to regret-related outcomes was influenced by a choice to repeat or avoid on 
the next trial, while dorsal striatum did show this effect. Anatomical studies show 
ascending spirals within both a striato-nigro-striatal loop and a limbic-to-motor 
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striatocortical loop, with the direction of both being ventromedial to dorsolateral (e.g. 
Draganski et al., 2008; Haber, Fudge, & McFarland, 2000; Haber & Knutson, 2009), 
and no evidence of direct information transmission from dorsal to ventral striatum. It 
is possible, however, that interactions between processing in ventral and dorsal 
striatum are expressed elsewhere, where anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), with its 
projections to ventral and dorsal striatum, is a prime candidate. Indeed, I found 
responses in ACC that were modulated by decisions to repeat previous bets, 
depending on previous outcome type. Since the ACC is often implicated in the 
monitoring of conflict (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001) the observed response here may 
be associated with monitoring of conflict between value and choice. Another 
possibility, however, is that it regulates or gates value-related activity in ventral 
striatum, thereby facilitating choice-related activity in the dorsal striatum. 
A possible alternative explanation for the findings of Studies 3 and 4 is that 
the 50p loss actually induces less regret relative to the 10p win, due to the high 
possible reward associated with a 50p bet affording greater justification for its 
selection. This may be especially the case for decision-makers who are primarily 
focused on possible gains, rather than possible losses, and may explain both the 
increased tendency to bet 50p after a 50p loss, as well as the increased activity in 
dorsal striatum (if this is reward-related activity). However, this explanation also 
predicts two other behavioural tendencies, which were not found. Firstly, it would 
predict that the tendency to bet 50p would be the highest overall, since betting 50p 
would be highly justifiable. However, participants were generally risk-averse, 
tending to bet the 10p more often than the 50p. Secondly, it would predict that the 
tendency to repeat 50p after a 50p win would be highest, since a 50p win would 
further defend the justifiability of a 50p bet. We actually find the tendency to bet 50p 
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is lower after a 50p win compared to after a 50p loss. According to the first 
hypothesis, on the other hand, relief-related 50p wins would not generate the same 
desire to make up for the past mistake, thus reducing the value of the 50p bet (a 
tendency that appears to be associated with decreased ACC activity). Subjective 
ratings of emotional experience, as well as information on decision-makers‟ rationale 
for their choices, would have been useful here.  
Here, I show that operational regret, under certain choice constraints, can lead 
to choices that appear to reflect attempts to make up for apparent mistakes, reflected 
in repetitive gambling behaviour. Furthermore, these findings suggest a central role 
for the striatum in this behaviour, in a manner that accords with current models of 
dorsal-ventral dissociation for striatum function. Further consideration of the role of 
regret-regulatory strategies in such behaviour, along with the neuronal mechanisms 
involved, is likely to be crucial in understanding mechanisms driving maladaptive 
behaviours such as gambling, as well as that seen in patient populations where 
compulsive gambling can sometimes be a side-effect of neuromodulatory therapy, as 
seen in Parkinson‟s disease. 
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This study has been submitted under the following reference: Nicolle, Fleming, Bach, Driver 
& Dolan, (2010). A regret-induced status-quo bias. 
 
 
Chapter 7. Does regret encourage a status-quo bias? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
When faced with a complex decision, people tend to accept the status quo. 
Indeed, across a range of everyday decisions, such as whether to move house or trade 
in a car, or even whether to flip the TV channel, there is a considerable tendency to 
maintain the status quo and refrain from acting (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). In 
a recent study, Fleming, Thomas, & Dolan (2010) investigated the neural 
mechanisms for overcoming such a status-quo bias in a difficult perceptual task, but 
these data did not account for why the bias exists in the first place. One influential 
view is that a status-quo bias is associated with anticipated regret (Baron & Ritov, 
1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1995; Tykocinski, Israel, & 
Pittman, 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998, 2001), such that this behaviour reflects 
a regret-minimising strategy. Here, I explore how asymmetric behavioural and brain 
responses to errors that follow choices to either reject or accept a status-quo may 
encourage a status-quo bias on subsequent decisions. Moreover, such a bias may 
account for my previous observation that regrettable outcomes encourage choice 
repetition, rather than avoidance. 
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Existing literature on counterfactual thinking and regret supports that our 
emotional responses to the outcomes of our actions depend not just on the nature of 
the outcome itself, but also on the type of behaviour that brings it about. Notably, 
mistakes arising from decisions to reject a status-quo apparently have an amplified 
emotional impact, compared to mistakes arising from a decision to accept the usual 
course, even when the two outcomes are objectively equally aversive. For example, 
Kahneman & Tversky (1982) found that the same car accident was judged to be 
more unpleasant subjectively if the driver had taken an unusual route home rather 
than their habitual route. Similarly, greater regret is judged to be incurred when value 
is lost on stocks that were recently switched to from a previously held stock, 
compared to if the failing stock was instead one that had been always held. Such 
asymmetries in the paths to regret have since been replicated in many different 
contexts in purely behavioural studies (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Feldman, Miyamoto, & 
Loftus, 1999; Landman, 1987; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg, van den Bos, van 
Dijk, & Pieters, 2002).  
Several theories have been proposed to explain the asymmetric impact of 
status-quo rejection errors (versus status-quo acceptance errors). Rejecting a status-
quo may be more salient and sometimes more costly than accepting it, such that 
status-quo rejection errors invite greater attention and are more easily remembered 
on future occasions. Of particular interest in relation to the literature on regret and 
counterfactual thinking is the suggestion that status-quo rejection is less “normal” (it 
is by definition less of a status-quo). According to Kahneman & Miller's (1986) 
Norm Theory, abnormal events are more mutable psychologically, which may allow 
for easier construction of counterfactual alternatives (which might have avoided the 
error). As a result, the emotional impact of status-quo rejection errors is amplified 
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relative to otherwise equivalent status-quo acceptance errors. An action associated 
with status-quo rejection might also be considered as more directly causal of the 
outcome than the „inaction‟ typically associated with status-quo acceptance, thereby 
amplifying a sense of accountability or blame for the error (Ritov & Baron, 1990; 
Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). With decision justifiability of key importance in 
theories of regret (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002), a 
broad view encompassing many of the other accounts suggested may be that the 
increased normality and lower potential for blame associated with status-quo 
acceptance makes this more justifiable and so less likely to induce regret.   
An amplified psychological regret following mistaken status-quo rejection 
may underlie a pervasive behavioural bias towards accepting the status-quo in later 
decisions (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1995; 
Tykocinski, Israel, & Pittman, 2004; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998, 2001). Moreover, 
a status-quo bias may provide a means of regulating future experiences of regret, by 
improving the perceived justifiability of future choices (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). 
Motivated by the purely behavioural literature connecting regret and the status-quo 
bias, and by the regret-related choice repetition found in the previous two chapters, 
here I examine the neural mechanisms underlying such a bias by testing an 
hypothesis that links choice behaviour, and neuronal activity at choice, to antecedent 
error processing. 
Turning to the possible neural basis of this asymmetry, functional 
neuroimaging studies have found a critical role of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) 
and insula in error processing (Braver, Barch, Gray, Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Carter 
et al., 1998; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; Klein et al., 2007; Menon, Adleman, 
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White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001). Interestingly, insula and anterior cingulate cortex 
activity has also been implicated in negative evaluation of our choices (Liu et al., 
2007) as well as more specifically in the experience of regret (Chua, Gonzalez, 
Taylor, Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009). Given these findings, I predicted that insula and 
mPFC activity may also be associated with the inflated emotional response to status-
quo rejection errors, as well as activity in the OFC, striatum and amygdala due to 
their apparent roles in regret. Furthermore, the insula is thought particularly 
important in predicting future consequences, for instance in terms of risk or 
uncertainty associated with choice (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Paulus, 
Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; Paulus & Stein, 2006; Preuschoff, 
Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009). This leads to a 
further prediction that the insula may be involved not only in representing the 
outcomes of our choices, but also in how this information is then used to guide future 
behaviour. In particular, activity here is predicted to be associated with a status-quo 
bias being elicited in response to a prior status-quo rejection error. 
Previously Fleming et al. (2010) identified a role for fronto-basal ganglia 
interactions in rejecting the status-quo in a difficult perceptual choice scenario, but 
they were unable to specify the antecedent neural mechanisms biasing choices. In the 
present study, I address this question directly in a similar task but now linking 
differences in error processing on a given trial (when explicit feedback on errors or 
correctness is provided) to any impact on the status-quo bias for the subsequent trial. 
Candidate mechanisms were predicted to lie within mPFC and insula due to their 
apparent involvement in error-detection and decision-making (Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese, & Snyder, 2001; Carter et al., 1998; Kiehl, Liddle, & Hopfinger, 2000; 
Klein et al., 2007; Menon, Adleman, White, Glover, & Reiss, 2001). Surprisingly, 
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previous neuroimaging studies have overlooked possible differences in the way such 
errors may be processed, such as a potential behavioural and neuronal asymmetry 
between status-quo acceptance and status-quo rejection errors.  
 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Participants  
Twenty healthy individuals participated in the study. Three participants were 
excluded after equipment failures meant their responses were not fully recorded 
during scanning. Thus, seventeen participants in all were included in the data 
analysis (8 female, mean age 23.5 yrs ± 4.8). Twenty additional participants were 
included in an initial manipulation-check behavioural experiment (15 female, mean 
age 22.8 yrs ± 4.0). 
 
7.2.2 Experimental procedure 
I modified the task reported by Fleming et al. (2010), originally designed to 
assess neuronal mechanisms associated with status-quo rejection, by now including 
explicit trial-by-trial performance feedback for errors and correct responses (Figure 
7-1). In brief, this task requires a trial-by-trial perceptual decision, with participants 
judging whether a target ball, landing on a simulated tennis court, was “IN” 
(overlapping the line) or “OUT”. Participants started each trial by holding the key 
corresponding to their choice on the previous trial (or holding IN on the very first 
trial). Each trial began with a central fixation cross and two peripheral lines. After a 
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variable delay, the target ball appeared briefly (66 ms) on either the left or right of 
the screen. Since the side of target presentation was random, participants were 
instructed to fixate centrally in order to maximise performance on the task, although 
formal eye-tracking was not instigated as this was irrelevant to my current 
experimental question. Participants were then reminded of their previous choice (the 
key currently still pressed, either IN or OUT), and decided either to continue holding 
the current key to stay with their previous choice (accept status-quo) or to switch to 
the alternative key, thus switching their decision (reject status-quo). Participants then 
held the appropriate key (new if they had switched, old if they had not) until the 
occurrence of a trial in which they chose to switch. 
In order to create a balanced design, the correct decision was to accept the 
status-quo on 50% of trials and to reject the status-quo on the remaining 50%. 
Explicit feedback was presented at the end of each trial, corresponding to a 40p gain 
or 40p loss for correct or incorrect decisions, respectively. In order to obtain 
approximately 30% errors overall, I manipulated the difficulty of the perceptual 
decisions by altering the distance of the target from the outside edge of the line, 
using a 2-up-1-down staircase procedure (Levitt, 1971) in 0.1 visual degree angle 
steps. Overall, each participant played 320 trials, over 4 separate sessions, while 
fMRI brain data were simultaneously acquired. Keys were pressed with the index or 
middle finger of the right hand, and key-choice contingencies (i.e. whether index or 
middle meant IN or OUT) were counterbalanced across sessions. Participants were 
paid according to the actual winnings for their two best sessions, which averaged 
£25.51 in the main experiment (SD = £2.7).  
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After scanning, participants gave subjective ratings of their emotional 
responses to errors in the task out of the scanner. These were post-hoc overall 
ratings, not trial-by-trial, and were completed on a 9-point Likert scale. Ratings 
probed relative responses to reject status-quo and accept status-quo errors along 
dimensions of regret, disappointment, blame, sense of “kicking yourself”, and desire 
to “make up for the mistake” (separate Likert scales for each of these 5 dimensions). 
For relative regret ratings, participants were asked “Which felt more regretful – when 
you stayed with your previous choice and made an error, or when you switched your 
choice and made an error.” Absolute ratings of errors overall were also gathered 
along the same dimensions (i.e. collapsed across accept and reject errors).  
 
 
Figure 7-1- An exemplar trial 
timeline. Participants began each trial 
holding the key corresponding to their 
choice on the previous trial, while 
fixating on the central cross flanked by 
two tramlines. After a varied delay, a 
ball landed on either the left or right of 
the screen, at any height on the 
tramline. Participants were then asked 
to judge whether the ball landed “IN” 
(overlapping the line) or “OUT”. Their 
decision was indicated by either 
continuing to depress their previous 
decision (a black box served to remind 
them of this status-quo), or to switch to 
the alternative key to reject the status-
quo and switch their decision. On 
rejecting the status-quo, participants 
then held the new key until they chose 
to switch again on a later trial. 
Accuracy feedback, and associated 
monetary win or loss, was presented at 
the end of each trial. 
 
 
750–2500ms
66ms
750ms
2000ms
IN
OUT
1500ms
IN
OUT
Hold
Hold 
or 
switch
1500ms
Incorrect
Lose 40p
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In an initial manipulation-check behavioural experiment, a separate cohort of 
participants gave absolute ratings of experienced regret after every error trial from 
320 consecutive trials, on a 9-point Likert scale, where 9 was the highest possible 
regret. With this additional experiment, I sought to confirm that errors on the task did 
indeed induce reported experiences of regret, while also aiming to provide unique 
evidence for a trial-by-trial account of the rejection-acceptance differences in regret 
(since previous studies have largely relied on anticipated relative regret for 
hypothetical scenarios, rather than actual personal current experiences of regret). The 
task used in this experiment was otherwise the same as in the scanning study. I also 
collected skin conductance responses (SCRs) in this additional experiment (as 
described in the Chapter 2, section 2.5). Each trial onset, ball appearance, decision 
cue, and outcome, were modelled as separate events, followed by an evoked SCR 
with a canonical shape (Bach, Daunizeau, Kuelzow, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).  
 
7.2.3 Imaging acquisition and processing 
Participants were scanned with a single-shot gradient-echo EPI sequence. 
Imaging parameters were as follows: 48 oblique transverse slices tilted by 30
o
, slice 
thickness = 2mm with a 1mm gap between slices, repetition time TR = 3.36s, α = 
90°, echo time TE = 30ms, BWPE = 27 Hz/pixel, positive phase-encoding gradient 
polarity in an anterior-posterior direction, field of view = 192×192 mm
2
, matrix size 
64×64, fat suppression, z-shim gradient pre-pulse moment = -1.4 mT/m×ms.  
Image preprocessing and data analysis were implemented using Statistical 
Parametric Mapping software in Matlab2009a (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for 
Neuroimaging, at UCL), as described in 2.4.  
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7.2.4 Behavioural analyses 
In our manipulation-check behavioural experiment, I tested for a difference 
between experienced regret ratings for rejection and acceptance errors, using a paired 
sample t-test. Ratings here were standardized to remove individual differences in 
mean regret ratings. 
Post-hoc (rather than online) ratings of subjective response to errors were 
analysed in the scanning experiment. These included absolute ratings of regret, 
disappointment, blame, sense of “kicking yourself”, and desire to “make up for the 
mistake” in response to errors overall. Relative responses to rejection and acceptance 
errors were collected along the same dimensions, and then any mean bias of each 
rating for one type of error over the other was tested with a one-sample t-test against 
the null hypothesis of no bias (midpoint rating of 5 on the scale). 
I predicted an overall behavioural status-quo bias (tendency to accept the 
status-quo option), in line with what has previously been shown with this particular 
„line-judgement‟ task (Fleming et al., 2010). I measured such bias as a tendency 
towards status-quo acceptance over-and-above what was the correct (optimal) choice 
on each trial, as assessed with a one-sample t-test. Finally, I measured how this 
status-quo bias may be influenced by the outcome of the preceding trial, using a 2×2 
repeated-measures ANOVA on data for the current trial, with factors for outcome 
(correct, incorrect) and choice (accept, reject) on the previous trial. 
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7.2.5 Imaging analysis 
In this experiment, I used fMRI to test two hypotheses in relation to the link 
between errors types and the status-quo bias. First, guided by the regret literature (see 
section 7.1), I predicted that error-related brain responses would be greater for 
erroneous status-quo rejections than for erroneous status-quo acceptances. Since the 
overall main effect of rejection error compared to acceptance error would be 
confounded by the motor response (changed or unchanged key), I tested for the 
critical interaction between outcome (error/correct feedback) and status-quo 
rejection/acceptance. Specifically, for the BOLD data corresponding to the feedback 
event, I tested the following contrast: Reject [error - correct] > Accept [error - 
correct]. Note that this contrast tests for a predicted increase in brain responses to 
errors on rejection than acceptance trials, while perfectly controlling for motor-
response related activations via the subtraction of correct status-quo rejection or 
acceptance response. This contrast was performed within an event-related general 
linear model using a model that included the 4 regressors of interest: accept-error, 
accept-correct, reject-error, and reject-correct. Onsets were modelled with stick-
functions at the time of outcome feedback, convolved with the standard canonical 
haemodynamic response function and its temporal derivative. Regressors of no 
interest comprised target ball onsets and button press, along with start of the decision 
phase parametrically modulated by RT if a decision to reject the status-quo was 
made. This modulation by RT was included to factor out activity previously shown 
to reflect local variations in difficulty in this task (Fleming et al, 2010). Head motion 
parameters defined by the realignment procedure were entered as 6 regressors of no 
interest, along with 17 additional regressors of cardiac phase (10 regressors), 
respiratory phase (6 regressors) and respiratory volume (1 regressor).  
Chapter 7: Does regret encourage a status-quo bias?
 
 
Page | 7.11  
 
I generated statistical parametric maps from the contrasts of interest. At the 
time of outcome feedback, I was interested in the main effect of error corrected for 
multiple comparisons across the whole brain volume. For the outcome-related 2-way 
interaction, Reject [error - correct] > Accept [error - correct], my focus was 
especially on error-related activity. Accordingly, I restricted the search volume for 
this 2-way interaction to a functional ROI from the orthogonal main effect of error > 
correct, set at a threshold on p < 0.005 uncorrected. Within these ROIs, I report 
voxel-wise activity significant at a FWE corrected threshold of p < 0.05. For 
completeness, I also report activity that survives whole-brain cluster-wise corrected 
significance of p < 0.05. 
My second hypothesis was that differences in processing of errors (versus 
correct) status-quo rejections versus acceptances would be associated with an 
increased behavioural status-quo bias on the subsequent trial. To explore the neural 
basis of such bias, I tested for two forms of a 3-way interaction whereby enhanced 
responsivity to status-quo rejection, compared to status-quo acceptance, errors (i.e. 
Reject [error - correct] > Accept [error - correct]) should be associated more with a 
subsequent decision to accept (rather than reject) the status-quo. I hypothesised that 
such an interaction could be associated either with outcome-driven responses 
(predicting subsequent choice) or choice-driven responses (associated with the 
initiation of the choice). To test these two means though which asymmetries in error 
processing could underlie a behavioural status-quo bias, I implemented two further 
event-related general linear models per participant. The first modelled onsets at the 
time of outcome feedback (for the 4 outcome types – accept-error, accept-correct, 
reject-error, and reject-correct) contingent on the choice made on the subsequent trial 
(subsequent accept or subsequent reject). The second modelled onsets at the start of 
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the subsequent decision phase, for either status-quo acceptance or status-quo 
rejection on the current trial contingent on outcome type (i.e. one of the four 
outcomes described above) on the previous trial. In both models, onsets were stick 
functions convolved with a canonical haemodynamic response function and its 
temporal derivative. Motion and physiological regressors of no interest were as in the 
previous model. I generated statistical parametric maps from the 3-way interaction 
contrast of interest. For both models, I restricted my analysis to functional ROIs 
identified from the outcome-related effects found in the first model. The same 
statistical thresholds were used, as described above. 
 
7.3 Results – Manipulation-check study 
The preliminary behavioural experiment showed trial-by-trial regret ratings 
were higher than 5 on the 9-point scale (mean = 5.83 out of 9), indicating significant 
experienced regret for errors in the task. Critically, regret ratings were greater for 
status-quo rejection errors (mean = 6.00, z mean = 0.09) than status-quo acceptance 
errors (mean = 5.66, z mean = -0.06) (t(19) = 2.21, p < 0.05) in line with previous 
studies. Here, I uniquely extend this to actual trial-by-trial outcomes and personal 
experiences in the present task, rather than merely hypothetical scenarios as in 
previous studies. Overall, I found a significant 6.2% bias towards the status-quo 
(t(19)=5.01, p<0.0001). I also observed an effect of correctness in skin conductivity 
response, at the timepoint of the outcome, where the SCR was bigger for incorrect 
than for correct responses (t(20) = 2.9, p < 0.01). No effect was observed for action 
or the action × correctness interaction, and no effect was observed at any other time 
point in the trial.  
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7.4 Results – Main experiment 
7.4.1 Post-hoc subjective ratings 
As predicted, regret was again significantly greater for status-quo rejection 
errors than status-quo acceptance errors (mean deviation from neutral point on the 
scale = 1.24, t(16) = 2.32, p < 0.05). No such effect was found for ratings of 
disappointment (mean deviation from neutral = 0.35, t(16) = 0.63, p = ns), despite 
absolute ratings of regret and disappointment for errors being similar (mean regret = 
5.29, mean disappointment = 5.35, t(16) = -0.13, p = ns). The only other rating that 
was higher for status-quo rejection errors than status-quo acceptance errors was self-
blame (mean deviation neutral = 1.06, t(16) = 2.31, p < 0.05), although the feeling of 
“kicking yourself” was trend significant (mean deviation neutral = 0.88, t(16) = 1.99, 
p = 0.06).  
 
7.4.2 fMRI data: Enhanced response to status-quo rejection errors in 
anterior insula and mPFC 
I addressed BOLD responses corresponding to the time of outcome feedback. 
A main effect of error > correct was found in bilateral anterior insula (Figure 7-2a). 
These were FWE significant whole-brain (p < 0.05 whole brain cluster-corrected). 
No effect of error was found within the OFC. The opposite contrast, correct > error 
responses, revealed effects in striatum, postcentral gyrus, superior temporal cortex 
and superior occipital cortex, but are of less interest due to a lack of a priori 
hypotheses for my current purposes.  
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The critical interaction contrast explored whether the main effect of error 
(versus correct) was stronger for status-quo rejection errors than for status-quo 
acceptance errors, as predicted from the subjective rating results. I tested for activity 
fitting this pattern at the time of outcome feedback. At whole-brain cluster-corrected 
significance, I found activity in medial prefrontal cortex (extending into the rostral 
anterior cingulate) showed greater responsivity to status-quo rejection  errors 
compared to status-quo acceptance errors, as evident in the contrast Reject [error - 
correct] > Accept [error - correct] (Figure 7-2b). I also tested specifically whether the 
error-related anterior insula activity, within a mask defined by the (orthogonal) main 
effect of error (extent threshold p < 0.005), showed any such enhancement for the 
case of status-quo rejection errors. I found that left anterior insula was significantly 
greater for status-quo rejection than to status-quo acceptance errors (p < 0.05 FWE 
corrected for the ROI) (Figure 7-2c & d). No regions showed significant effects in 
the inverse interaction. All effects are summarised in Table 7-1. 
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Figure 7-2 – Group SPM data showing responses at the time of outcome feedback, 
thresholded at p<0.005 for display purposes, shown on a normalised canonical template brain. 
a) While brain corrected bilateral anterior insula response to the main effect of error > correct 
(MNI peaks -36,17,-5 and 39,26,-2). b) Whole brain corrected activity in medial prefrontal 
cortex (MNI peak 3, 47, 25) reflecting the interaction of choice and outcome (Reject [error > 
correct] – Accept [error > correct]). c) Anterior insula activity from the main effect of error, 
showing the same interaction of choice and outcome and d) the plotted mean parameter 
estimates for the four outcome types at the peak voxel (MNI -30, 26, 16). Error bars show 
within-subject standard errors of the difference between error and correct responses for the two 
decision types. 
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Table 7-1 – The table shows activation for the main effects of error and correct trials, 
and the interaction of outcome with rejecting or accepting the status-quo. Contrasts were 
performed on responses modelled at the time point of trial outcome. 
 
 
7.4.3 Anterior insula and mPFC activity at choice predicts a status-quo 
bias 
In the main experiment, I observed a 7.9 % status-quo bias (t(16) = 7.59, p < 
0.00001). I tested whether this bias was dependent on the outcome of the previous 
trial, using a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with factors for outcome 
(error/correct) and reject/accept status-quo on the previous trial. I found a main effect 
of reject/accept, such that overall participants tended to repeat the strategy used on 
the previous trial (i.e. to keep rejecting or keep accepting, F(1,16) = 13.79, p < 
0.005). However, this effect interacted with outcome (F(1,16) = 11.25, p < 0.005), 
with erroneous status-quo rejection encouraging significantly greater subsequent 
status-quo acceptance (mean = 0.56) compared to correct status-quo rejection (mean 
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= 0.49) (t(16) = 3.15, p < 0.01), which was not the case for erroneous status-quo 
acceptance (mean = 0.59) compared to correct status-quo acceptance (mean = 0.62) 
(t(16) = -1.88, ns, Figure 7-3). Furthermore, erroneous rejection of the status-quo was 
the only outcome type that significantly drove a tendency towards an alternative 
strategy (i.e. from rejection to acceptance of the status-quo) on the subsequent trial, 
as shown by a one-sample t-test against no bias (t(16) = -3.21, p < 0.01). 
 
 
Figure 7-3 – Figure shows how the status-quo bias is contingent upon the outcome of 
the previous trial. Error bars show within-subject standard errors of the difference between 
error and correct responses for the two decision types. 
 
At the time of choice on the subsequent trial, pooling correct and error trials, 
I found enhanced brain activity associated with a decision to reject the status-quo 
(compared to accept), in bilateral cerebellum, bilateral supramarginal gyrus, and 
bilateral insula (p < 0.05, whole-brain cluster-level FWE corrected). Decisions to 
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accept the status-quo were associated with a trend significant cluster in rostral ACC 
(p < 0.06).  
I next explored the possible link between the enhanced error-related activity 
following rejection errors and the behavioural bias towards subsequent status-quo 
acceptance. Accordingly, I designed a three-way interaction contrast which tested 
whether the critical 2-way interaction (Reject [error - correct] > Accept [error - 
correct]) was more closely associated with participants making a subsequent decision 
to accept rather than reject the status-quo, thereby providing a link between the 
neural outcome response and the subsequent behavioural status-quo bias. I found 
significant effects when modelling the interaction at the time of subsequent choice. 
Specifically, I found that the anterior insula pattern of activity shown in Figure 7-2 c-
d was also expressed when participants choose to accept the status-quo, but not when 
they decide to reject the status-quo (contrast estimates at the peak of the previous 
anterior insula 2-way interaction [MNI -30, 26, 16] taken forward to a 2 × 2 × 2 
ANOVA, 3-way interaction, F(1,16) = 10.51, p < 0.005). I found that mPFC showed 
the same pattern of activity to anterior insula, such that the enhanced responsivity to 
errors under status-quo rejection was also expressed at subsequent choice, but only 
when participants are currently choosing to accept, rather than reject, the status-quo. 
However, this response was not expressed within the same peak as for the 2-way 
outcome-related response. These choice-related responses are shown in Figure 7-4 
and in Table 7-2.  
When the 3-way interaction was tested at the time of preceding outcome, now 
categorised by subsequent choice, no significant effects were found. The time-course 
plots in Figure 7-4 b & d also indicate these responses appear to emerge at the time 
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of choice on the subsequent trial. Since a 3-way interaction was not identified in 
these regions at the time of outcome, predicting subsequent choice, then these results 
point to a choice-related fMRI response (dependent on the outcome of the previous 
trial). I note, however, that a limited inter-trial interval and low temporal resolution 
of fMRI prevents us from unequivocally assigning modulation of the BOLD 
response to either previous outcome or subsequent choice. Future studies exploiting 
the higher temporal resolution of MEG may be useful for teasing apart the exact 
temporal dynamics of outcome-driven versus choice-driven responses. 
 
Figure 7-4 – Group SPM data showing responses at the time of subsequent choice, 
thresholded at p<0.005 for display purposes, shown on a normalised canonical template brain. 
a) and b) show anterior insula activity reflecting an interaction of previous choice and outcome 
with current choice (MNI peak -33, 26, 16) (i.e. (Reject [error - correct] > Accept [error - 
correct]) only when the current choice is to Accept). c) and d) show the same 3-way interaction 
within medial prefrontal cortex (peak MNI 15, 56, 13). 
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Table 7-2 - The table shows activation for the main effects of reject and accept at 
choice, and the interaction of these choices with the choice and outcome on the previous trial. 
Contrasts were performed on responses modelled at the time point of subsequent trial choice. 
 
 
7.5 Discussion 
While a status-quo bias was previously found to arise for difficult perceptual 
decisions (Fleming et al., 2010), it was unclear why, in such situations of uncertainty 
participants are driven to stay with a status-quo, rather than change to a different 
option. Here, I hypothesised that erroneous rejection of the status-quo may lead to 
greater regret than erroneous acceptance of the status-quo, both psychologically and 
neurobiologically, and that such an asymmetry can be a key driver of a status-quo 
bias. Thus greater regret after status-quo rejection may reduce its justifiability and 
appeal, and encourage future decisions that align with a status-quo option. 
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In keeping with this perspective, here I show erroneous status-quo rejection is 
associated with stronger feelings of regret than erroneous status-quo acceptance, with 
anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) BOLD signals also showing an 
inflated response specifically for erroneous status-quo rejections (as opposed to 
erroneous status-quo acceptance). Both regions have been previously implicated in 
error-processing (e.g. Carter et al., 1998; Klein et al., 2007; Menon et al., 2001; 
Ullsperger & Von Cramon, 2004), but hitherto without any consideration of status-
quo rejection versus status-quo acceptance.  
A particular role of the insula in interoceptive awareness (Critchley, Mathias, 
& Dolan, 2002; Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004), and more 
generally subjective feeling states (Craig, 2002), has shaped theories of insula 
involvement towards the detection of external threat stimuli or loss, and for 
awareness of resulting physiological arousal. Errors that people become aware of are 
associated with stronger insula activity compared to those of which we are unaware, 
in keeping with an increased autonomic response to the former errors (Klein et al., 
2007). I did not find evidence for increased physiological arousal, as assessed with 
SCRs during status-quo rejection versus status-quo acceptance errors. Although this 
null outcome should be interpreted with caution, I did find significant effects for 
error versus correct feedback overall, just no selectivity for status-quo acceptance 
versus rejection. This hints that the insula activation I highlight is likely to represent 
more than just increased physiological arousal. Apart from a suggested role in error-
processing, the insula (and mPFC) is more generally implicated in reflection on one‟s 
own (or others‟) performance (Bengtsson, Lau, & Passingham, 2009; Kelley et al., 
2002; Mitchell, Banaji, & MacRae, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2004). Despite the 
psychological literature consistently showing that errors stemming from decisions to 
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reject a status-quo are not experienced as equivalent to those stemming from a 
decision to accept a status-quo, to my knowledge the present study is the first to 
address error-processing in the brain in terms of such differences.  
Participants also showed a clear overall bias towards accepting the status-quo. 
Previous literature suggests that past experience of higher regret for status-quo 
rejection errors encourages higher anticipated regret for the prospect of a similar 
status-quo rejection error in the future (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; 
Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1995; Tykocinski, Israel, & Pittman, 2004; Tykocinski & 
Pittman, 1998, 2001). Amplified emotional and neuronal responses to erroneous 
status-quo rejection, compared to acceptance, could lead decision-makers to consider 
accepting the status-quo as the more justifiable choice, thus a subsequent status-quo 
bias (see Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg et 
al., 2002). Here, I found such a decision bias to be associated with activity in the 
insula and mPFC, regions which also show an inflated response to status-quo 
rejection errors at the time of such a preceding outcome. 
Existing evidence suggests that the insula is involved in processing 
information necessary for learning and goal-directed behaviour (e.g. risk and 
uncertainty, Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, & Platt, 2006; Paulus, Rogalsky, 
Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; Preuschoff, Quartz, & Bossaerts, 2008). The 
insula is critically involved in the anticipation of future aversive outcomes, which is 
important for avoidance learning (Ploghaus et al., 1999). It is also an important 
component of the neurocircuitry for stress, fear and anxiety, showing heightened 
activity during experience and anticipation of aversive events in people suffering 
from anxiety disorders (Shin & Liberzon, 2009). Its involvement in anxiety disorders 
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is suggested to be associated with inappropriately high prediction of future aversive 
events (Paulus & Stein, 2006). In healthy decision-making, the insula is particularly 
found to be involved in post-error behavioural modification and response slowing 
(Clark et al., 2008; Hester, Barre, Mattingley, Foxe, & Garavan, 2007; Kuhnen & 
Knutson, 2005; O'Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann, & Dolan, 2003; Paulus et al., 
2003). Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff (2009) provide a functional model of the 
insula, that postulates a role in integrating internal physiological and external sensory 
information, along with their associated uncertainty, contextual information and 
individual preferences, to motivate adaptive subsequent behaviour. The results from 
this chapter are in keeping with a role of the insula in post-error behavioural 
adaptation, in this case encouraging a status-quo bias in response to previously 
amplified emotional (and neuronal) responses to erroneous status-quo rejection in 
particular. 
In this study, I have considered the status-quo to be the previous decision, in 
accord with literature on the functional role of regret in consumer decision-making 
(Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000). In such a case, an inaction bias 
is implied, since remaining with the current decision involves inaction. Under certain 
other conditions, however, status-quos can involve action (e.g. a goalkeeper may 
have a stronger bias to dive to save the ball than to remain stationary). It is currently 
unclear whether an inaction bias and a status-quo bias are independent, or are rather 
driven by the same underlying cause (Anderson, 2003; Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov 
& Baron, 1992; Schweitzer, 1994). In particular, the likelihood of regret may be the 
driving force behind both biases, so the two could be considered as a unitary 
construct for the purpose of this study. Unfortunately, here and in Fleming et al 
(2010), these two possible forms of bias (status-quo and inaction) are synonymous by 
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design. It remains possible, however, that an inaction bias arises primarily or 
exclusively at the level of the motor response, with the effort needed to act or switch 
behaviour a salient feature driving the asymmetric impact of erroneous decisions to 
accept and reject the status-quo. Status-quo biases, on the other hand, may arise at 
the more abstract level of the decision, with features such as the normality and 
perceived causality of the behaviour playing a greater role. Indeed, the fact that I 
found a tendency for participants to repeat their previous form of response (i.e. 
accept or reject), hints at the presence of another form of bias, perhaps at a higher 
hierarchical level than the bias to repeat the previous IN or OUT response. This form 
of bias (or perseveration in choice) appears to be encouraged when the same strategy 
succeeded in the past, as we found it to be strongest after correct trials (see Figure 
7-3). More broadly, I note that perseveration is increasingly incorporated into formal 
models of learning and decision-making (e.g. Schonberg, Daw, Joel, & O'Doherty, 
2007). Future research could address possible differences in the way the various 
forms of bias – inaction, status-quo, and strategy perseveration – are processed in the 
brain. 
In conclusion, I suggest that inflated emotional and neurobiological responses 
to status-quo rejection errors (as compared with status-quo acceptance errors) may be 
a key contributor to the emergence of a status-quo bias. In support of this, I show 
enhanced error-related responses in anterior insula and mPFC, as well as enhanced 
subjective feeling of regret, for status-quo rejection errors. The observed 
asymmetries in neural and emotional responses predict a bias towards the status-quo 
in subsequent decision-making. This regret-induced status-quo bias may also 
underlie the choice repetition effects observed in the previous two chapters. 
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Chapter 8. General discussion 
 
8.1 Summary and synthesis of results 
In this thesis, I have addressed the experiential content of regret, the external 
and psychological antecedents that are necessary for it to be elicited, and its 
motivational impact. Using fMRI, I examined the neural mechanisms involved at 
each of these levels of processing. In addition, three further themes flow through this 
thesis, as discussed in Chapter 1. The first concerns identifying any necessary 
precursors of regret that are currently absent from regret-based economic models, 
with a special focus on the decision-maker‟s attribution of responsibility. Secondly, I 
question whether the actual experience of regret may be associated with goals that 
are distinct from those associated with its anticipation, with these unique goals 
manifesting in behaviour that cannot be easily explained by existing models of 
anticipated regret. The third concerns behavioural and cognitive strategies that may 
be used to regulate the experience of regret. I suggest that emotional regulation may 
need to be taken into account when addressing the experience and motivational 
impact of any human aversive experience. Below I discuss how each of the five 
studies, that comprise this thesis, add to our understanding the role of regret and 
responsibility in decision-making. 
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8.1.1 Responsibility as a necessary antecedent to regret 
The results of Study 1 (Chapter 3) indicate that self-blame should be 
considered a vital antecedent to the experience and neuronal expression of regret. In 
this study, trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret were found to depend on 
subjective and objective responsibility. Using fMRI, I showed a key role for the 
amygdala in this self-blame-dependent regret and for the angular gyrus in attribution 
of responsibility. The pattern of ventral striatum activity in Study 4 (Chapter 6) also 
supports a view that the way the brain responds to regret-related outcomes is 
critically dependent on a decision-maker having a sense of agency, as does the 
behavioural response to such outcomes. Moreover, the results of Study 1 provide no 
evidence for what Connolly & Zeelenberg (2002) term “outcome regret”, i.e. 
showing invariant psychological or brain responses to regret-related outcomes under 
all levels of responsibility. Following Theme 1 of this thesis, these data support 
responsibility as a necessary precursor to the experience of regret, alongside a 
between-option upward counterfactual comparison process. 
Curiously, self-blame does not necessarily make the experiences more 
aversive. Externally enforced outcomes may actually encourage a stronger emotional 
response when one feels hard done by. In contrast to previous studies reporting 
involvement of OFC and cingulate cortex in regret (Camille et al., 2004; 
Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns, 2008; Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor, 
Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009; Coricelli et al., 2005; Liu et al., 2007), in Study 1 these 
regions actually show enhanced response to regret-related outcomes when 
participants were not objectively responsible. This provokes a reconsideration of the 
roles of these brain responses in regret, where activity may in fact be associated with 
externally attributed frustration, helplessness or denial of responsibility. 
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Study 5 (Chapter 7) also adds to our understanding of the antecedents of 
regret. Previous work has shown that regret depends not just on the consequences of 
our behaviour, but also on how easily the behaviour itself can be justified post-hoc. 
An example, supported by the findings in Study 5, is that errors from action (or 
decisions to deviate from a status-quo or norm) result in greater regret compared to 
errors from inaction. Decisions that deviate from a norm or status-quo may induce 
greater regret because they are less easily justified (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). 
Consequently, these results encourage us to embrace perceived low justifiability of 
behaviour as another necessary antecedent to the experience of regret. As discussed 
below, low perceived justifiability may be learnt from previous experiences of this 
asymmetry in regret, and may encourage a future bias towards accepting the status-
quo. Alternatively actions may be perceived, by the decision-maker, as more directly 
causal of its outcome than inaction, thereby amplifying a sense of accountability or 
blame for the error (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991). With 
self-blame as an important precursor to the experience of regret, this may account for 
the action-inaction asymmetry in regret.  
 
8.1.2 Responsibility improves learning of action-outcome contingencies 
Study 2 (Chapter 4) was motivated by the possibility that internal attribution 
of responsibility may improve learning of action-outcome contingencies compared to 
when we are not responsible. This may be due to of a greater incentive to learn 
optimal future behaviours, stemming from the direct personal impact of these 
outcomes. An enhanced focus on between-option counterfactual comparisons, 
associated with regret, might also lead to more efficient learning from the outcomes 
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of actions taken and those (fictive actions) not taken. In Study 2, I compared the 
efficacy of value learning by active trial-and-error against vicarious learning through 
observation of the outcomes of actions performed by others. Here I showed that trial-
and-error learning is consistently more accurate than passive observational learning. 
Moreover, a model comparison suggested that this asymmetry in learning is 
associated with greater attention to fictive information at a mechanistic level. 
Although this study did not directly tap into the motivational effects of regret, it goes 
some way to suggest that two core components of regret (i.e. responsibility and 
between-option comparisons) can be beneficial for learning and decision-making. In 
general, the results also suggest that the descriptive and predictive value of social 
learning theories and reinforcement learning models may benefit from taking into 
account the unique mode through which action-outcome contingencies are learned, 
including the subtle biasing influence of social comparison. 
From the design of Study 2, we cannot be sure that improved learning is 
directly associated with regret. Although active learning benefits from an enhanced 
attention to fictive information, this does not mean that learners are motivated 
specifically by an aim of avoiding upward between-option counterfactual 
comparison. In other words, it is not clear that active learners are motivated to 
minimise regret rather than to maximise relief. Future studies could develop this task 
design, so as to more explicitly test whether actors learn better to be regret-averse 
than observers, e.g. by providing one option on each trial which acts as a regret-
minimizing choice. On the other hand, the pattern of learning deficit shown by 
observers does hint at a relative absence of regret-aversion. Passive observational 
learning was found to be associated with a biased appreciation of the likelihood of 
receiving a bad outcome, and this was associated with a relative inattention to fictive 
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information. This poor observational learning manifests exclusively as optimistic 
over-valuation of low value options. In other words, observers underestimate the 
likelihood of experiencing negative events as observed occurring to others, a bias not 
present in actors‟ direct learning by trial-and-error. I suggest that observers‟ 
inattention to fictive information and lack of personal involvement with the outcomes 
of the actors‟ decisions means that they are not motivated by a possibility of 
committing later bad decisions. In contrast, active learners are motivated by 
anticipated regret during learning, founded in their greater attention to fictive 
outcomes, between-option counterfactual comparison and agency, which motivates 
more efficient and accurate learning, especially for low value options.  
Improved learning with personal responsibility may also explain why, in 
Study 1, self-blame regret is seemingly a less aversive experience than feelings of 
helplessness, frustration or anger associated with externally induced bad outcomes. 
This may be because perceived control over ones future circumstances, and the 
potential to improve them, reduces the pain associated with a current mistake. In 
contrast, helplessness has been shown in animal models to interfere with avoidance 
learning, while also producing stress and reactive depression in both animals and 
humans (cf. review of learned helplessness, by Seligman, 1972). 
 
8.1.3 The motivational impact of experienced regret 
In the remaining three studies, I measured trial-by-trial influences of regret-
related outcomes on subsequent behaviour, with the aim to provide a better 
understanding of the motivational impact of experienced regret. In Studies 3 and 4 
(Chapters 5 & 6) I found a tendency for decision-makers to repeat, rather than avoid, 
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previously regrettable choices. A role of the striatum both in the experience and the 
behavioural impact of such outcomes, shown in Study 4, is in keeping with previous 
suggestions that regret-related learning signals are processed in the striatum (e.g. 
Lohrenz et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2009), although the present findings suggest the 
two processing levels involve different striatal structures. This activity may be 
related to previous findings of increased striatal response and increased desire to 
continue gambling associated with near misses (Clark, Lawrence, Astley-Jones, & 
Gray, 2009), and may be associated with higher sensitivity to anticipated future wins 
that may compensate for the previous outcome. The behaviour is moreover in 
keeping with suggestions that „chasing‟ behaviour (or repeated gambling) in 
response to near-misses provides gamblers with the opportunity to eliminate the 
impact of regret by potentially making up for their mistakes (Loftus & Loftus, 1983). 
From this literature, one explanation for the tendency to repeat previously 
regret-related choices is that experienced regret encourages a desire to make up for a 
previous mistake. If true, this explanation may be important for understanding the 
unique motivations associated with current experiences of regret, compared to its 
anticipation. While anticipated regret motivates us to adjust behaviour so as to avoid 
possible future regret, current experiences of regret are unpleasant and our strongest 
motivation may be to regulate or reduce this experience rather than to plan for future 
avoidance. Others have found that, while fear and anxiety (associated with 
anticipated emotion) promote safety-seeking behaviour, anger and sadness 
(associated with present threat) promote high-risk/high-reward behaviours, in 
keeping with a goal of “reward replacement” (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2000). 
Similarly, while fear or anticipatory anxiety in relation to possible future regret may 
initiate a form of flight response (i.e. regret-avoidance), experienced regret may 
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encourage active attempts to reduce or undo the aversive feeling, or to repair the 
damage with a compensatory good choice or outcome. The latter bears closer 
analogy to a fight response. It may also reflect a form of Loewenstein & Lerner's 
(2003) direct impact of current emotional state, which putatively occurs 
independently of ones expectations about future outcomes and their probabilities (i.e. 
an indirect impact).  
Metcalfe & Mischel's (1999) comparison of hot versus cool processing may 
also be important in the distinction between a direct and indirect impact of regret. 
The putative “hot system” is emotional, simple, reflexive, fast, stimulus-controlled 
and accentuated by stress. The “cool system”, on the other hand, is cognitive, 
complex, reflective, slow, controlled and attenuated by stress. In Studies 3 and 4, the 
hot behavioural effects of experienced regret may take precedent over the cool 
anticipation of future regret, because of the immediacy of the current experience and 
the ambiguity surrounding future outcome probabilities. The cool system is thought 
to depend on the later development of executive control mediated via the prefrontal 
cortex, while the hot system is though to be mediated by phylogenetically and 
ontogenetically older systems, involving limbic brain structures such as the amygdala 
and the striatum. It is possible that experienced regret, mediated by a hot processing 
mechanism in the striatum, influences behaviour independent of any anticipated 
regret learnt from it, which may be separately processed in the prefrontal cortex 
(especially the OFC). That the expected behavioural effects of anticipated regret on 
decision-making were not observed in these studies (i.e. towards regret-minimizing 
or regret-avoidant choices) may explain why we see involvement of the striatum, 
rather than the OFC. 
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The results of Study 5 (Chapter 7) indicate that the regret-related choice 
repetition found in the aforementioned studies might reflect a regret-induced status-
quo bias. Rather than a flight or fight response, this behaviour may reflect a form of 
freeze response. In Study 5, I show that experienced regret is higher after an 
erroneous decision to reject a previous action, compared to an erroneous decision to 
accept it. The fMRI data reveal that anterior insula and medial prefrontal cortex show 
increased BOLD signal after such status-quo rejection errors, mirroring the 
asymmetry in the subjective experience of regret. A similar pattern of signal change 
was associated with accepting the status-quo on a subsequent trial, thereby linking 
error-related activity on the previous trial to a subsequent behavioural bias towards 
accepting a status-quo option. As such, these results point to the status-quo bias 
being driven by previous mistakes that have induced a greater intensity of 
experienced regret. It is unclear, however, if the behavioural bias is a direct result of 
experienced regret, or if it is promoted by greater anticipated regret for subsequent 
status-quo rejection errors. Zeelenberg & Pieters (2007) highlighted decision delay or 
avoidance as a means of preventing or reducing future regret, while sticking with a 
status-quo may also increase the justifiability of the subsequent decision (Chapter 1, 
Table 1.1). A regret-induced status-quo bias may be more in keeping, then, with a 
response to anticipated rather than experienced regret. 
A further question that might be addressed in future studies of this regret-
induced status-quo bias concerns the temporal pattern on the action-inaction 
asymmetry in experienced regret. Gilovich & Medvec (1994) found that, while 
actions are subject to the emotion of regret most immediately following a mistake, 
inactions are regretted more over a longer temporal horizon. The authors suggest that 
various factors decrease the pain of regretful actions over time, including behavioural 
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steps to make up for a mistake, psychological attempts at dissonance reduction and 
the identification of „silver linings‟. On the other hand, factors that increase the pain 
of regrettable inactions over time include gradually increased confidence in ones 
ability to act, less salient evidence for justification of inaction compared to action, 
and the open-endedness of inaction-induced regret that encourages its growth with 
time. Future studies could explore how the regret-induced status-quo bias, and the 
neuronal responses associated with it, are modulated over time. 
We cannot change previous outcomes, as much as we may strive to, and so it 
could be considered irrational to use past experiences to steer future choices. On the 
other hand, it is rational to take them into account if these experiences contribute to 
improved learning from our mistakes, have direct impact on our goals, vigilance or 
effort, or indirect effects on our future expectations. While Study 2 points to a 
beneficial impact of regret on learning, Studies 3-5 suggest that experienced regret 
can also promote inertia or behaviour akin to repetitive gambling which may have 
negative effects on our wellbeing. The different results here may be due to an 
increased uncertainty regarding future outcome probabilities in studies 3-5, 
compared to study 2. 
 
8.1.4 Experienced regret promotes strategies of regret-regulation  
The third theme of this thesis concerns the various behavioural and cognitive 
strategies that can be used to regulate the aversive experience of regret. Zeelenberg 
& Pieters (2007) suggest that one such strategy is to deny or defer responsibility for 
the mistaken action/decision (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.1.c – “Deny responsibility for 
the decision”). In Study 1, individuals were found to actively reduce their feeling of 
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responsibility for relatively worse outcomes, in a manner akin to such a regulation 
strategy.  
These regulatory strategies may also alter the effect of regret on future 
behaviour. I have suggested that regret-related choice repetition, found in Studies 3, 
4 (and perhaps in a different way in Study 5) is best explained by a regulatory 
strategy associated with minimising experienced regret. Specifically, this behaviour 
could be associated with an attempt either to make up for a previous mistake 
(Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.1.a – “Undo decision”), or to improve the justifiability of 
the choice by making it a norm or status-quo (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.1.b – “Justify 
decision”). The results of Study 5, also suggest that similar behaviour may stem from 
a strategy of delaying or avoiding a subsequent decision, as a means of avoiding 
possible future regret (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, I.1.d – “Delay or avoid decision”). If the 
active learning measured in Study 2 is assumed to elicit experiences of regret, then 
the results of this study also emphasize the benefits of regret for improving the 
quality of learning and decision-making (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, I.1.a – “Increase 
decision quality”). 
Speculatively, these regulatory responses may stem from a direct impact of 
experienced regret, and may prevail when avoidance of future regret is not an option 
(i.e. when it is not possible to follow Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.2.a – “Reverse decision 
(switch to alternative)”). It is possible that these strategies come from a higher 
cognitive level and may, to some extent, be independent of a more primitive 
valuation system. If this is the case, the two systems may run in parallel so that a 
regulated conscious feeling of regret may not interfere with an unconscious impact of 
regret on future choice behaviour. In keeping with this, the fMRI results from Study 
4 suggest that regret-related activity (in ventral striatum) is not affected by a 
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decision-maker‟s subsequent behaviour. This provides little evidence for individuals 
suppressing or denying regret (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.3.b) or reappraising the 
quality of the alternative option (Chapter 1, Table 1.1, II.2.b) at the level of the initial 
valuation. 
If individuals regulate their aversive experiences of regret, an important 
question concerns whether regret can ever be truly measured empirically before it is 
actively suppressed. This is an issue that we, as regret researchers, must take into 
account. Future work should directly explore which features of regret are unaffected 
by behavioural and cognitive strategies, and so can be measured regardless. It is also 
conceivable that, by empirically measuring the regulatory strategies themselves, 
perhaps through the observable responses of decision-makers, we can incorporate 
these strategies into future models of regret and its impact on decision-making. 
 
8.2 Implications of these findings 
The findings presented in this thesis not only deepen our understanding of the 
experience of regret and its role in decision-making, but also raise issues for how 
regret can be approached in future research. By developing a fuller understanding of 
the situational factors and internal appraisals that elicit regret, we can then better 
control and/or manipulate these conditions empirically. Traditional learning models 
update the value of a choice as a function of either standard or regret-based (or 
fictive) prediction-errors (e.g. Lohrenz et al., 2007; Marchiori & Warglien, 2008; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). On such accounts the value of a choice option should be 
incrementally decreased for negative or regrettable outcomes, and a regret-averse 
decision-maker should then avoid choice options that are considered most likely to 
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induce regret. Therefore, such models currently provide a poor fit to an observed 
tendency to repeat previously regret-related gambles, shown in studies 3, 4 and 5 of 
this thesis. The descriptive and predictive value of such models may benefit from 
taking into account an influence of perceived responsibility and justifiability, the 
different roles of experienced and anticipated regret (where only the latter may be a 
good predictor of regret-avoidant behaviour), and an influence of regret-regulatory 
strategies that modify our response to experienced regret. 
Understanding subjective responsibility and blame may have wider 
implications in formulating therapies for painful and debilitating life regrets. An 
ability to externally shift responsibility for our bad choices can reduce aversive 
feelings of regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), while understanding that others have 
made similarly bad choices provide justification for our actions by placing us within 
the social norm (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). On the other hand, an ability to 
accept responsibility for our actions can motivate adaptive future behaviours, leading 
to long-term improvements in quality of life. Decision-making in business, politics, 
the legal world, health care, and in personal relationships may also be improved by 
an ability to effectively anticipate levels of self-blame. Indeed, anticipating future 
regret has been shown to have positive influences on decisions in sexual behaviour 
(e.g. Richard, Van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), consumer choices (e.g. Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000), and health related choices (e.g. Lechner, 
de Vries, & Offermans, 1997). Reb (2008) also found that anticipating regret can 
improve the quality of the decision process by increasing vigilance and care. 
The relationship between regret and choice-repetition found in this thesis has 
potential implications for understanding the “chasing” behaviour exhibited by some 
problem gamblers. In a large sample of horse races, gamblers tended to go for long 
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shot gambles (low probability of high possible gain) on the last race of the day, as if 
trying to break even or to make right earlier losses (McGlothlin, 1956). Losing 
gamblers also tended to increase their bets more than did winning gamblers. 
Anticipated regret is also found to significantly increase intentions to play the lottery 
(Sheeran & Orbell, 1999; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2004). Such behaviour may provide 
gamblers with an opportunity to modulate current regret by making up for their 
mistakes. Evidence for a link between compulsive gambling and dopamine agonist 
treatment of Parkinson patients (Molina et al., 2000) supports a possibility that 
dopaminergic projections to striatum may play a critical role here, which is in 
keeping with the role of the dorsal striatum in comparable behaviour in Study 4. 
Moreover, the experience of “near misses” in gambling has been proposed as having 
a similar conditioning effect on future behaviour as experiencing a full win 
(Griffiths, 1990; Reid, 1986), while also being associated with strong feelings of 
regret (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a). Near misses have recently been associated 
with increased striatum activity as well as with a simultaneously increased desire to 
continue gambling, despite these outcomes being rated as more unpleasant than full 
misses (Clark et al., 2009; see also Clark, 2010). Some gambling tools are now 
designed to allow for a higher than chance frequency of near misses (Reid, 1986), 
suggesting that casinos may apprehend the role that anticipated regret and near 
misses play in reinforcing continued gambling, and that they employ this for their 
own advantage. 
This thesis takes a step in bridging psychological, economic and 
neuroimaging approaches to studying regret. Taken together, the findings provide 
some clarification as to which external and internal events cause us to experience 
regret and how we may respond to it, optimally or otherwise. As discussed above, the 
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findings have important theoretical and practical implications for understanding the 
role of regret in promoting gambling-like behaviour in healthy or problematic 
gamblers or in patients receiving dopaminergic neuromodulatory therapy for 
Parkinson‟s disease. Appreciation of the role of regret and attribution of blame in 
optimal learning and decision-making, as well as an ability to predict how regret 
influences individual decisions, likely has widespread practical implications in, for 
example, policy development, healthcare, marketing, advertisement and investment. 
Furthermore, understanding the importance of regret-regulatory strategies in personal 
quality of life, and appreciating how such strategies can be impaired, may help in 
developing therapies for depression and anxiety disorders. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
Supplementary table to Chapter 3: Details of the gamble pairs used in the 
task, including the probabilities of each of the winning and losing outcomes (in 
points) of each gamble option. Gamble pairs 1-24 have equal expected value (i.e. 
[outcome 1 × probability 1] + [outcome 2 × probability 2]). Gamble pairs 25 and 26 
are catch trials with noticeably different expected values.  
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Pair Gamble 1 Gamble 2 
 Outcome 1 Probability 1 Outcome 2 Probability 2 Outcome 1 Probability 1 Outcome 2 Probability 2 
1 80 0.5 -80 0.5 60 0.25 -20 0.75 
2 10 0.5 -20 0.5 130 0.25 -50 0.75 
3 70 0.5 -170 0.5 20 0.5 -120 0.5 
4 30 0.5 -50 0.5 10 0.5 -30 0.5 
5 50 0.5 -30 0.5 80 0.5 -60 0.5 
6 150 0.5 -10 0.5 190 0.5 -50 0.5 
7 160 0.5 -80 0.5 60 0.75 -20 0.25 
8 40 0.5 -80 0.5 20 0.75 -140 0.25 
9 70 0.5 -50 0.5 20 0.75 -20 0.25 
10 200 0.5 -30 0.5 130 0.75 -50 0.25 
11 50 0.5 -30 0.5 80 0.75 -200 0.25 
12 50 0.5 -30 0.5 40 0.75 -80 0.25 
13 120 0.25 -60 0.75 60 0.25 -40 0.75 
14 10 0.25 -50 0.75 40 0.25 -60 0.75 
15 100 0.25 -80 0.75 20 0.75 -200 0.25 
16 80 0.25 -40 0.75 20 0.75 -100 0.25 
17 140 0.25 -30 0.75 20 0.75 -5 0.25 
18 20 0.75 -100 0.25 110 0.25 -50 0.75 
19 60 0.75 -60 0.25 150 0.25 -10 0.75 
20 60 0.75 -20 0.25 200 0.25 -10 0.75 
21 100 0.75 -140 0.25 60 0.75 -20 0.25 
22 100 0.75 -80 0.25 80 0.75 -20 0.25 
23 10 0.75 -70 0.25 40 0.75 -160 0.25 
24 80 0.75 -40 0.25 100 0.75 -100 0.25 
         
25 150 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 -50 0.5 
26 10 0.5 -200 0.5 200 0.75 -10 0.25 
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Appendix B 
 
 
Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs, as predicted by the softmax function of the 
choice-independent learning model, using the mean best fitting learning rates and temperature 
of the softmax. Pairs are labelled according to the probability of a win for each stimulus. Choice 
accuracy is measured as the probability that the model chooses the stimulus with the highest 
probability of a win.  
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Mean best fitting learning rates (optimised separately for chosen and unchosen stimulus 
options) as predicted by the choice-independent learning model for actor and observer sessions. 
Best fitting learning rates were significantly different for actors (mean α = 0.06) and observers 
(mean α = 0.03) (t(31) = 2.47, p < 0.02). Best fitting temperatures of the softmax did not differ 
significantly between actors (mean β = 1.09) and observers (mean β = 1.13) (t(31) = -0.81, ns). 
 
 
 
Stimulus values predicted for a) actor learning, and b) observer learning by the choice-
independent learning model, using the mean best fitting parameters across participants as the 
learning rates and the temperature of the softmax function. These values are shown for the four 
stimuli, each associated with a unique probability of winning (80%, 60%, 40% and 20%). Note 
that the flat portions of each line reflect the blocks of test trials. Here learning does not take 
place, as outcome feedback is not given. 
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Choice accuracy for test trial gamble pairs, as predicted by the softmax function of the 
chosen-only learning model, using the mean best fitting learning rates and temperature of the 
softmax. Pairs are labelled according to the probability of a win for each stimulus. Choice 
accuracy is measured as the probability that the model chooses the stimulus with the highest 
probability of a win.  
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Mean best fitting learning rates (optimised separately for chosen and unchosen stimulus 
options) as predicted by the chosen-only learning model for actor and observer sessions. Best 
fitting learning rates did not significantly differ between actors (mean α = 0.09) and observers 
(mean α = 0.07) (t(31) = 0.71, ns). Best fitting temperatures of the softmax also did not differ 
significantly between actors (mean β = 1.11) and observers (mean β = 1.16) (t(31) = -1.13, ns). 
 
 
 
Stimulus values predicted for a) actor learning, and b) observer learning by the chosen-
only learning model, using the mean best fitting parameters across participants as the learning 
rates and the temperature of the softmax function. These values are shown for the four stimuli, 
each associated with a unique probability of winning (80%, 60%, 40% and 20%). Note that the 
flat portions of each line reflect the blocks of test trials. Here learning does not take place, as 
outcome feedback is not given. 
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